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The Saudi economy is faced with critical challenges due to excessive dependence on oil and the lack of 
other sources of income. The present thesis seeks to study the influence of these factors on the Saudi 
economy and examines the potential implications of introducing consumption and personal income taxes 
on economic growth. This thesis provides a theoretical analysis of economic growth, where the discrete-
time of Barro (1990) model is extended in three chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). 
Chapter 4 aims to describe the Saudi economy before implementing the proposed fiscal policy reforms by 
the IMF. Since oil revenues solely finance productive government spending, Chapter 4 studies how the 
Saudi economy is affected by a negative shock in oil demand. Results of this chapter show that the growth 
rate of government spending is the growth rate of oil profits, . It also shows that although the level of 
consumption is growing slowly due to negative shock, it is indeed increased relative to the previous 
trajectory. This suggests that there is some partially offsetting shift in the level of consumption, which may 
not be obvious. 
In Chapter 5, the model presented in Chapter 4 is extended by introducing consumption tax to investigate 
the effectiveness of these taxes on economic growth. Oil revenues and consumption tax revenues in this 
chapter feed productive government spending. The results show that there are two types of steady-state, the 
exogenous and endogenous growth steady-state, which cannot exist for the same set of parameter values. 
This result demonstrates two main findings. The first is that if the  is sufficiently high (low) for a given 
value of consumption tax, then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) growth steady-state. The 
second finding is that if we set  constant and vary consumption tax, the economy at a certain value of 
consumption tax could move from one type of steady-state to another. In the latter case, the endogenous 
growth steady-state would be preferable because it would ensure a higher growth rate. Consequently, our 
results cast a new light on the possibility of switching regime as we change the policy parameter, and how 
consumption tax can compensate for any reduction in oil revenues. 
Chapter 6 studies the possibility of introducing personal income tax in the Saudi economy and how its 
economic growth can be affected by this type of tax. Two different sources of government revenues finance 
productive government spending: oil and personal income tax revenues. The finding is like chapter 5, in 
which the two types of steady-state cannot exist for the same set of parameter values. However, the results 
of this chapter, contrary to the findings of chapter 5, show that two critical values allow the economy to 
switch from exogenous growth steady-state to endogenous growth steady-state and vice versa. These two 
critical values depend on the rate of personal income tax. The results also show that the personal income tax 
would temporarily reduce the growth rate under certain parameter values, which could be considered as a 
warning to a policymaker. This result indeed contrasts with the result in chapter 5, where the growth rate 
will unambiguously be temporarily increased by an increase in consumption tax. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The economic growth of a country is strongly associated with high production capacity. 
Therefore, a country that produces abundant commodities and is well-endowed with natural 
resources is likely to attain significant economic growth. Understanding natural resources is an 
important aspect of understanding effects on income and demographic changes. Since political 
power can moderate the former, natural resource wealth can generate economic growth with 
strong governance and institutional policies. Among the natural resources, oil has been considered 
to be the most important for a long time. Its importance cannot be compared with any other 
commodity due to its unique properties and its diversity of uses in many areas. The importance of 
oil also lies in the high global demand for it to meet different human and production uses. 
Consequently, it plays a significant role in the economy, whether for producing or consuming 
countries.  
For the oil-rich countries, however, oil revenues coupled with a weak government can damage 
economic growth. For example, corruption and lack of transparency would lead to inefficient use 
of economic resources. Although some people view oil revenues as a curse, effective 
management, well-designed fiscal policy, and an effective democratic approach can have 
significant implications for the economic prospects of oil-rich countries. In other words, the 
optimal and efficient use of oil could stimulate economic growth in the country.  
Saudi Arabia is one of those countries, which are abundant in oil resources. It heavily relies 
on revenues generated from oil to the extent that they determine the fate of the whole national 
economy. In a 2017 report, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA)1 stated that the 
highest oil revenues received by the country were 305.3 billion U.S. dollars in 2012. According 
to this report, oil revenues represented the most significant proportion of total revenues, compared 
with non-oil revenues. The oil revenues contributed to the state's total revenues by more than 80%, 
on average, during 1990-2017 (SAMA, 2018). Figure 1 displays how the oil sector2 contributes 
to the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which shows the importance of oil to the Saudi 
economy during 1970-2018 (SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2019). 
 
1 The SAMA is the abbreviation for the central bank of Saudi Arabia. 
 




Oil in the Saudi economy is the economy's main engine, and its revenues feed the public 
budget by a significant percentage. According to historical statistics, Saudi Arabia's GDP is 
closely related to oil, given that it is considered the most important economic sector in the country. 
In other words, the oil sector is one of the main GDP components in Saudi Arabia, where its 
average contribution to the GDP was about 79% during the period 1970-2018.  
From the below figure, it is obvious that the GDP growth is greatly affected by the oil sector, 
where the GDP follows any changes in the oil sector. For instance, during the 1970s, oil prices 
doubled more than once3, until they reached approximately $35 per barrel, which led to an 
increase in oil revenues. Thus, that ultimately was reflected in the rise in GDP, as shown in the 
below figure. During the 1980s and 1990s, oil prices continued to fluctuate between $12 and $34, 
affected by many economic and political events. These events led to a decline in oil revenues and 
therefore the GDP. However, post-1990s (i.e. at the beginning of 2008 and 2012), oil prices rose 
to unprecedented levels. During this period, Saudi Arabia's GDP benefited from this rise, bringing 
significant income from oil revenues. Since oil prices after that remained fluctuating due to the 
persistence of some global economic and political events, Saudi GDP also remained fluctuating 
due to its excessive sensitivity to global oil markets. As a result, the oil sector is seen as one of 
the main factors influencing the economic growth in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 




3 Historical oil prices (1970-2017) and associated economic and political events will be discussed and shown in the next chapter 











 GDP (Million $) At Constant Prices (2010=100)
 Oil Sector (Million $) At Constant Prices (2010=100)Source: SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2019
15 
 
The Saudi economy consists of several sectors, the most important of which are the oil, public, 
and private sectors. However, all these sectors and their growth are closely related to the amount 
of financial returns from the oil export process, which is the primary engine of the economy (Al-
Saeedi and Al-Otaibi, 2015). The fiscal policy in Saudi Arabia and its tools of government 
spending, fees, subsidies, and taxes are much more important than monetary policy in directing 
and managing the movement of the economy for some reasons. The most important is the size 
and role of government spending represented in the state budget in influencing the economy. 
Although fiscal policy generally includes taxes and public expenditures together, Saudi Arabia 
relied primarily on public spending, where taxes are very limited in the state budget. Still, public 
spending is the main component in economic growth, which is funded by oil revenues, as 
confirmed by Alrasheedy and Alrazyeg (2019), Alshammari and Aldkhail (2019), Al-Obaid 
(2004), and Barri (2001)4. The reason is that it has an impact on all economic activities through 
the support provided by the government for public services on the one hand and the support to the 
private sector on the other. The primary source of income in the Saudi economy is oil revenues. 
Due to the public ownership of oil, government spending has become a key role in injecting these 
revenues into all areas of the economy and leading the economic activity as a whole. As a result, 
there is no doubt to expect that the oil revenues and then the level of public spending and 
eventually the overall economic activity would have a substantial and direct impact due to 
volatility in the price of oil in global markets. 
1.2 Importance of the Study 
The significance of this study is related to the challenges facing the Saudi macroeconomy. 
Saudi Arabia's economy currently faces many difficulties due to oil price fluctuations. Among the 
challenges faced is that oil revenues are unstable because they rely on conditions in the global 
market. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report of 2015, Saudi Arabia has 
experienced three painful periods due to low oil prices. Figure 2 shows that the first period was 
1982-1986. It was a result of a general expansion in the oil sector and an attempt by powerful 
economies to prove themselves efficiently by cutting links with Saudi Arabia, thus paralysing the 
country's economy. The financial crisis of 1998-1999 in Asia and the Global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 were the other two periods that derailed Saudi Arabia's financial system. Notably, the 
latter periods were characterised by a sharp contraction in demand for oil, which slowed down 
global economic activity. 
 




Figure 2: Oil Revenue Declines During the three Historical Episodes 
 
The three periods were a learning experience as they showed the need for Saudi Arabia to 
consider its financial policies. The beginning fiscal situation was weak before the fall in oil 
revenues, with a GDP deficit of about 3% and an unresolved debt of about 70% as a proportion 
of GDP. This situation made the government undertake spending cuts during the oil crisis. In 
2008-2009, oil prices further declined; consequently, Saudi Arabia and the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)5 had to cut production further. These three periods saw 
oil revenues plummet by 50%. Thus, drops in revenues and the contraction of global oil demand 
negatively affected Saudi Arabia's overall economic growth. The IMF has further indicated that 
the fiscal balances later declined, and credit money growth also slowed (IMF, 2015b). Moreover, 
the fall in oil revenues led to negatively affected credit growth. Consequently, government 
revenues fell despite a decrease in government spending to curb the problem. 
Another challenge facing the country is that Saudi Arabia has no effective tax system and 
suffers from a lack of taxation to generate revenues away from oil6. The current taxes considered 
a tiny proportion of state revenues and therefore insufficient. Although the government is always 
required to spend more on education, health, and other social services, the Saudi government is 
currently facing a significant challenge regarding the stability of its revenues and its ability to 
meet the increased need for public spending. In 2015, the IMF released a report that pointed out 
a significant drop in oil prices had the potential to lead to weak growth in the coming period. They 
also mentioned uncertainty over future oil prices, stating that the massive decline in oil revenues 
and continued expenditure growth would lead to a substantial fiscal deficit over the medium term. 
As a result, the IMF provided a set of proposals to Saudi Arabia to reform its fiscal policy because 
 
5  The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960 and comprises currently of 13 
governments. OPEC members include Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Republic 
of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (OPEC.org.2020). 
 
6  The details discussion of the tax system is available in chapter two. 
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the Saudi economy currently has a weak financial system to face the instability of the 
government's total revenues. It is, therefore, essential to focus on alternative revenue sources, such 
as taxes, as a way of ensuring that the economy is not hit by changes in oil prices in the future 
(IMF, 2015a). As a result, since the Saudi economy relies heavily on oil revenues to stimulate the 
economy, it is essential to study how the economic growth would be affected if there is a negative 
shock in demand for oil. Moreover, exploring the possibility of introducing new taxes, as 
suggested by the IMF, would be urgent for evaluating their effectiveness alongside oil revenues 
in the world's second-largest oil economy. 
1.3 Research Questions 
 What would be the impact of a negative shock in demand for oil on Saudi Arabia's economic 
growth? 
 How would the main level variables7 in Saudi Arabia's economy be affected if the level of 
government spending8 reduces due to the fluctuations in oil revenues? 
 How would Saudi Arabia's economic growth and its main level variables be influenced if 
consumption tax is introduced as per the IMF's suggestion? 
 In what ways can the consumption tax compensate for any reduction in the level of 
government spending associated with a decrease in oil revenues? 
 What would be the effect of introducing personal income tax on Saudi Arabia's economic 
growth and its main level variables? 
 Which among consumption tax or personal income tax would be more suited for achieving 
economic stability in Saudi Arabia? 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
Because of volatilities in oil prices witnessed in markets recently, oil can no longer be 
considered a consistent revenue source. The assessment of fiscal sustainability is identified as the 
main problem in developing countries because their structures of tax revenue are often not well 
developed. This situation applies particularly to resource-driven countries and especially oil-
producing countries (Kia, 2008). Therefore, oil-producing countries have been motivated to 
reform their tax regimes in order to increase and diversify their tax revenues (Igberaese, 2013). 
 
7  We refer to level variables in this thesis as aggregate variables, e.g. the level of output, the level of capital stock, the level of 
consumption, etc. 
 
8 The growth rate in our model is assumed to be derived from the growth rate of government spending. Thus, although a level 
variable means a variable that does not represent a rate of growth, studying the changes in the government spending level is 
important not only for economic growth but also for other level variables in our economy. 
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According to Saudi statistics, most of the government's revenues in the country comes from the 
oil sector. Therefore, the importance of other revenues rather than oil revenues has become crucial 
due to the need for stimulating growth and sustainable economic development. Correspondingly, 
the IMF's recommendation to Saudi Arabia is to change its fiscal policy since it depends 
significantly on oil earnings. Among these recommendations is to reform the current tax system, 
which is the focus of this study. 
This thesis is intended to examine how economic growth would be affected if there is a 
negative shock in the oil demand. It also aims to focus on the fiscal policy reforms and find out 
the effectiveness of implementing the proposals of IMF on Saudi economic growth for countering 
oil revenue fluctuations. More precisely, this study seeks mainly to examine the possibility of 
introducing consumption tax and personal income tax and discuss the effectiveness of these taxes 
along with oil revenues in economic growth. In addition, the present study pursues to investigate 
the appropriate amount of consumption tax that could compensate for potential reduction in oil 
revenues. In brief, this study is mainly based on two aspects. The first is a description of the Saudi 
economy and the impact on the economic growth of a negative shock in demand for oil. The 
second is the proposal of the IMF for reform of fiscal policy and the introduction of new taxes to 
compensate for any decrease in oil revenues. The reason behind this is that oil revenues are subject 
to fluctuation and decay. Therefore, stable additional revenues must be available to offset and 
cover recurrent costs in the country. This study will also simulate the impulse responses under 
two different scenarios: economic growth in Saudi Arabia before and after implementing the 
IMF's recommendations. The objective is to assess the effect of introducing new taxes on Saudi 
economic growth. 
1.5 Motivations 
The motivations for this study are based on three main aspects: the IMF recommendations to 
officials of Saudi Arabia, the role of fiscal policy in the Saudi economy in driving the economy, 
and the government's plans which can be summarised below. 
1.5.1 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Recommendations  
The IMF has issued recommendations that developing countries can adopt to improve their 
economic conditions and further increase their income. To do so, the IMF works with the 
governments of developing countries to develop their policies. A case in point is that of Saudi 
Arabia. The IMF has stipulated recommendations in its recent annual reports that are of 
significance as they contain guidelines necessary for boosting growth and extending stability 
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among other integral issues. Their recommendations seek to ensure economic development and 
check risk spillovers in a country whose economy is dependent on oil revenues. 
 The IMF has recommended Saudi Arabia to reform its fiscal policy since the country is 
heavily reliant on revenues from oil. Low oil prices have led to financial instability risks in some 
periods. The fiscal consolidation measures suggested by the IMF to Saudi Arabia could be the 
best way to avoid such situations. The main reason why the IMF has proposed that Saudi Arabia 
reform its policy is that Saudi has a weak financial system, which can be attributed to the previous 
three periods, as shown in Figure 2. Among the IMF's suggestions is a proposal to reform the 
country's current tax system because Saudi Arabia cannot continue to rely exclusively on oil. In 
this regard, the IMF has recommended Saudi Arabia to consider and look for alternate revenue 
sources, such as implementing new taxes. The IMF has given high attention to the imposition of 
new taxes because it could generate significant revenues for the government's budget. These new 
taxes include consumption tax, particularly Value-Added Tax (VAT), and selective taxes on 
tobacco and energy drinks, as a way of offsetting the shocks that have previously affected the 
Saudi Arabian economy (IMF, 2016b).  
The issue of limited domestic taxation was cited in the IMF as one of the most critical factors 
that restrict GDP growth in non-oil sectors. In that regard, the IMF suggests that Saudi Arabia 
should impose a consumption tax of VAT to cope with economic shocks resulting from dropping 
oil prices. The IMF recommendation was based on several reasons for implementing this type of 
tax. First, VAT has proven highly effective in increasing tax revenues, particularly revenue 
collection from the non-oil sector. In 2014, IMF staff estimated VAT revenue in Saudi Arabia 
and, assuming 90% of private consumption, found that if Saudi Arabia introduced a well-designed 
VAT at the rate of 3%, the potential revenue would be 0.9% of GDP. While if the country were 
to add VAT at a rate of 5%, then revenue would likely be about 1.5% of GDP. Second, Saudi 
Arabia has the ability to increase its revenues in all areas, whether through indirect taxes (like 
VAT) or direct taxes (like personal income tax) because they are both available tools. Another 
benefit of introducing a value-added tax would be that VAT administration is quite simple 
compared to different kinds of taxes. It does not also affect foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
exports. It would also reduce the need to introduce some other distortion taxes such as personal 
income tax (IMF, 2015c). 
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Moreover, the IMF has recently released a paper in 2020 called 'The Future of Oil and Fiscal 
Sustainability in the GCC9 Region'. The IMF has urged the GCC countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, to help reduce future financial pressures on the budgets of these countries through 
additional income other than oil. In their paper, they have mentioned that the current financial 
reforms and plans are insufficient to meet the ongoing changes in the oil market. The main reason 
for this is that global oil demand is anticipated to reach its peak in the next two decades. As in 
previous papers, they have hinted that the reform of the current tax system as one of the main 
fiscal policy tools is essential for two main reasons. The first reason is to ensure revenue stability, 
while the second reason is due to the limited taxes in the state (IMF, 2020a). On the other hand, 
although Saudi's officials announced in 2020 that the personal income taxes would not apply10, it 
could be soon implemented in the Saudi economy since the state budget is still tied to volatile oil 
prices, as indicated by the IMF and the statistics. The country, at the same time, tries to reduce its 
reliance on oil. As a result, it is a clear sign that the IMF is urging Saudi Arabia to work on major 
economic reforms. In the same vein, the article of Martin, Nereim, and El-Din in 2020 emphasised 
that the Saudi government is working to accelerate plans to sell some state-owned assets. It does 
not also rule out the possibility of imposing a personal income tax, as it seeks to strengthen the 
state treasury, which has been affected by the recent significant drop in oil prices. In this regard, 
the Saudi Minister of Finance stated that all possibilities are under review by the government to 
enhance its financial resources, and it will take a long time to plan the personal income tax. 
However, although there is currently no imminent plan to implement it, we do not rule out 
anything. 
1.5.2 The Role of Fiscal Policy 
Even though the fiscal and monetary policy are both essential tools for a government to sustain 
and promote the economy, the fiscal policy plays a crucial role more than monetary policy in 
stabilising the Saudi economy. Several reasons make us focus on fiscal policy and its reforms 
rather than monetary policy. First, the fiscal policy in Saudi Arabia is considered as the main 
stability performance criteria of the economy for the government because the Saudi currency 
(Riyal) is set at a fixed exchange rate regime to the U.S. dollar11. Thus, the Saudi Arabia economy 
remains relatively ineffective in monetary policy compared to the fiscal policy. Moreover, in most 
oil-exporting countries, the fiscal policy has changed in recent years as a result of high oil prices. 
 
9 The GCC countries is the abbreviation for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which involve six nations: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
 
10 According to the General Authority of Zakat & Tax (GAZT), Saudi Arabia does not have currently a personal income tax. 
 
11  The Saudi Riyal and US dollar exchange rate has been set at 3.75 Riyal/1 US dollars since 1986. 
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The fiscal expansion has increased inflation, and existing exchange-rate regimes have limited 
monetary policy in the fight against inflation. Simultaneously, the main tool for macroeconomic 
stability in these countries is the fiscal policy (Sturm et al., 2009). Second, the sole owner of the 
country's oil resources is the governmental Saudi Aramco; therefore, it contributes most of its 
profits to the government's budget. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's fiscal policy is essentially the 
only way to transfer revenues from the oil industry to a non-oil sector (Hasanov et al., 2020) . 
Third, the Saudi economy is unique since personal income tax is not available. Thus, expansionary 
fiscal policy is carried out through the dependence of public expenditure on oil revenues. Fourth, 
the most important reforms advocated by the IMF, which we will be focused on in this thesis, are 
related to the fiscal policy. 
1.5.3 The Government's Future Plans 
Following the IMF's recommendations, Saudi Arabia has recently developed a new plan called 
Vision 2030, which basically maps out some of the suggestions of the IMF. It seeks to achieve 
several political, economic, and social objectives. The most significant economic priorities of the 
Vision are to reduce reliance on oil and diversify the sources of national income (Saudi Vision 
2030, 2016). The main reason is that the Saudi government is looking for alternatives and new 
sources of revenue. Some of the policies which have been established to help achieve that goal 
are: 
1.5.3.1 Increase non-oil exports: 
Saudi Arabia intends to increase non-oil exports by building incentive programs to encourage 
exports, focusing on developing the export readiness of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
These programs include, for example, providing export credit financing, customs duty drawback 
and exemption on selected materials, equipment and machinery, as well as loan programs for 
public and private industrial investments. The aim is to find and provide opportunities for 
companies ready to export and work to improve the efficiency of the domestic export environment 
to international markets. 
1.5.3.2 Diversification of income sources through the imposition of VAT: 
As the IMF mentioned in their report of 2015 that Saudi Arabia has plenty of room for 
implementing new taxes, the country has responded to the advice of the IMF by introducing new 
tools that can boost revenues away from oil. Thus, Saudi Arabia recently announced the possibility 
of imposing taxes that could generate other revenues for the government's budget. 
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1.5.3.3 Increase local value by privatising some state-owned assets: 
The government seeks to sell some of the national oil company's shares to the public. Since 
the company's capital is considered very large, the outlook says that the sale of a small percentage 
of the shares of the national company would generate a large amount of revenue. Therefore, 
Aramco Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the centre of attention in the Saudi Vision 2030. The main 
reason for selling these shares is to enhance transparency and look for investments away from oil. 
As a result, the proposals from the IMF, the position of fiscal policy and the government's 
plan all together inspire us to study the economic growth in the Saudi economy and how it is 
affected by any changes in oil revenues and by introducing new taxes. 
1.6 Contributions 
Although our modelling approach presented in this thesis uses a similar approach to some 
applied in the previous literature, it aims to investigate economic growth in Saudi Arabia further 
and contribute in four main aspects to the field, as outlined below. 
In this study, we model the oil sector as an exogenous and monopolistic sector. This approach 
is confirmed by the literature on the oil market structure, as we will see in the literature review 
chapter. The reason for modelling the oil sector in this fashion is that the economic growth of 
resource-rich countries in most research is considered to be affected, both positively and 
negatively, by the oil industries. However, the economic growth literature ignored to analyse the 
market power of oil. In other words, the economic market condition of the oil sector is not given 
enough and detailed attention in economic growth literature. In most economic growth studies, 
particularly concerning Saudi economic growth, the oil sector is treated as an exogenous factor, 
and they examine how the economic activities are only affected when a shock on this exogenous 
sector occurs. In other words, the oil sector is only considered like any other exogenous variable. 
However, due to the great importance and attention of this sector, modelling the oil sector in such 
a way, i.e. as a monopolistic sector, can help us to find out some aspects. For instance, what and 
how the government receives revenues from the sector, how this important exogenous source 
operates, and how it can affect other endogenous variables in growth models. Thus, we model the 
oil sector as a monopolistic sector and discover the government's net oil revenues. As yet, there 
has not been a definitive study that shows and investigates the economic growth and oil production 
of countries where the oil sector is treated as a monopolistic sector. Therefore, our first 
contribution is to model the oil sector as a monopolistic sector in an endogenous growth model, 
i.e. Barro (1990). The importance of the oil sector can be seen in its role in financing the 
productive government sector. 
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The second contribution in this thesis is to extend the original Barro (1990) model further by 
allowing for three different sources of government revenues to finance productive government 
spending. These sources are (i) only oil revenues, (ii) oil revenues with consumption tax, and (iii) 
oil revenues with personal income tax. (i), (ii), and (iii) would be studied separately in three 
different chapters. Thus, each chapter of the three main chapters would have a government sector 
financed by a different source of revenues. In the economic growth literature, there are many 
studies where the government sector is assumed to be an unproductive sector and therefore have 
treated government revenues as a pure waste of resources. However, a few models have 
considered the government sector as a productive sector, such as the Barro (1990) model. Also, 
as far as our knowledge goes, the only paper that examined consumption tax as an only source to 
finance the productive government sector in the Barro (1990) model is Bambi and Venditti's 
(2018) paper. Although we use the Barro (1990) type of production function and follow some of 
his assumptions, our models in each chapter hold some differences from his original model and 
Bambi and Venditti (2018) model. The main differences are as follows: 
 The government spending in Barro (1990) model is financed by only a distorted tax, namely 
income tax. While in the primary model of Bambi and Venditti (2018), government spending 
is financed by a consumption tax. However, our models have different sources of government 
revenues to finance government spending in each chapter. More precisely, the government 
spending in chapter four will be fed by only oil revenues, while two different taxes, namely 
consumption and personal income tax, will be the source of government revenues along with 
oil revenues in chapters five and six, respectively. 
 
 The Barro and Bambi and Venditti (2018) models are endogenous growth models. On the 
other hand, our models may be either exogenous growth models due to the exogenous oil 
revenues or endogenous growth model due to taxes. Thus, one type or two different types of 
balance growth paths could arise in some models. 
 
 In the Barro (1990) and Bambi and Venditti (2018) models, there is no transitional dynamics, 
where the economy is always in the steady-state position. However, each model in our study 
would discuss the stability properties in more detail and represent transitional dynamics, 
examining each model separately. 
Consequently, the second main contribution of this study can be summarised by adding oil 




For the third contribution, as we will see in chapter three (literature review chapter), studies 
that have explored the best methods and strategies to deal with volatility in resource revenues has 
focused on offsetting volatility and shocks through Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) . However, 
the literature ignores the fact that tax reform could be one of the most important fiscal instruments 
to help oil-rich countries maintain stable economic growth, especially in countries that do not 
have many tax regimes. It is true that some oil-rich countries, such as Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries, suffer from a lack of taxation. Although these counties have some taxes, such as 
corporate tax and fees charged to foreigners, they are considered a tiny proportion of state 
revenues and therefore insufficient. Therefore, reforming the current fiscal policy would also be 
better than using SWFs which can be affected by several external factors. As will be discussed in 
the literature review chapter, these external factors may not be controlled by the countries that 
own them. As a result, the study is mainly aimed at investigating the introduction of new taxes in 
Saudi Arabia, as suggested by the IMF, and then to find out the amount of tax to compensate for 
a reduction in the government spending level associated with the decline in oil revenues. In other 
words, this study focuses on offsetting volatility and shocks through tax reforms to help oil-rich 
countries maintain stable economic growth in the event of negative shocks in oil demand. This is 
considered to be the third contribution to this study. 
The fourth contribution is related to studying and analysing the role of taxes on Saudi 
economic growth. Although many studies examined Saudi economic growth, according to our 
research, no research has studied the taxation, consumption and personal income taxes, and 
economic growth of Saudi Arabia. In particular, how different taxes would affect Saudi economic 
growth and how the reforms of the tax system would be a solution to fluctuating oil revenues. 
Thus, since tax reforms in the Saudi economy have not been covered in detail before, this thesis 
aims to fill the large gap of economic growth studies in Saudi Arabia as the fourth contribution to 
this study. Consequently, this thesis analyses the possibility of introducing consumption and 
personal income taxes in the Saudi economy. It is also attempted to contribute a theoretical 
knowledge base on economic growth in Saudi Arabia with and without different types of taxes. 
Finally, this study is also different from previous models developed for resource-rich countries 
that have focused on low-income countries. The current model attempts to fit the conditions of 
Saudi Arabia because it has much scope to implement new taxes, as the IMF mentioned. The 
unique characteristics of Saudi Arabia considered in this study12 make the case study 
more attractive. 
 
12 Saudi Arabia has some characteristics that distinguish it from other countries. Thus, a separate chapter (Chapter Two) is devoted 
to highlight and analyse the Saudi economy. 
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1.7 Research Methodology 
The methodology of this research is based on three foundations: a case study, a theoretical 
model, and a discrete-time method. Starting with a case study methodology, it provides the best 
approach to studying the country's economy. According to Lokke and Sorensen (2014), a case 
study is a positivist or interpretive approach used to enhance the refinement of areas under study, 
such as the economic status of a nation. A case study may also be inductive or deductive, and it 
may rely on qualitative or quantitative methods or mixed-method. Researchers apply it as a way 
of testing a theory. Case studies are valuable tools for testing theories that are usually involved in 
economic sectors. Case study methodologies facilitate understanding of criteria used to set 
economic decisions in a nation. Cases examine a theory by testing whether it corresponds to 
specific goals, analysed results, and generalizability of findings. It is, therefore, appropriate for 
evaluating and validating a particular exception in a country by revealing if the hypothesis is true 
or false (Lokke and Sorensen, 2014). Based on this, we study the case study of Saudi Arabia for 
two main reasons. The first reason is that it is chosen because it is considered one of the world's 
largest oil economies in terms of production and exports. The second reason is that it faces some 
challenges due to its massive dependence on oil revenues and the limitation of other sources of 
income. 
Regarding the types of research papers in economics, there are three common types which are 
theoretical, empirical, and theoretical plus empirical papers together. The main difference among 
these papers is how the research question is approached. Theoretical papers are a complement to 
empirical research, but they are generally used to understand the deep underlying economic 
principles and mechanisms at work. Therefore, theoretical papers make reasonable assumptions 
about the world and the people involved and then determine what should potentially happen if the 
research problem scenario occurred. Even if data is available, economists may generalise how 
individuals or variables behave in certain situations using theory to predict what should occur. On 
the other hand, once data on a problem is available, empirical papers are a natural choice. In order 
to answer research questions, empirical papers use data collected by observation or experiment. 
Data refers to verifiable information, such as events of history, economic indicators, 
demographics. An empirical paper may explain the mutual occurrence of several events. Data 
analysis is a theory that is based on facts and not on opinions (Powers 2012). Our study is based 
on a theoretical framework about economic growth in Saudi Arabia. It is designed to fit the 
economy of Saudi Arabia. There are two key explanations for the implementation of a theoretical 
framework in this study. The first is to provide a theoretical knowledge base on Saudi economic 
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growth, while the second is due to the lack of some data for this study, such as taxes. Thus, the 
theoretical framework is used to extend an existing neoclassical model, particularly the Barro 
(1990) model. 
In the analyses of the theoretical models in macroeconomics, Macroeconomists usually use 
one of the two methods to describe 'state' variables in their models and to deal with time. These 
methods are discrete-time and continuous-time, where their models track variables relative to 
changes in time. Specifically, discrete models are used to analyse variables that occur at specific 
points in time, with the time treated as a countable or finite variable that is expressed in integer 
values. In contrast, continuous models conceptualise changes in variables as events that occur 
along a continuum of time (Brida, Lorenzo, and Yapor, 2017). The differences between presenting 
altered variables in discrete and continuous time are evident in explaining economic theories. For 
example, Brida, Lorenzo, and Yapor (2017) outlined that the continuous-time approach is mainly 
used to present changed variables through growth theory, while discrete-time expresses varying 
instances of business through a cycle theory. However, both reflect the occurrence of changes 
based on a specified time. Moreover, Romer (2012) explained in his book 'Advanced 
Macroeconomics' that the alternative of continuous-time is discrete-time, which uses the variables 
that are specified at specific dates (usually t=0,1,2,..). Typically, the choice between them is based 
on comfort. For instance, the Solow model has the same consequences in discrete time as in 
continuous time (Romer, 2012). Based on this, we use the discrete-time approach because we 
believe that it is elegant and more convenient to use. 
In each economy, there are several determinants of economic growth. These determinants 
depend, in fact, on the economic structure. In Saudi Arabia, the public sector is one of the largest 
dominating sectors in the economy for an extended time, which is financed by oil revenues. 
According to statistics, government spending is one of the most influential sectors in the Saudi 
economy. The graph below shows the trend of real GDP and real government spending in Saudi 
Arabia from 2000 to 201813 (SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2019), where the government spending 




13 To assess the relationship between these two variables, we run a regression to find out if a given correlation is statistically 
significant. Using the data provided by SAMA's Annual Statistics 2019, the results show that the government spending and real 
GDP variables have a significant (strong) positive relationship during (2000-2018), where is r(degree of freedom)=r(19)=0.976, 




Figure 3: Real GDP and Government Spending Trend during (2000-2018) 
 
 
There are a number of economic growth models, but we believe that the Barro (1990) model 
would fit the Saudi economy. The reason is that his model is designed to take much advantage of 
the important role of the government sector in the economy, as it is evident from the statistics of 
the Saudi economy. Furthermore, we understand now that the government sector plays a 
fundamental role as a productive sector in Saudi economic growth, as confirmed by Alrasheedy 
and Alrazyeg (2019), Alshammari and Aldkhail (2019), Al-Obaid (2004), and Barri (2001). 
Therefore, the government sector in the Saudi economy should not be treated as a sector that is a 
pure waste of resources. The objective here is also to use the Barro (1990) model in helping to 
understand as much as possible of the Saudi economic growth. Therefore, the government 






   
To have a constant return to scale, we apply the Barro (1990) type of production function by 
assuming that there is no population growth in the steady-state, where the aggregate labour is 
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The structure of the chapters in this thesis is sequential in one topic but comprises of different 
models. The thesis is divided into seven chapters, where the first chapter is the introduction, and 
the second is the analysis of the Saudi economy. The third chapter is the literature review. The 
fourth is modelling Saudi economic growth before the implementation of the proposed fiscal 
policy by the IMF. The fifth and sixth chapters are modelling Saudi economic growth separately 
with the consumption tax and the personal income tax, respectively. The last chapter includes the 
conclusion, policy recommendations, and limitations and future research. Thus, the three main 
chapters are the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters14.  
Barro (1990) model will be extended in all three main chapters by adding the oil sector and 
taxes and modifying the government's budget constraint accordingly. Taxes will be added in the 
model of the fifth and sixth chapters, where the fourth chapter will only include the oil revenues 
in the government budget constraint. For all three main chapters, the key feature of our model is 
that the oil sector is modelled and treated as an exogenous and monopolistic sector, where the 
growth is basically led by a growing demand for oil. Moreover, by introducing taxes in our 
models, we aim to find out how effective the implementation of the proposals of the IMF would 
be on Saudi Arabia's economic growth to counter oil revenue fluctuations and identify the 
appropriate amount of consumption tax that could compensate for the potential reduction in oil 
revenues. 
Given that there are three main chapters in this thesis, they are all theoretical and based on a 
standard neoclassical growth model along with Barro (1990) production function form. The 
essential difference in these three chapters is in the government budget constraints, where each 
chapter contains different sources of government revenues. However, they all have some 
similarities. One of the similarities is that we convert the main variables (i.e. level variables) to 
per government spending unit (PGSU) variables by dividing them by government spending to 
find the growth rate. For instance, we divide the capital stock, , by government spending, , to 
obtain the capital PGSU, ≡ / , and the same thing for the other level variables. Another 
similarity is that households and firms are assumed to not reach the international market, including 
financial markets15. Moreover, we assume that the government sector has a narrow dealing with 
the foreign sector. More precisely, the government sector just exchanges and uses all its revenues 
 
14 The detailed structure of the thesis will be presented at the end of this chapter. 
 
15  In some emerging markets, the government prohibits the domestic final goods sector to have an international trade or imposes 
high tariffs to protect domestic industries. In our model, however, we assume that just to simplify our model by avoiding 
international trade in the final goods sector. One more reason for this assumption is the fact that the oil exports in Saudi Arabia 
represented a significant percentage of total Saudi's exports. By excluding oil; therefore, the proportion of non-oil exports is a very 




to purchase imported goods16. Thus, government revenues are equal to government spending 
every period. The imported goods are used as public goods, where the government provides them 
to the private sector (e.g. infrastructure, legal framework) to enhance the firm's production 
function. This represents the only international transactions with the government sector in our 
model of the fourth chapter. In the fifth and sixth chapters, besides this, the government sector 
exchanges its taxes revenues for imported goods. Thus, the balance of trade (BOT) in all chapters 
is assumed to be balanced, i.e. there is neither surplus nor deficits. Below are the details of the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters in this thesis. 
In the fourth chapter, we extend Barro's endogenous growth model and describe the Saudi 
economy before implementing the proposed fiscal policy by the IMF. We model the Saudi 
economy, where it is highly dependent on oil revenues. Thus, we simplify the theoretical model 
by setting the oil sector to maximise its profit as a monopolistic sector. Then, the government uses 
them to enhance the firms' production function. The primary assumption in this chapter is that we 
only have one exogenous source of revenue that finances government spending and determines 
the long-run growth. This exogenous source is the oil (monopolistic) sector which faces growing 





Therefore, this chapter aims to answer two of the research questions. In the first research 
question, we examine how Saudi Arabia's economy would be theoretically affected if there is a 
negative shock to the demand for oil. Here the focus will be on the impact of reducing the growth 
rate of government spending on the whole economy. For the second research question, this chapter 
attempts to answer how the main level variables, such as the level of capital stock, output, and 
consumption, would be affected if the level of government spending changes due to the change in 
oil revenues. Despite our primary focus on growth, we also study the change of level variables as 
a special case of our model to determine the difference in the short and medium run. 
 
16 Although this is a strong assumption, the fact is that many oil-rich countries suffer from their excessive dependence on their 
foreign imports. The reason is due to the dependence of their economies on a single commodity for export, oil. Saudi Arabia is 
one of these countries, which relies on imports to meet the essential needs of goods and services, where most capital equipment 
are imported. According to SAMA's annual statistics report 2017, although oil exports declined significantly during the period 
from 2013 to 2016, imports continued to increase, where imports exceeded oil exports in two consecutive years 2015 and 2016. 
Thus, we assume in our model that all government’s revenues use in purchasing imported goods. 
overnment spending at time t; and
Oil revenues at time t
:
:   G
 .:  










The fifth chapter is an extension of the main chapter, where we extend the model by 
introducing the consumption tax, as suggested by the IMF, and modify the model accordingly. 
We use the terminology of consumption tax in our model instead of sales tax or VAT17 for three 
reasons. The first reason is that we set up this kind of tax in the model (i.e. when we give the 
assumption of households and firms initially) and treat it as a legal obligation to pay only by the 
households. Thus, the consumption tax is somewhat different from other types of taxes, such as 
sales tax which is supposed to impact firms' profit. Although there is no fundamental difference 
between the consumption tax and sales tax theoretically18, there is an apparent difference between 
them. In reality, the consumption tax is usually on consumption goods, whereas the sales tax may 
be levied on both consumption and investment goods. Thus, the second reason for treating taxes 
in this chapter as consumption tax is that we ignore taxes on investment goods. The third reason 
is that the VAT affects intermediate goods because it imposes on every stage of production, but 
we do not have an intermediate sector in our model. As a result, there are, in this chapter, two 
sources of government revenues, oil revenues and consumption tax revenues, that finance 





Again, these two sources of government revenues will finance productive government 
spending. Similar to the previous chapter, all government revenues are used to enhance the firms' 
production function, as Barro (1990). To follow up the main economic policy in the country, such 
as an economic reform of the fiscal policy, this chapter aims to focus on four main aspects. The 
first aspect is to generate additional revenues for the government since the country does not have 
enough taxes by introducing consumption tax, as the IMF suggested. The second aspect is to 
analyse the real effects of introducing a new tax on the key level variables, such as the level of 
government spending, capital stock, and consumption. The third aspect is to investigate the impact 
of introducing consumption tax on economic growth. In fact, the second and third aspects are 
related to the third research question. The fourth aspect is to find the possible amount of 
consumption tax that can keep government revenues constant when there is a reduction in oil 
revenues. In other words, this chapter also seeks to examine the amount of consumption tax that 
 
17 In general, sales tax and VAT in a simple model without intermediate goods, such as our model, are very similar. The only 
minor difference between them is the initial model setup. 
 
18 Theoretically and particularly in a closed economy, consumption tax is equivalent to sales tax. However, there is a slight 
difference between them, which is in the initial model when we write down the equations. More precisely, this difference lies in 
firm sector, where sales tax, in general, reduce the firms' net profit.   
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could compensate for the decrease in the level of government spending associated with the decline 
in oil revenues. This analysis tries to answer the fourth research question. 
 The sixth chapter is also related to the previous chapters, but it now discusses introducing 
new taxes. A personal income tax will be presented as a proposal to reform the current fiscal 
policy. The motivation behind studying this type of tax is due to the fact that the state urgently 
needs to create other revenues away from oil. Thus, this chapter pursues to find out how a personal 
income tax can work and affect both the key level variables and the growth rate in the Saudi 
economy. The two main aims attempt to answer the fifth research question. In fact,  this chapter 
is like chapter five in having two sources of government revenues to finance productive 
government spending, but it is different in the type of these sources. More precisely, the two 
sources of revenues in this chapter are oil revenues and personal income tax revenues. Thus, the 





In all three main chapters, the agents in the economy, equilibrium, analysis of the steady-state, 
local stability, transitional dynamics, and numerical simulation will be examined. In the 
concluding chapter, we summarise our previous chapters and our models, and we focus on our 
results. It also attempts to provide policy recommendations and possible future works. 
1.8 Results 
This section summarises our fundamental findings in the three main chapters, four, five, and 
six. In chapter four, although we used the Barro endogenous growth model and his type of 
production function, our model showed different conclusions from Barro's finding. More 
precisely, we found that the growth rate of government spending is the growth rate of oil profits, 
. That means everything in the economy of this chapter grows at the rate of government 
spending, which is the exogenous growth rate, unlike Barro's conclusion. The findings of our 
analysis also indicated that if the growth rate of government spending declines, both capital PGSU 
and consumption PGSU would raise at the steady-state. Moreover, we obtained an interesting 
finding that although the level of consumption would grow at a slower rate due to the reduction 
in the government spending growth rate, the consumption PGSU would be higher. Higher 
consumption PGSU suggests that there would be partially offsetting of the effect of the reduction 
in the government spending growth rate. Thus, our model showed that there is some partial 




    
 









Chapter five also extended Barro (1990) model, where two government revenues, oil revenues 
and consumption tax, finance productive government spending. Even though it is unlikely to have 
a steady-state in which the two sources of revenues grow at a different rate, thinking of an 
equilibrium in which one of these shares tends to zero, and the other tends to one could be a valid 
equilibrium to consider in this chapter. For this reason, we studied three possible types of steady-
states. We then found that two of them involve that the growth rate of government spending tends 
to an exogenous growth rate (type (I) steady-state), while the third possible involves that the 
growth rate tends to an endogenous growth rate (type (II) steady-state). However, studying the 
existence of steady-states of both types showed that there is an unavoidable contradiction between 
two conditions related to type (I) steady-state and type (II) steady-state. Thus, we concluded that 
both types of steady-state growth rate could not exist for the same set of parameter values.  
Based on the above finding, two results have been found in how and when the economy could 
move from a steady-state to another. The first finding was that if we set consumption tax, , 
constant and change . The results showed that if  is sufficiently high (low) for a given value 
of , then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) growth steady-state. The second 
finding was that if we set   constant and vary . The outcomes indicated that at a certain value 
of , the economy would switch from one type of steady-state to another one. More precisely, 
the latter result implies that as we gradually increase , the economy eventually will pass from 
an exogenous growth steady-state to an endogenous growth steady-state. We could interpret the 
critical value of  at which this switch occurs as being the 'take-off' point for the economy, i.e. 
the curve at that point becomes upsloping because high  produces a high growth rate. Thus, as 
 is increased, beyond this point, the steady-state growth rate of the economy is eventually 'freed' 
from the growth rate of oil profits; whereas, until it is reached, the steady-state growth rate is tied 
to the growth rate of oil profits. The switch to the endogenous growth steady-state would raise the 
rate of growth, as high taxes would help provide enough government spending to improve the 
production function of the firms. 
This chapter also investigated how the consumption tax can compensate for any reduction in 
the level of government spending associated with a decrease in oil revenues. In this regard, we 
provided an exercise and derived a formula for consumption tax that allowed us to calculate the 
required tax rate that compensates for any reduction in oil revenues and keep, at the same time, 
the government spending unchanged. Our simple example of this exercise displayed that if the oil 
revenues declined by 10%, the required tax rate to compensate for this reduction is 6.21%.  
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Chapter six examined the possibility of introducing personal income tax in the Saudi economy, 
and how its economic growth can be affected by this type of tax. This chapter also extended the 
Barro (1990) model, where oil revenues and personal income tax finance productive government 
spending. Similar to chapter five, because there is a contradiction between two conditions for each 
type of growth models, the steady-state results confirmed that both types of steady-state cannot 
exist for the same set of parameter values. However, the findings of this chapter, contrary to the 
findings of chapter five, show that two critical values allow the economy to switch from 
exogenous growth steady-state to endogenous growth steady-state and vice versa. To examine 
under which conditions our economy would be in, we investigated two situations. The first 
situation was to change  and fix , whereas the second situation was the opposite. The result 
of changing  and fixed  showed that if  is sufficiently high (low) for a given value of , 
then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) growth steady-state. The second situation 
is the opposite, i.e. keeping  constant and varying . The result of the second situation 
displayed two different positions for the steady-state growth rate. Specifically, if  is either 
(neither) sufficiently low or (nor) sufficiently high, then the steady-state will be an exogenous 
(endogenous) growth steady-state. These two patterns give us a clear picture of having two critical 
values for . The first critical value is when the economy moves from exogenous growth steady-
state to endogenous growth steady-state, while the second critical value is the opposite. These two 
critical values depend on the rate of personal income tax. Consequently, the main results of 
switching from one type of steady-state to another one, found in chapters five and six, are indeed 
unusual in most growth models. 
Finally, the outcomes in chapter six also showed that the personal income tax would 
temporarily reduce the growth rate under certain parameter values, which could be considered as 
a warning to a policymaker. This outcome indeed contrasts with the result in chapter five, where 
the growth rate will unambiguously be temporarily increased by an increase in consumption tax. 
The intuition for why personal income taxes are found to harm growth whereas consumption taxes 
do not is that although consumption tax and personal income tax can provide additional revenues 
to the government, which implies that firms will receive more positive externalities, these taxes 
can have a different impact on other economic activities. For instance, consumption taxes would 
lower current consumption but savings, and therefore investment, would be increased, which 
implies high capital accumulation. Increased investment can increase labour productivity and 
wages, and therefore future output and consumption. On the other hand, personal income tax 
negatively affects private investment and labour supply. More precisely, it reduces capital 
accumulation and can encourage people to work less. Thus, personal income tax discourages 
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capital accumulation and so decreases the growth rate in the economy. As a result, consumption 
taxes would stimulate the growth rate in the economy, unlike personal income tax. 
Before we move to the next chapter, which gives an overview and analysis of the Saudi 










































Diagram 1: The Structure of the Thesis












Modelling Saudi Economic Growth with the IMF 
Proposal (Introducing Consumption Tax)
Chapter VI:
Modelling Saudi Economic Growth 




The first chapter covers the importance of the study, objectives, motivations, contributions, and the research methodology. It also 
summarises the main results. 
The literature review chapter surveys six main aspect: (i) economic growth models, (ii) the structure of 
the Saudi’s oil market, (iii) economic growth in oil-rich countries, (iv) managing oil revenue 
fluctuations in oil-rich countries, (v) taxes and their roles in economic growth, and (vi)  fiscal policy 
and economic growth in Saudi Arabia. 
The fourth chapter is built up on a theoretical framework. Neoclassical model of 
growth is used and modified to describe the Saudi economy before the implementation 
of the proposed fiscal policy reforms by the IMF.  
The fifth chapter focuses on fiscal policy reforms. Here the IMF's 
recommendations are implemented by introducing consumption tax to 
track the economic growth. The model of chapter four is extended with 
the aim to investigate how effective these taxes are in maintaining a 
stable economic growth.   
Chapter six studies the introduction of personal income tax in the Saudi economy. This is particularly 
important considering Saudi Arabia because it seeks to reduce its dependence on oil in the near future. 
Similar to the previous chapter, we modify our early model by introducing personal income tax and 
examine equilibrium, analyse the steady-state, stability, transitional dynamics, and numerical simulation. 
Chapter seven summarises the previous chapters, models, and highlight the findings. It also 
covers policy recommendations and possible future works. 
The second chapter provides an overview of the Saudi economy. We analyse the structure and characteristics of 




2 Chapter Two: Analysis of the Saudi Economy 
2.1 Introduction 
In this research, Saudi Arabia has been chosen as a case study for several reasons. The most 
important being the fact that it is the largest economy in the Middle East in terms of GDP, one of 
the emerging economies and a member of the Group of Twenty (G20), and one of the largest oil-
producing and exporting countries in the world. However, it faces many problems, most of which 
have arisen because of structural economic imperfections. The most significant of these issues is 
the way to deal with the economy where it has been managed over the past decades through total 
dependence on oil, which is a challenge for the country due to fluctuating oil revenues. 
Furthermore, the private sector relies on direct and indirect government support, which is financed 
by oil revenues, to ensure their survival and continuity.  
Based on these economic issues, the importance of deeply studying and analysing the Saudi 
economy has emerged. This chapter focuses on describing the characteristics of the Saudi 
economy, which distinguishes it from other economies. It also aims to highlight and analyse these 
economic problems by tracking economic performance for more than five decades. It includes 
five main sections covering basic information about Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian tax system, 
development and growth in the Saudi economy, the oil sector and its role in the Saudi economy, 
and finally the development plans and current ‘Vision’ plan of Saudi Arabia. The role of the oil 
sector will be discussed in detail because of its importance to the Saudi economy. The fact is that 
the oil sector has been vital to the economic growth of the country. Thus, we also look at the role 
of the government sector, particularly government spending, in driving economic growth. 
2.2 Basic Information about Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is an essential gateway for the world, being at the centre of the three continents of 
Asia, Europe and Africa, as well as being surrounded by some of the most important water 
crossings. It locates in the far southwest of Asia and borders on the North by three countries, 
Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait, on the East by the Arabian Gulf19, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, on the South by two counties, Oman and Yemen, on the West by only the Red Sea. 
 
19 The Arabian Gulf is also called the Persian Gulf. 
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Saudi Arabia accounts for four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, with an area of around 2 million 
square kilometres. According to the Saudi General Authority for Statistics, the nation's population 
stands at 33.4 million with an estimated annual growth rate of 2.64%, males accounting for 57.6% 
and females accounting for 42.4% (General Authority for Statistics, 2018). The national currency 
is called Saudi Riyal (SAR), and the exchange rate between the Saudi Riyal and US Dollar has 
been fixed at 3.75 Riyal/1 US Dollar since 1986. 
 
 
Figure 4: Saudi Arabia Map 
 
2.3 Saudi Arabian Tax System 
Taxation is generally one of the primary sources of revenues for a country to finance its activities 
and expenditures. In a national economy, it plays an essential role and is considered one of the 
key instruments for fiscal, political and social policy. The most important tax functions of a state 
can be summarised as financing state expenditures, achieving the social goal of redistributing 
income, finding a balance in financial policies by encouraging investment in certain domestic or 
foreign products. It also meets policy targets by providing exemptions or incentive measures to 
economic sectors that influence consumption, production and saving habits, and protecting local 
products by imposing higher taxes on imported products and reducing or abolishing domestic 
products. This section will give a historical overview of Saudi taxes and describe the current 
taxation system and how the government receives oil revenues, which constitute a significant part 
of the revenues in the country. 
Source: (Worldatlas.com, 2017) 
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2.3.1 Historical Overview of Taxation 
Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, have practised a system of social solidarity since the 
dawn of Islam through the imposition of Zakat20 on Muslims, one of the pillars of Islam. Zakat 
encourages income distribution because it is imposed on those with wealth and is dedicated to 
helping and supporting poor and needy people. Regarding the role of Zakat as a financial tool, the 
rate of Zakat is fixed, i.e. it does not increase or decrease due to financial need. Also, Zakat does 
not go to the state treasury; instead, it goes directly to the poor and needy. However, due to the 
limited financial resources of states in the past, taxes were imposed along with Zakat to finance 
public expenditure and projects of the state (Alobaid and Atya, 1994). 
According to an International Monetary Fund (IMF), they pointed out in their report of 2015 that 
the evolution of tax regimes has mainly been influenced by the role of oil exports and their 
revenues in financing the government budget. The introduction of taxes in Saudi Arabia goes back 
to 1950, when personal income tax, capital gain tax and corporate tax were imposed on all citizens 
and non-citizens. However, after a short period, the tax law was amended to exclude citizens, who 
only had to pay Zakat. In 1975, as oil revenues improved and the country’s income increased, 
taxes on foreigners were temporarily paused because of the need to hire expatriates to help build 
infrastructure and develop the local economy. The IMF report also noted that one of the main 
characteristics of the Saudi tax system is the absence of consumption tax and personal income tax 
on citizens and non-citizens. Corporate tax is also very limited for non-citizens engaged in 
commercial or professional activities. However, Saudi Arabia imposed 2.5% of Zakat on real 
estate if it is held for speculative purposes (IMF, 2015c). 
2.3.2 Current Taxation 
Taxation in Saudi Arabia is very limited, meaning the contribution of its revenue to total 
government revenue is very small. The current main taxes in Saudi Arabia are corporate tax and 
value-added tax (VAT). Regarding corporate tax, according to the Saudi General Authority of 
Zakat and Tax, Saudi citizen investors pay Zakat while non-Saudi citizen investors are subject to 
corporate tax. The rate of corporate tax is 20% for any of the following: "(1) A resident capital 
company; (2) A non-Saudi resident natural person who conducts business; (3) A non-resident 
person who conducts business in the Kingdom through a permanent establishment" (General 
Authority of Zakat and Tax, 2004, Article 7). Regarding consumption tax, Saudi Arabia 
introduced a 5% VAT rate in 2018 on most countries' goods and services. Later, in 2020, the 
 
20 Zakat refers to Islamic alms and is an obligatory contribution of a particular portion of one's wealth (2.5%) in support of the 
poor, needy or other charitable purposes (The Free Dictionary, 2016). 
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government raised the VAT rate from 5% to 15% due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has 
dramatically affected oil revenues. As a result, Saudi citizens are currently subject to only VAT 
and Zakat, whereas personal income tax is absent. 
2.3.3 Oil Sector Taxation 
The government wholly owns the oil sector; however, the government does not receive 100% oil 
revenues. From this standpoint, our passion is to investigate the distribution of oil income in Saudi 
Arabia. This is because oil is the main engine of the Saudi economy, and oil revenues feed the 
public budget by a significant percentage. According to Abdul-Baqi, Saudi Aramco’s21 vice 
president of exploration (Susris 2004, para 36):  
we are a self-financing company. We sell our crude, for revenue, deduct our operating 
costs. Then pay the government taxes and royalties. The money remaining is used to 
finance our capital projects, and what is left is distributed as dividends to the shareholders, 
and we have been doing this since the company started in 1933.  
Moreover, according to Nat Kern, the President of Foreign Reports Inc., Saudi Aramco pays 20% 
royalties and 85% of its oil profits as a tax rate (Mufson, 2016)22. Although no official source 
describes the exact percentage distribution of oil profits in Saudi Arabia, we have arrived at an 
approximate method for calculating the distribution of oil revenues and profits in Saudi Arabia. 
However, it can only be considered as the researcher’s approximation of the distribution of oil 
income. The researcher estimates that the approximate percentage of oil revenues received by the 
government may be around 94% of total oil profits. The remainder goes to financing the 
company’s capital projects, as shown in Diagram 2. 
 
21 Saudi Aramco is a national company and is one of the world’s leading companies in terms of exploration, production, refining, 
marketing and exporting of oil. 
 
22 The source of this information is an unpublished report by Foreign Reports, Inc. Ideas were then deductively based on what has 





Diagram 2: Estimation of the Distribution of Oil Revenues 
 
Even though oil revenues received by the government may account for around 94% of the 
country’s budget revenues, oil revenues could represent almost 100% of Saudi’s budget revenues. 
The reason is that most of the other revenues come from oil, too, such as petrochemicals and 
petroleum refining. Thus, these additional revenues vary as oil prices change. 
2.4 Development and Growth in the Saudi Economy 
The Saudi economy has undergone various stages of development which differ significantly from 
other developing countries. It has some unique internal and external conditions, where the most 
important of these conditions are: (I) Saudi Arabia enjoys substantial oil reserves, which makes it 
highly ranked among the world's countries that export oil. This feature has undoubtedly provided 
sufficient resources for faster development than other developing countries. (II) It occupies 
importance in the heart of the Islamic world, with Makkah and Madinah being the two main holy 
cities for all Muslims. This has made it a commercial centre and a spiritual centre frequented by 
pilgrims from all over the world. (III) Saudi Arabia has not experienced any external colonisation, 
unlike many other developing countries. Thus, its wealth has not been looted, and it has not 
suffered cultural, religious and social distortion. This has helped it to achieve the social and 
political stability necessary for development. (IV) As development programs did not begin in 
Saudi Arabia until later, this gave it the advantage of being able to benefit from the experiences 
of others. Unlike some industrialised countries, it was able to obtain the latest technology from 
developed countries, helping it to achieve efficiency in performance and low costs (Alobaid and 
Atya, 1994). 
Source: Based on the researcher calculation 
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2.4.1 Development Period Before 1970 
Alobaid and Atya (1994) analysed the period before 1970 in Saudi Arabia, as the early 1970s was 
classified as an interval phase in the development of the Saudi economy. Since 1949, the 
development of Saudi society was influenced by oil due to significantly higher oil revenues. 
Despite the government not intervening in development during that period through a 
comprehensive plan, it was still based on an annual budget. During this period, the state’s budget 
enjoyed surpluses for most years. However, the characteristics of a pre-planning phase can be 
identified in two main regards. The first was being the weak absorptive capacity of the Saudi 
economy, i.e. it was unable to exploit its resources fully to achieve a level of development 
commensurate with the level of the resources. The second was being the Saudi economy having 
the characteristics of a traditional developing country. These characteristics can be summarised 
as low levels of nutrition among individuals, poor education and health. 
2.4.2 Development Period After 1970 
This section includes a comprehensive summary of the most important phases of the development 
of the Saudi economy after 1970. SAMA’s Annual Statistics (2018), AlThumairi (2016), Al-Kibsi 
et al. (2015), Suleiman (2013) have shown that Saudi Arabia went through three significant phases 
between 1970 and 2014: boom, recession and recovery. These stages witnessed substantial 
changes in the local economy due to fluctuations in oil revenues during that period and some 
important economic and political events. The figure below shows oil prices and charts the stages 
of development of the Saudi economy, as oil is the most important economic resource that has 
driven the development movement in Saudi Arabia. Also, this figure is generally indicative of the 
evolution of the price of oil at various stages. Due to the importance of the oil sector, its prices, 
and the revenues generated from it, the stages of growth of the Saudi economy have been 





























































































Oil Prices, the Three Phases, and Related Events During 1970 to 2017 
The first stage 
(1970-1981)
The second stage 
(1982-2002)
The third stage (2003-2014)







Temporary Agreement between OPEC and 
Non-OPEC Members to Cut Oil Production
Low Oil 
Production
Following the Iraq invasion 
of Kuwait
Asian Crisis











Events in the 
Middle East 
and North 




* Increasing oil demand from China and India, speculations in oil markets, disorder and violence in Nigeria, Venezuelan government tensions with foreign oil companies, and events in Iraq.
** Arab Spring is "a series of anti-government uprisings affecting Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2010" (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary).
*** High oil production especially from the United States, declining world oil demand and rising the dollar exchange rate.
Sources: SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2018; AlThumairi, 2016; Al-Kibsi et al., 2015; Suleiman 2013; and the Researcher.
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2.4.2.1 The First Phase (1970-1981) ‘Boom Phase’: 
Economic indicators during this period showed an improvement in the financial and economic 
situation of Saudi Arabia. In the below figures, the average annual growth rate of real GDP during 
this period reached 10.75%. At the beginning of this phase, nominal GDP increased from $8,596 
million to $166,231 million by 1981.  
 




Figure 7: Gross Domestic Product During the First Stage 1970-1981 
 
Saudi Arabia achieved a marked improvement from year to year due to the increase in oil 
production and its prices and revenues. Oil production rose from 1,386 million bpy at the beginning 
of 1970 to 3,579 million bpy at the end of 1981. There was no cut in production throughout this 
period other than in 1975, 1978, and 1981, where the decrease was 16.6%,  9.8% and  1.2%, 
respectively, see Figure 8. Oil prices increased significantly, rising from $1.3 per barrel in 1970 to 
$34.2 in 1981. The price of a barrel of oil doubled more than once, leading to a rise in oil revenues 
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Source: SAMA’s Annual Statistics, 2018
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jumps in oil prices, the first occurring after the October War between Egypt and Israel in 1973 and 
the beginning of the transition of the oil pricing decision of international companies to OPEC, 
leading to a jump in price from $2.7 a barrel to $9.8 per barrel in 1974, an increase of 262%. The 
second jump was the result of an interruption of supplies from Iran during its revolution in 1979, 
and then its disconnection from Iraq and Iran after the outbreak of war between the two countries 
in 1980. Thus, oil prices rose by 65.9%, from $17.3 a barrel in 1979 to $28.7 per barrel in 1980. 
This reflected positively on the general budget of Saudi Arabia, where oil revenues rose in the last 
two years of the period to $85,148 and $87,625 million in 1980 and 1981, respectively, as shown 
in Figure 9. 
 
   
Figure 8: Saudi Crude Oil Production During the First Stage 1970-1981 
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When comparing the first and last years of this stage, we find that the proportion of oil revenues 
rose very significantly during the ten years, reaching 4514%. This prompted the government to 
adopt successive increases in spending, rising from $1,678 million in 1970 to $75,906 million in 
1981. Figure 10 displays how government spending sharply increased in this phase. Current 
government spending accounted for nearly 52%, while government investment spending was 48%, 
see Figure 11. The reason for this allocation of government spending and investment was the need 
to meet basic needs and obtain equipment such as defence, public administration, transport, 
communications, education and vocational training, and cultural affairs. 
 
Figure 10: Nominal Government Spending During 1970-1981 
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The period also witnessed a significant increase in the average income per capita, which rose from 
$1,432 in 1971 to $16,997 in 1981, as shown in Figure 12, meaning the average rise in the average 
income during this period was 1087%. Thus, it is clear that the period 1970-1981 was one of the 
most critical stages witnessed by Saudi Arabia because of its prosperity, growth and high levels of 
welfare. 
 
Figure 12: Average Income Per Capita During the First Stage 1970-1981 
 
2.4.2.2 The Second Phase (1982-2002) ‘Recession Phase’: 
The second period witnessed an economic recession. Figure 13 displays that the average annual 
real GDP growth rate dropped to 0.47% during the period, which can be considered very low 
compared to the previous boom phase. The nominal GDP fluctuated during this period, increasing 
and decreasing until it reached $189,605 million in 2002, where it was $140,089 million at the 
beginning of this phase, see Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Gross Domestic Product During the Second Stage 1982-2002 
 
During this phase, economic and political events significantly impacted oil prices (see Figure 5) 
and other macroeconomic variables in Saudi Arabia. During the period, oil prices fell from $27.5 
a barrel in 1985 to $13.73, $17.23, and $13.40 per barrel in 1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively. 
The main reason for this was the temporary agreement to reduce production between OPEC and 
non-OPEC members. For this reason, Saudi Arabia’s response was production reduction to a low 
of 3.2 million barrels per day (MMbbl/bpd) in 1985, equivalent to 1,159 MMbbl a year, as can be 
seen in Figure 15. As a result, oil revenues were negatively affected, reaching a low of 11,323, 
17,974, and 12,905 million dollars during the period 1986-1988, see Figure 16. After that, oil 
prices remained relatively stable but fell again to a low of $12.2 per barrel during 1998, affected 
by some events such as the Iraq and Kuwait war and the Asian financial crisis. 
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Figure 16: Oil Revenues During the Second Stage 1982-2002 
 
Therefore, government spending during this period remained weak and low, between $36-68 
million. However, in the early 1990s, government spending rose due to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
Most of the government spending was in current government spending, reaching an average of 
79% during this phase, as shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Annual Current and Capital Government Spending: 1982-2002 
  
 
Besides, Figure 19 demonstrates how the average income per capita at this stage negatively 
impacted. It decreased from $16,997 in 1981 to $8,821 in 2002, a decrease of 48%. Although the 
last years of this phase witnessed a marked improvement in oil prices and consequently oil 
revenues due to the increase in American and Asian demand as well as the growth of the global 
economy, this stage led to much economic instability. The reason behind that is because of its total 
reliance on oil revenues, which was frequently fluctuated. 
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2.4.2.3 The Third Phase (2003-2014) ‘Recovery Phase’: 
The third phase witnessed a recovery in the Saudi economy compared to the previous recession. 
Figure 20 displays that the average annual growth rate of real GDP in this phase was 5.03%. The 
nominal GDP increased to historical levels in this phase, reaching $756,350 million in 2014, see 
Figure 21. 
 
Figure 20: GDP Growth Rate at Constant Prices During the Third Stage 2003-2014 
 
 
Figure 21: Gross Domestic Product During the Third Stage 2003-2014 
 
There were unprecedented increases in oil prices from 2003 to 2014, as shown in Figure 5. The 
average price of oil reached $31.11 a barrel as a result of increased US demand and growth of 
Asian demand as well. In 2008, oil prices rose to $95.16 a barrel because of many economic and 
political factors. For example, there was an increased oil demand from China and India, 
speculation in oil markets, disorder and violence in Nigeria, tensions between the Venezuelan 
government and foreign oil companies, and political events in Iraq. This was followed by the 
global financial crisis in 2008-2009, which caused the price of oil to decline by 35.6% to reach 
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‘Arab Spring’, was that oil prices rose again, but this time significantly, reaching $110.22 a barrel 
in 2012. Although Saudi oil production during this period remained relatively stable at an average 
daily output of about 9.06 million bpd, oil revenues were positively affected by the events that 
took place. From the beginning of this stage, oil revenues increased to reach $262,231 million in 
2008 and then fell by 55.8% due to the global financial crisis. After that, oil revenues began to 
recover to a maximum of $305,284 million in 2012, as shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 22: Saudi Crude Oil Production During the Third Stage 2003-2014 
 
  
Figure 23: Oil Revenues During the Third Stage 2003-2014 
 
The recent increase in oil revenues prompted the government to adopt increases in spending, rising 
from $68,533 million in 2003 to $304,160 million in 2014. The average current government 
spending was 77%, while the average government investment spending was 23%, see Figure 25. 
The increase in current government spending was due to the government’s desire to raise standards 
of living, improve the population’s quality of life, provide job opportunities for citizens, and 
expand quantitative and qualitative education, training, health and social services. The average 
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Figure 26. Finally, compared to the previous stage, the Saudi economy tried to get out of the 




Figure 24: Nominal Government Spending During 2003-2014 
 
 
Figure 25: Annual Current and Capital Government Spending: 2003-2014 
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2.5 The Oil Sector and Its Role in the Saudi Economy 
Saudi Arabia is one of the oil-rich countries. It is considered the world’s largest and most 
significant oil country in terms of oil reserves, output, exports, and refining capacity. Saudi 
Arabia’s oil exports are primarily linked to Saudi production decisions because oil is the main 
commodity of the country that is exported abroad. According to OPEC, Saudi Arabia owns 18% 
of the proven oil reserves of the world. The oil and gas industry represents approximately 70% of 
export income. Moreover, Saudi Arabia in 2015 was one of the top three crude oil-producing 
countries (OPEC, 2018). Also, the oil sector's average contribution to the GDP was about 79% 
during the period 1970-2017 (SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2018). Thus, oil in the Saudi economy 
is the main driver of the economy, and its revenues feed the public budget to a significant extent. 
As a result, it is not surprising that the Saudi economy is described as a one-commodity economy. 
This section will be divided into four parts to discuss the significant role of the oil sector in the 
Saudi economy and the country’s economic development programs. Briefly, it covers the 
following: the importance of the oil sector in the Saudi economy, the characteristics of oil 
production economics, Saudi Arabia’s role in global oil markets, and finally the connection 
between global demand for oil and global economic growth. 
2.5.1 The Importance of the Oil Sector to the Saudi Economy 
There is no doubt that the oil sector in the Saudi economy has played a significant role in boosting 
growth and development. The massive financial revenues generated by its exports have 
contributed to the large government spending of Saudi Arabia and the financing of various 
development projects. The importance of the oil sector in the Saudi economy can be highlighted 
through the subsequent brief sections. 
2.5.1.1 A Large Proportion of GDP is Produced in this Sector 
The oil sector contributes a large share of GDP, with the average contribution rate between 1970-
2000 being 43.4%. During the period 2001-2017, the average contribution to GDP was 42.5%. 
Although this percentage has gradually declined over the past five years as a natural result of 
efforts to diversify the local economy, the oil sector remains the dominant sector in the 




Figure 27: The Average Contribution of Oil and Non-
Oil Sectors to GDP During 1970-2000 
Figure 28: The Average Contribution of Oil and 
Non-Oil Sectors to GDP During 2001-2017 
 
 
2.5.1.2 Oil Exports and Derivatives Represent the Bulk of the Total Value of Exports 
Saudi Arabia undeniable relies heavily on the export of oil and other petroleum products. The 
following figure clearly indicates the dominance of oil exports in the exports sector during the last 
12 years. Looking at historical data of Saudi exports during the period 2005-2017, provided by the 
annual report of SAMA (2018), it is obvious that a huge part of exports comprises oil exports, with 
the average oil exports representing approximately 84%. However, this percentage does not reflect 
the real statistics since petrochemical exports are included as non-oil exports in official statistical 
reports. We believe that petrochemical exports should be included in oil exports for two reasons. 
The first reason is that a report by European Business states that the primary raw materials used in 
the manufacture of petrochemicals are typically obtained from oil and gas (European Business, 
2006). The second reason is that the primary source of petrochemicals is crude oil, which is reused 
more than once to get petrochemical products. As long as petrochemical production come initially 
from oil, it should be treated under oil production. Therefore, if we add petrochemical exports with 
oil exports, then the average oil exports of Saudi Arabia during the same period, 2005-2017, would 





Source: The First Annual Report of SAMA, 2015 & 










Figure 29: Oil and Non-Oil Exports Percentage of Total Exports 
 
2.5.1.3 The Oil Sector is Considered the Main Source of State Revenues 
Saudi’s dependence on the export of oil and other petroleum products is, therefore, a result of 
significant financial revenues. There is no doubt that these huge oil revenues have enabled Saudi 
Arabia to increase government spending and the financing of various development projects, 
putting the state in a good development situation compared to many developing countries. 
However, this exposes the economy to great fluctuations due to the instability of oil prices and 
hence its revenues. 
The figure below shows that oil revenues represent most of the country’s revenues. The average 
contribution of oil revenues accounted for more than 80% of the state's total revenues from 1990 
to 2017. The increase in oil revenues resulted from the increase in global oil demand during the 
same period. Indeed, the average global oil demand rose from 66.53 million bpd in 1990 to 98.19 
million bpd in 2017, an increase of 47.6%, which led to higher oil prices that reflected on Saudi 
oil revenues (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018). 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
4.31% 5.00% 5.79% 5.03% 7.86% 5.58% 4.53% 4.58% 5.03% 5.71%
9.82% 10.63% 9.24%
95.69% 95.00% 94.21% 94.97% 92.14% 94.42% 95.47% 95.42% 94.97% 94.29% 90.18% 89.37% 90.76%
Years Percentage of Non-Oil Exports
Percentage of Oil Exports *
* Petrochemical exports are included in oil exports.
Source: SAMA's Annual Statistics, 2018.
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2.5.2 Characteristics of Oil Production Economics in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi oil production is characterised by properties that distinguish it from other oil-producing 
countries, meaning it occupies a unique position in the global oil market, as outlined below.            
(I) The vast size of the proven oil reserves in Saudi Arabia, estimated in 2017 at 266.2 billion 
barrels, is equivalent to 16% of the world’s reserves. This makes it the second country after 
Venezuela in terms of proven oil reserves (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018). These 
substantial oil reserves and continuous production for a long time has made Saudi Arabia occupy 
a distinguished position in the global oil field. (II) The geographical location of Saudi Arabia 
makes it at the junction of most continents, see Figure 4. Thus, its location undoubtedly reduces 
the cost of transportation to various consumer markets in the world (Alobaid and Atya, 1994).   
(III) Lower production costs are common for Saudi oil compared to production costs in other 
regions for the following reasons: the availability of large reserves, advanced technology and the 
geological nature of Saudi oil wells, namely a few dry wells and abundant production and the 
decline of most deep wells (Alobaid and Atya, 1994). (IV) The diversity of oil production in Saudi 
Arabia means it produces various types of oil, such as Arabian Heavy, Arabian Medium, Arabian 
Light, Arabian Extra Light, and Arabian Super Light, which allows it to occupy a distinguished 
position in the oil market (Saudi Aramco, 2017). (V) It has the availability of infrastructure, 
production facilities, refining, transportation and distribution of crude oil and refined products, as 
well as the presence of integrated petrochemical plants (Saudi Aramco, 2017). These unique 
characteristics of Saudi oil production make it an essential global supplier of oil. They also enable 
Saudi Arabia to act as a prominent leader in the oil market, particularly in the OPEC. 
2.5.3 The Role of Saudi Arabia in the Global Oil Market 
Saudi Arabia plays a significant role in the global oil market to meet the increasing global oil 
demand. It has been able to increase production quickly due to its excess production capacity of 
more than 2.7 million bpd, representing over than half of the world’s surplus capacity. The table 
below displays the total oil production in Saudi Arabia in 2017, at 11.950 million bpd, representing 
about 13% of the total daily world oil production. Despite the oil production in the United States 
exceeding Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2017, oil production in Saudi Arabia had the largest 
share of the daily output in previous years. Saudi Arabia is the second-largest country in terms of 
proven oil reserves, reaching 266.2 billion barrels, or 16% of the world’s reserves, where 
Venezuela is the largest country in terms of proven oil reserves. The main reason for this goes 
back to 2008 when there were disputes between the Venezuelan government and foreign oil 
companies operating there, which led to reduced oil exports. As a result, Venezuela accumulated 
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oil until it reached 303.2 billion barrels in 2017, equivalent to 18% of global reserves (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018). By the provision of the necessary supply of oil, Saudi 
Arabia has been able to take a significant role in the global oil market and make a positive 
contribution to global economic stability. The following table shows a comparison between the 
most significant oil countries in terms of the size of production and proven oil reserves. 




(Thousands Per Day) 
Oil Proved Reserves 
(Thousands Million Barrels) 
2017 % 2017 % 
United States 13,056.99 14.1% 50.0 2.9% 
Canada 4,830.63 5.2% 168.9 10.0% 
Mexico 2,224.15 2.4% 7.2 0.4% 
Brazil 2,733.99 3.0% 12.8 0.8% 
Venezuela 2,110.20 2.3% 303.2 17.9% 
Norway 1,968.87 2.1% 7.9 0.5% 
United Kingdom 999.13 1.1% 2.3 0.1% 
Russian Federation 11,257.26 12.2% 106.2 6.3% 
Iran 4,981.68 5.4% 157.2 9.3% 
Iraq 4,519.96 4.9% 148.8 8.8% 
Kuwait 3,025.44 3.3% 101.5 6.0% 
Qatar 1,915.83 2.1% 25.2 1.5% 
Saudi Arabia 11,950.84 12.9% 266.2 15.7% 
United Arab Emirates 3,935.27 4.2% 97.8 5.8% 
Algeria 1,540.27 1.7% 12.2 0.7% 
Angola 1,674.39 1.8% 9.5 0.6% 
Libya 864.56 0.9% 48.4 2.9% 
Nigeria 1,987.75 2.1% 37.5 2.2% 
China 3,845.94 4.2% 25.7 1.5% 
Other countries 13,225.46 14.3% 108.2 6.4% 
Total World 92,648.6 100.0% 1,696.6 100.0% 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018 
 
2.5.4 Global Demand for Oil and Its Relationship to Global Economic Growth 
Looking at the data, it can be observed that there has been a growing demand for oil over time in 
recent years, which could be based on several factors. One possible reason for this increase in 
demand for oil over time could be economic growth in the rest of the world, leading to some 
countries demanding more oil. Developing countries, especially China and India, are growing 
rapidly due to industrialisation, which is one reason for increased oil demand globally (Kumhof 
and Muir, 2012). Several reports from OPEC emphasise that China has one of the highest demands 
for oil. The oil demand from China alone over the last ten years was 100.6 million bpd, accounting 
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for 11.15% of the total world oil demand during the period 2008 to 2017 (Annual reports of OPEC, 
2018, 2015, and 2011). Based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2018), the US, 
China, Japan, and India were the main four countries in terms of oil consumption. They consumed 
almost 378 million bpd over the last ten years, representing 41.3% of total oil consumption in the 
world. On the other hand, the average GDP growth rates of these countries during 2008-2017 were 
1.61%, 8.11%, 0.73% and 7.39%, respectively (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018). 
Thus, it seems evident that there is a link between world oil demand and world real GDP, where 
their data need to be considered to understand if there is a significant correlation between these 
two variables. 
According to the World Bank (2018), world real GDP (at constant 2010 US price) grew from 
$19.11 trillion to $80.08 trillion during the period 1970-2017, with an annual average growth rate 
of 3.14% (The World Bank, 2018). In the same direction, world oil demand grew from 45.23 
million bpd in 1970 to 98.19 million bpd in 2017, representing a rise of 117% during the same 
period, with an annual average growth rate of 1.7% (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2018). From the available data, we show in Figure 31, the relationship between world oil demand 
and world real GDP during 1970-2017. To find out if the relationship between them is statistically 
significant or not, we run a regression to assess whether a given correlation is statistically 
significant. The data was obtained from the World Bank and BP statistical review of world energy 
for the period 1970-2017. The result displayed a significant (strong) positive relationship between 
world real GDP and world oil demand, where is r (degree of freedom) = r (46) = 0.989, P-value   
< 0.001. This result could be evidence that since the Saudi economy is highly dependent on oil 
revenues, it is also true that the economy would be affected by the world real GDP. 
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2.6 Development Plans and Vision 2030 
This section will discuss two main phases of planning in Saudi Arabia: firstly, the ten five-year 
plans from 1970 to 2020 (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2018; General Authority for 
Statistics, 2016) and secondly, the plan which is called Vision 2030 (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). 
2.6.1 Development Plans 1970-2020 
Saudi Arabia has recognised the importance of planning to achieve development performance and 
has embarked on comprehensive planning as a development method since 1970. Ten development 
plans have been approved from 1970 to 2020. Saudi Arabia has so far implemented these 
development plans, through which it has achieved distinguished experience in development 
projects with the major objectives and ambitions of coping with all economic and social change. 
Each plan contains five-years and has some economic and social goals to be achieved during 
specific years.   
Even though Saudi Arabia has achieved much in building infrastructure, services, and productive 
sectors over the past fifty years of development, these plans were affected by all the phases that 
the Saudi economy went through, which has previously been analysed: boom, recession, and 
recovery. The boom period included the first and second five development plans. In this period, 
oil production and its revenues were grown fast; thus, its revenues were devoted to building the 
necessary equipment that the country needs. Most of the goals of these plans have been 
accomplished. The second phase was the recession, which involved the third five-year plan to the 
mid of the seventh five-year plan. Although ambitious strategic plans were put in place to be 
achieved during this period, the instability of oil revenues and their significant fluctuations limited 
the implementation of many of them. However, in the next period, i.e. the recovery phase, oil 
revenues increased unprecedentedly, which helped the decision-maker to draw applicable future 
policies and plans. Finally, all development plans were designed to a fundamental basis for 
economic development but relying solely on oil to finance these plans led to the postponement of 
some of the desired objectives to the following plans. As a result, it has emerged that serious 
research is necessary for other income sources that reduce oil dependency and assist the planner 
in drawing up plans to be executed within a defined period. Thus, an ambitious plan has been 
established and designed to achieve these goals in addition to other objectives. 
2.6.2 Vision 2030 
Although Saudi Arabia occupies a superior position among the world’s countries, it has earnestly 
sought to move the economy away from relying on oil revenues by adopting a vision of high 
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ambition to be achieved by 2030. Thus, the Saudi Council of Ministers agreed in 2016 on Vision 
2030, which has many economic, political and social objectives. On the economic side, the Vision 
was built on some of the IMF’s recommendations to implement many reforms in the Saudi 
economy. Among these reforms are the following: 
2.6.2.1 Increase non-oil exports: 
Saudi Arabia intends to increase non-oil exports by building incentive programs to encourage 
exports, focusing on developing the export readiness of small and medium-sized enterprises. These 
programs include, for example, providing export credit financing, customs duty drawback and 
exemption on selected materials, equipment and machinery, as well as loan programs for public 
and private industrial investments. It also seeks to create a unique logistics platform, regional and 
international integration, and support for national companies. The aim is to increase the ratio of 
non-oil exports to non-oil GDP to 50%. It also aims to advance the rank of Saudi Arabia in the 
Logistics Performance Index from 49th to 25th globally and be the first regionally. 
2.6.2.2 Diversification of income sources : 
The country has responded to the advice of the IMF by introducing new tools that can boost 
revenues away from oil. Through diversifying sources of income by the imposition of a value-
added tax and launching promising sectors, the country aims to increase the annual non-oil 
revenues from 163 billion riyals to one trillion riyals (i.e. from $43.5 to $266.7 billion). Moreover, 
it pursues to bolster small and medium-sized enterprises and productive families, in addition to the 
non-profit sector. The objective is to increase the participation of small and medium-sized business 
towards GDP from 20% to 35%, lower the unemployment rate from 11.6% to 7%, raise the savings 
rate from 6% to 10%, and raise the share of the non-profit sector in GDP to 5%. 
2.6.2.3 Increase local value by privatising some state-owned assets : 
The government seeks to maximise the investment capacity and allocation of some government 
services. For instance, it plans to sell a small part of the national oil company’s shares (Saudi 
Aramco) to enhance transparency and look for investments away from oil. The goal is to raise the 
share of foreign direct investment to GDP from 3.8% to 5.7% and the value of Public Investment 
Fund23  assets from 600 billion riyals to over 7 trillion Saudi riyals (i.e. from $160 billion to $1.87 
trillion). 
 




This chapter has described the Saudi economy during the period from 1970 to 2017. It is obvious 
from our analysis that the Saudi economy can be described as a single-commodity economy. As 
mentioned before, the economy relies significantly on oil, which is wholly owned by the 
government, where its revenues contribute by more than 80% of the total state revenues. These 
revenues are the primary source of public spending, and therefore most economic sectors, 
especially the private sector, depend on government support to ensure their survival and continuity. 
In fact, the Saudi economy, especially economic growth, is heavily influenced by government 
spending. The fluctuation rate of real GDP growth is linked to the fluctuations in the growth of 
government spending, and the latter is also related to fluctuations and instability of oil prices. 
Therefore, we can say that government spending is one of the most essential pillars of economic 
growth in the country. As a result, the two most significant challenges facing the economy are its 
primary reliance on oil revenues and the desire to diversify its income sources. Thus, the Vision 
2030 plan has been presented as a road map towards achieving many economic and social reforms. 




3 Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the factors that influence 
the economic growth in oil-rich countries, especially Saudi Arabia24. Towards this, the present 
chapter reviews the literature in this area under six main themes: (i) the economic growth models, 
(ii) the structure of the oil market: Saudi's oil sector, (iii) economic growth in oil-rich countries, 
(iv) managing oil revenue fluctuations in oil-rich countries, (v) taxes and their roles in economic 
growth, and finally (vi) fiscal policy and economic growth in Saudi Arabia. There are two main 
reasons behind searching in different themes. The first is due to the fact that the issues discussed 
in this thesis are overlapped. The second is to give us a deeper understanding of the works most 
related to what is being proposed in the present research. 
3.2 Economic Growth Models 
An analysis of neoclassical growth models shows that economic models could be classified 
into exogenous and endogenous growth models. In exogenous growth models, factors that affect 
the long-term growth rate are assumed to be determined outside the model, like technological 
progress and population growth. Solow and Ramsey's growth models were seen as prominent 
examples in the area of exogenous growth models. Ramsey's model is considered much more 
technically complex. However, the main difference between the two models is that agents and 
planners in the Solow model follow a simple linear rule of consumption and investment. While, 
the Ramsey's model, on the other hand, considers maximising the utility of agents and planners, 
and therefore choosing consumption and investment optimally (Angeletos, 2013). Hence, the 
objective of the Ramsey growth model is to maximise welfare. Further, exogenous growth models 
usually deal with a closed economy where households and firms are considered primary agents. 
Households are expected to maximise their lifetime utility based on an intertemporal budget 
restriction, while firms are anticipated to increase profits based on their factor accumulation 
constraints. 
These exogenous growth models differ from endogenous growth models. The factors of long-
term economic growth rate in endogenous growth models are set within the model. Endogenous 
growth models focus more on technology or knowledge, investment in human capital, research 
 
24 All chapters in this thesis have overlapping themes of one topic; therefore, we believe that combining the concerned literature 




and development (R&D), and institutions promoting economic growth. There are some 
endogenous growth models that have been discussed in the literature, such as Rebelo (1991), 
Romer (1986), and Arrow (1962). Barro (1990) illustrated how decentralised choices could lead 
to sub-optimal and Pareto optimal saving and economic growth rates in their models. These models 
depended on constant returns25 to private capital, where human and non-human capital are 
included. Along similar lines, Barro followed the aspects of this approach by introducing a public 
sector into a simple model and assuming constant returns of economic growth instead of 
diminishing returns.  
Our study is based on the Robert Barro (1990) model; therefore, it is imperative to understand 
this model more deeply. In Barro's (1990) paper on, 'Government Spending in a Simple Model of 
Endogenous Growth', he developed a version of the Ramsey model. In 1990, Barro extended 
existing endogenous economic growth models to incorporate the government sector since 
production involves public services and private capital. The main idea of Barro's model is to 
introduce a public sector in a Cobb-Douglas production function. The reason behind using a Cobb-
Douglas production function is that externalities and taxes which are linked with public 
expenditures arrive at productive efficiency. Barro argued that the reason for introducing public 
goods in the production function is that private inputs are different from public inputs. Therefore, 
it would be difficult, for example, for the private sector to undertake activities such as national 
defence rather than the public sector. In this setting, public goods are provided for each household 
producer. Barro clarified that public goods input into private production is likely to lead to a 
positive relationship between government and growth. Besides, capital and public goods together 
may show a constant return to scale. However, the absence of one of these inputs implied that 
production may represent decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, both private capital and 
government inputs have to be expanded in a similar way to avoid a decreasing return to scale 
(Barro, 1990). 
The Barro model proved that public spending should be used for investment in public projects, 
such as schools, sanitation, and infrastructure. These projects are financed through income taxes 
and are used to accompany private investments. Since public investments are associated with the 
productivity of private investments, taxation can affect overall growth (Barro, 1990). However, it 
 
25 The rule of returns to scale applies to the long-term production analyses. In the long run, the output expansion can be 
accomplished across various variables, i.e. the production may be improved by adjusting all the variables by the same or different 
proportion. There are three types of returns to scale. First is called constant returns to scale (CRS), which means that the output 
increases with the same inputs proportion. Second is referred to increasing returns to scale (IRS), which implies that the output 
increases by more than the proportion increase in inputs. The third type is decreasing or diminishing returns to scale (DRS), which 




is worth noting that government spending or public expenditure in the Barro model can be justified 
under the full depreciation of public capital. Therefore, government spending is equal to 
government investment (Novales, Fernández and Ruiz, 2014). Barro defined the current 
government spending as productive public spending (i.e. public spending increase the marginal 
productivity of private capital). The examples provided include property rights, public 
infrastructure, public transport systems, electricity networks, and fire and police departments. 
Moreover, the Barro model focused on government taxation and how taxes are used to improve 
the economy through investment in public projects. It was assumed that the benefits are realised 
from productive government expenditures. Barro (1990) illustrated that growth and welfare could 
be maximised by a fraction of government expenditure and an income tax rate. In his model, the 
main hypothesis was that government expenditures improve efficiency in the economy's private 
sector. However, this study did not include government consumption expenditure or unproductive 
government spending. But, since the government expenditure has to be funded, distortionary 
taxation is necessary. The size of the government determines the effect of government expenditure 
and tax on the economy. If the size of government is big, the negative impact of taxation dominates 
the positive impact of government expenditure on private productivity and vice versa (Capolupo, 
2009). In other words, productive public spending financed through income taxes tends to 
complement private investments. These, in turn, boost the private sectors' productivity, and thus 
higher taxes impact economic growth. 
The key conclusions of the Barro model can be summarised in how changing productive 
expenditures and non-productive expenditures, and distorting taxes affect the long-term growth 
rates. In a more precise way, increased productive expenditures generate long-term economic 
growth, but increased non-productive expenditures have no impact on long-term growth. On the 
other hand, increased distorting taxes decreases the rate of growth if all other conditions being 
equal (Kudrin and Sokolov, 2017). 
In addition to these two main types of models of economic growth, i.e. exogenous and 
endogenous growth models, semi-endogenous growth models are also proposed in the neoclassical 
growth model literature. However, semi-endogenous growth models are considered controversial. 
Charles I. Jones introduced a semi-endogenous growth model. In Jones' paper (1995), he 
emphasised that the debate was structured based on the scale of effects in the endogenous growth 
literature, i.e. the supported long-run growth by research and development (R&D) is either 
endogenous or semi-endogenous. Jones (1995) solved the issue of the scale effects, which implies 
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a situation where the economic size of a country relates positively to growth. According to Jones 
(1995, p.779), the semi-endogenous growth model is:  
unlike the AK-style models and the R&D models of Romer/Grossman Helpman/Aghion-
Howitt, this model predicts that the growth rate is determined by parameters that are 
typically viewed as invariant to policy manipulation. Growth in the economy is tied 
directly to growth in productivity, which in turn depends on the discovery of new designs 
through R&D. Individuals are the critical input into the discovery of new designs, and the 
growth rate of the economy depends crucially on the growth rate of the labor force, an 
exogenous variable.  
Therefore, the semi-endogenous growth model can be defined as follows: exogenous population 
growth determines the long-run growth despite the technological change being endogenous. Thus, 
if growth is semi-endogenous, then a public policy like R&D subsidies does not define the long-
run economy. On the other hand, if growth is endogenous, government actions affect growth. 
Barcenilla-Visús, López-Pueyo, and Sanaú have illustrated the differences between the two 
close economic growth theories: the full endogenous growth theory and the semi-endogenous 
growth theory. They clarified that the full endogenous growth model theory supposes a constant 
return to scale in the production of knowledge. Under this assumption, the total factor productivity 
(TFP) depends on the growth rate of research intensity. To raise the TFP, it is important to increase 
the growth rate of the research intensity. On the other hand, the theory of a semi-endogenous 
growth model suggests a decreasing return to scale in the production of knowledge. This explains 
that, although there is continued growth in the technological input, the TFP growth is not grown 
fast. Under this assumption, the TFP is based on the population growth rate. Therefore, the 
population's growth rate must be increased to raise the TFP (Barcenilla-Visús et al., 2014). 
Under this theme, we have scanned the three types of economic growth models for two reasons. 
The first is to understand the difference between the types of models and the factors determining 
each type. The second is due to the fact that our models, which will be presented in each chapter, 
would be based on different sources of government revenues to finance government spending. 
More precisely, the exogenous and endogenous sources of government revenues would be 
examined in our model. Although this study is based on the Barro (1990) model, our models are 
likely to end up being either exogenous or endogenous growth model. The reason behind that is 
due to the use of different sources of government revenues to finance productive government 
spending. As a result, our research must analyse these types of economic growth models to position 
this research in the right context. 
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3.3 The Structure of Oil Market: Saudi's Oil Sector 
In this section, we focus on the literature on the structure or the behaviour of the oil market. In 
particular, we look at Saudi Arabia for two underlying reasons. The first is due to the importance 
of Saudi's oil sector in our study, where we need to understand the work of this sector for modelling 
it into an economic growth model. The second is due to the fact that there is disagreement among 
some economists, politicians and even the public about how the oil sector acts in general, and 
mainly in Saudi Arabia. Thus, there is a need to explore the oil market structure in Saudi Arabia 
(i.e. it works in perfect competition, imperfect competition, oligopoly, or monopoly market). 
Most of the studies in this literature have analysed the behaviour of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), for which Saudi Arabia is one of its principal founders. 
In these studies, Saudi Arabia is often seen as a cartel that acts as a wealth-maximising monopolist. 
For example, Griffin (1985) studied the behaviour of the OPEC countries and found that the 
behaviour and structure of OPEC were both dominant and competitive. For Saudi Arabia, Al-
Yousef (1998) examined Saudi behaviour in the oil market. She tested two economic models over 
the period 1970-1996. The two models investigated were the swing producer model (1975-1986) 
and the market sharing model (1987-1996). The results were positive, showing that Saudi Arabia 
acted during the first time frame of a swing product by adjusting output for price stability in the 
first model. On the contrary, in the second model, it was considered a producer of market share in 
terms of maximising its revenues.  
In another approach, Alhajji and Huettner (2000) studied different models to verify the 
presence of a dominant producer in the oil market during 1973-1994. In their paper, they used 
three other models to examine OPEC and non-OPEC members. These models were the dominant 
firm model, the Cournot model26, and the competitive model. Each model tested three variants of 
members, which are OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the core countries of OPEC27 as the dominant firms 
in the world oil market. All models' statistical findings only accepted the dominant firm model for 
Saudi Arabia. Thus, when examining only Saudi Arabia, they found that it acts as a dominant 
product in the market. Similarly, Kaufmann et al. (2008) and De Santis (2003) found similar results 
in concluding that Saudi Arabia does not show production sharing behaviour and acts as a 
dominant firm. Both studies came to assert the same concept about Saudi Arabic with reference to 
being an outstanding oil producer.  
 
26 The Cournot model is a model describing the situation that all firms produce a homogeneous product. According to Alhajji and 
Huettner (2000), based on the non-OPEC production in the previous period, the OPEC determines the production which maximises 
its profit. 
 
27  In Alhajji and Huettner (2000) paper, the core countries of OPEC include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar. 
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Although this literature is not very related to our main topic of economic growth, understanding 
how this sector works, particularly in Saudi Arabia, could be a starting point in our study. 
Moreover, many economic growth models focused on oil-rich countries have ignored the structure 
of the oil market. Thus, treating and modelling the oil sector as a monopolistic sector, as confirmed 
by many studies in the structure of the oil market literature, in an economic growth model would 
add a feature to our research. 
3.4 Economic Growth in Oil-Rich Countries 
The third important area reviewed in this research is closely related studies to the current study 
on economic growth in oil-rich countries. Although the literature in this area has been widely 
conducted in several studies as the majority focused on the influence of natural resources on 
economic growth, it is important for this study because it narrows the research scope and would 
help explain the relationship between economic growths in oil-rich countries. In this literature, two 
kinds of hypotheses will be examined about the possible effect of 1) natural resources are a curse 
or 2) natural resources are a blessing. 
Let us begin with the hypothesis that natural resources are seen as a curse. In this regard, 
investigating natural resources has been the scope of many studies for being a curse. They have 
pointed out that natural resources can sometimes be a curse since they could slow the economic 
pace in certain economies like fiscal policy challenges, political issues, and bad governance. 
Gylfason (2001) conducted a study that found that economic growth continues to vary across 
wealthy nations, arguing that oil revenues appear to affect human capital and thus contribute 
towards slow economic growth. Other studies, such as Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and Sachs 
and Warner (1995), have found that oil revenue, as a natural resource, is a significant negative 
determinant of growth.  
Along these lines, Rodriguez and Sach (1999) conducted a study on why resource-rich 
countries show slow growth compared to resource-poor countries. Their theoretical model was 
used to illustrate how we expect an economy to respond to an influx of revenues from the export 
of a natural resource based on the Ramsey growth model. They introduced a new sector in their 
model called "the natural resource" (p.281) and considered it as an exogenous level of production. 
It was assumed that economies having abundant resources are living beyond their means and above 
a steady-state equilibrium. The reason behind their assumption of living beyond their means is that 
natural resource industries that basically depend on non-sustainable resources cannot expand their 
production at the same rate as the other industries due to limited natural resources.  
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Rodriguez and Sach (1999) applied a dynamic general equilibrium model, where the 
Venezuelan economy was used to analyse the impact of overshooting a steady-state point. In the 
model, it was assumed that the Venezuelan economy is a one-good economy, where its natural 
resources can be used as exports in exchange for imported investment goods. The country's current 
account was assumed to be balanced, with no foreign investment. The country's domestic resources 
were used as capital stock, and the natural resources used to cover the cost of importing investment 
goods. Due to a lack of foreign earnings, the Venezuelan economy has a balanced current account, 
and there are no surplus foreign earnings. It was further assumed that, in this economy, the 
available resources were either consumed or invested. In their study, the data on the country's 
growth performance was taken from 1972 to 1993. This study found that the natural resource 
production is going to tend towards zero in the steady-state. However, the natural resource during 
the transition to that steady-state would make the economy to enjoy exceptional possibilities for 
consumption. For this reason, the economy with natural resource would adjust to its steady-state 
not from below but from above. In the case of the Venezuelan economy, the study results showed 
that it was above a steady-state point which later converged to a steady-state optimal point. This 
was because, in a resource-abundant economy, consumption was high since it was dependent on 
domestic resources. During the transition, it showed on average negative rates of growth. Thus, in 
the long run, it would be challenging to sustain a high level of consumption because it would not 
be able to maintain its own capital stocks, which implies that a decline in output. In other words, 
although resource would lead to a temporarily boosting level of consumption and investment, the 
steady-state would return to its old steady-state. Consequently, the natural resources would cause 
a slow growth rate. 
Notwithstanding, a small number of studies have examined how natural resources have been a 
blessing to some wealthy oil nations that have effective fiscal policies and good governance 
structural systems. On these lines, the study by Moneef (2006) suggested that "resource abundance 
is supposed to provide the economy with the investment capital and advanced technologies needed 
for the big push" (Moneef, 2006, p.15). Alkhathlan (2013) highlighted the likely effect of two 
variables, namely economic growth and oil revenues. Alkhathlan's study particularly examined the 
relationship between oil production and economic performance in Saudi Arabia during 1971-2010. 
This study underlined that a few studies indicated that an abundance of natural resources 
substantially positively influences economic growth. The economic growth of a wealthy nation 
with abundant natural resources potentially rises faster than less natural resource countries. The 
explanation for this is that the abundance of natural resources tends to reduce financial pressures 
and improves both income and purchasing power over imports. Thus, the abundance of natural 
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resources is projected to increase investment and economic growth rate. Finally, the study findings 
showed that the effect of oil revenues on real GDP is positive. 
Our literature review shows that studies on the possible impact of natural resources on 
economic growth are based on two hypotheses, curse or blessing of natural resources. However, a 
number of questions regarding how natural resources are managed and how their revenues are 
employed remain to be addressed. There are two main reasons for these questions to arise. The 
first is that some of these studies seem to deal with resource revenues as a pure waste of resources. 
Therefore, in this case, the natural resources represent a burden on the economy. Second, although 
some studies are empirical and based on historical data, they have not clearly clarified how the 
natural resources used. Thus, these studies did not provide clear evidence that natural resources 
are a blessing. Although our study would not directly contribute to this debate, we believe that our 
study would show that if government revenues are used to finance productive government 
spending, then the natural resources could stimulate economic growth and eventually it could be 
a blessing. Our thought is that if resource revenues are devoted to enhancing productivity instead 
of treating them as a pure waste of resources, they could have a favourable economic growth effect. 
However, a negative effect may also be possible; therefore, this study tries to study how natural 
resources, particularly oil, can be negatively affected, how this negative impact affects economic 
growth, and the possibility of compensating for this potential negative impact. For this reason, we 
next survey managing oil revenue in oil-rich countries. 
3.5 Managing Oil Revenue Fluctuations in Oil-Rich Countries 
This section will discuss the literature review on dealing with resource revenue fluctuations or 
the best strategy to deal with them. We examined the literature on managing oil revenue 
fluctuations in oil-rich countries because our study is mainly based on economic growth in the 
second-largest oil country, Saudi Arabia. Another reason behind surveying this kind of literature 
is because we are arguing that fiscal policy reforms could be a safe solution compared to other 
solutions provided by many previous studies on this topic, which will be discussed next. 
Several neoclassical growth models have studied the impact of government operations on 
welfare, resource management, and economic growth. Some previous studies have suggested that 
stabilisation of funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)28, are a solution to the volatility of oil 
revenues, for instance, Devarajan et al. (2017), Primus (2016), Richmond et al. (2015), and Berg 
 




et al. (2013). Before discussing whether or not these funds are a suitable solution to the 
governments that own them, we need early understanding of what the SWFs are, who usually uses 
them, why some governments own them, and how these SWFs are financed.  
First of all, understanding the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) concept requires one to 
understand the reserves. Reserves refer to any funds set aside by the overarching authority in a 
country to increase investment targeting the economy and the citizens of that country. 
Consequently, the SWF refers to a state-owned investment fund that consists primarily of money 
drawn from the country's reserves. The resource-rich or oil-rich countries usually use these funds 
to save their financial surpluses represented by the revenues of these resources. The most common 
sources of the SWF include the surpluses in balance of payments, official operations/investments 
in foreign currency, and privatisation revenues. Additional sources involve government transfer 
payments as well as revenues from the exportation of resources. The SWFs serve different 
purposes that involve future generations savings, financing social and economic development, 
serving political strategy, and aiding in dissipating unwanted liquidity for monetary authorities 
(Beck and Fidora, 2008). 
To start with the recent studies in managing resource revenues, Berg, Portillo, Yang, and Zanna 
(2013) studied public investment in developing countries with abundant resources. The CEMAC29 
region and Angola were the subjects of the study. They developed a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model to examine the macroeconomic impacts of investing resource 
revenues. In their model, the main assumption was that the natural resource is exogenous and 
finances public investment. In their paper, Berg et al. (2013) proposed a sustainable investment 
approach combining public investment with a resource fund. The primary purpose of this approach 
is to address macroeconomic issues. Berg et al. (2013) emphasised that sustainable investing 
eliminates procyclical fiscal policy and decreases macroeconomic stability risk. By establishing a 
stabilisation fund, sustainable investing can also help disconnect recurring government spending 
from resource revenue streams; therefore, the economy becomes protected from instability due to 
resource income fluctuations.  
Along the same lines, Richmond, Yackovlev, and Yang (2015) inspected the investing volatile 
resource revenues in capital-scarce economics. They used Angola as a case study to examine fiscal 
approaches to investing resource revenues. Their model introduced a stabilisation fund where 
revenues from the natural resource can be saved during good times and used to facilitate public 
 
29  The CEMAC is the abbreviation for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, which involves Cameroon, Chad, 
the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. All these counties are abundant in natural 
resources and oil, except the Central African Republic (Akitoby and Coorey, 2012). 
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investment during hard times. Richmond et al. (2015) revealed that despite the overuse of the 
conservative investment approach30 helping the economy to have a large stock of foreign assets, it 
could slow economic growth. Moreover, they emphasised that using the spend-as-you-go 
approach31 could potentially harm the economy, causing boom-bust cycles. However, a gradual 
scaling-up approach32 could be a better strategy to accomplish two main targets. The first is to 
encourage investment to foster growth, while the second is to achieve economic stability by a 
stabilisation fund. As a result, they concluded that the latter approach makes public investment 
more capable of diversifying economic growth. 
Primus (2016) studied the fiscal rules for resource windfall allocation in a resource-rich 
developing country, Trinidad and Tobago. She employed different fiscal rules to identify the best 
way to allocate resource windfalls between spending now and saving in a sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF). The first rule is the full spending of resource windfall on consumption and investment. 
This rule would increase household welfare but would cause fiscal volatility. On the other hand, 
the second rule is the full saving of resource windfall in a SWF. This rule would help to reduce 
fiscal volatility but simultaneously affect household welfare. Primus (2016) found that as long as 
both household welfare and fiscal stability are the priority goals of the government to achieve, 
none of the two rules would be the best fiscal response to resource windfalls. Therefore, the 
government needs to save a part of the windfall in a SWF and spend the other on both consumption 
and investment to meet those goals. 
Similarly, Devarajan, Dissou, Go, and Robinson (2017) examined the budget rules and 
resource booms and busts in low-income countries. They used a DSGE model and considered a 
small open economy. Their paper simulated the fluctuation impact of resource windfalls on long-
term economic growth and welfare under resource price uncertainty. Three various scenarios have 
been examined: positive, negative, and periods of shocks on the resource price (i.e. positive and 
negative). Devarajan et al. (2017) found that the temporary positive shock in a resource price 
change would increase revenues. Therefore, saving the revenue windfall in a sovereign fund is the 
preferable strategy. During a negative temporary price change, public investment should be 
reduced. However, if there is a positive and a negative shock in all periods, combining the two 
 
30 According to Richmond et al. (2015, p.203), the conservative investing approach implies that: 
the government maintains constant ratios of public investment and government consumption to GDP at initial levels. 
As total GDP rises, public investment spending also rises, but there is no significant scaling-up. As a result, a resource 
fund can accumulate a large stock of external savings while public capital only grows slowly over time. 
 
31  The spend-as-you-go approach means that all resource windfall spends and does not save. 
 
32  The gradual scaling-up approach implies that "increases public investment gradually and then sustains it at a higher level" 
(Richmond et al.,2015, p.201). 
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previous strategies, i.e. public investment and saving abroad, could be the best strategy in this case. 
As a result, the three strategies would help the economy to achieve stable economic growth. 
Although managing resource revenues to maintain economic growth has been examined in the 
literature, very few studies have considered the best methods and strategies to deal with volatile 
resource revenues. Devarajan et al. (2017), Primus (2016), Richmond et al. (2015), and Berg et al. 
(2013) assumed in their models that the resource (e.g. oil) output and the international resource 
prices follow an exogenous process, with the government taking revenues to finance its public 
investment. However, since the oil sector should be an essential sector when modelling oil-rich 
countries, these studies, as well as the economic growth literature, ignored to analyse the market 
power of oil. As confirmed by most research on the oil market structure, the oil sector in some oil-
rich counties is treated as a monopolistic sector. Therefore, they have ignored some key questions 
that should be considered, particularly those related to oil-dependent countries. Furthermore, since 
resource (oil) revenues have been modelled in previous literature as an exogenous source, there is 
a necessity to investigate: (i) how this essential exogenous source operates and affects? (ii) what 
does a government get in revenues from that monopolistic source and how? and (iii) how can the 
growth rate of government spending be affected by that source? Although this source is exogenous 
and uncontrollable, the above questions are still worthwhile to investigate because the oil sector 
remains an important sector in many oil countries. 
Furthermore, as Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) supporters claim that they are an important 
strategy, they should not be considered a source of income diversification and much help for the 
domestic economy for several reasons. The most important reasons are that, instead of developing 
the domestic economy, SWFs may help develop the economies of foreign countries receiving these 
funds. In this regard, Beck and Fidora (2008) illustrated that many oil producers generally seek to 
acquire financial assets during the time in which they produce oil to prevent rapid fiscal policy 
changes when oil reserves are exhausted. Financial wealth is allocated to future generations, so the 
current general wealth of the country does not benefit from that and remains unchanged (Beck and 
Fidora, 2008). Besides, SWFs do not guarantee sustained revenues for a country that relies heavily 
on oil revenues to finance its persistent expenditures. For instance, if a country invests all or most 
of its resource revenues in foreign assets, these assets may incur losses due to the risks associated 
with some investments. In this regard, Park and van der Hoorn (2012) pointed out that many SWFs 
incurred significant financial losses on their investment as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis. For example, Malaysia, Ireland, Singapore (Temasek), Norway, and New Zealand funds 
lost about 35.7%, 30.4%, 30.0%, 23.3%, and 22.1%, respectively of their asset values in their 
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funds during the financial crisis in 2008. Consequently, investing local wealth abroad can be 
adventurous and may expose the local economy to instability due to often uncertainty in the global 
markets. 
Therefore, the idea of relying on SWFs may not be appropriate to support the continuation of 
economic growth for two reasons. The first reason is regarding the investment returns, where it is 
known that high (low) returns are associated with high (low) risks. Thus, if the SWFs invest in 
high returns investment, they may face high risks, implying that they may lose the local wealth 
anytime. If, on the other hand, the SWFs invest in low returns investment, then these returns may 
not be sufficient to meet the increased expenditures and support the economy. Especially if the 
economy was hit by a negative shock, whether related to oil or otherwise. The second reason is 
that SWFs are also potentially associated with specific periods of withdrawal, limiting the 
availability of cash at the time of need. As a result, the SWFs may not be able to provide enough 
or available funding to finance government spending in the case of negative shocks in demand for 
oil.  
The shortfalls identified above are part of shortcomings associated with the SWFs on the 
economy. Although most studies in this regard have relied on SWFs as a solution to fluctuating 
oil revenues, the research in the reform of tax systems to deal with oil revenues fluctuation remains 
limited. As a result, there is a need to look at another method or policy that ensures the flow of 
state revenues and the maintenance of at least stable economic growth. For this reason, our study 
aims and seeks to contribute to how the reform of tax systems could be a solution to fluctuate 
resource revenues, in the case of one of the oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia. In brief, even 
though our study is similar to the previous studies in terms of studying possible solutions to the oil 
revenues fluctuations, it is different in terms of the method that can alleviate the fluctuations in 
these revenues and maintain stable economic growth. 
3.6 Taxes and Their Roles in Economic Growth 
We begin this theme by distinguishing first between taxes. In general, there are two types of 
taxes, direct and indirect taxes. The most common types of direct taxes involve corporate or 
company income tax, personal income tax, and property tax. Corporation tax is a tax imposed on 
the company's net income, while the personal income tax is a tax imposed on an individual's 
earnings of employment, pensions, savings. On the other side, the main indirect tax is a 
consumption tax, which includes some other types of taxes, such as sales tax, value-added tax 
(VAT), customs, and excise duty. These types of taxes are different from each other in their 
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characteristics. More precisely, VAT is a consumption tax levied on services and products whose 
values have been introduced at various stages of a supply chain, i.e. from the production through 
to the final marketplace. In contrast, sales tax is charged on the turnover of the service or the 
product being sold, while excise duty is charged on the correct use of controlled products like 
Tobacco, Petroleum, or Alcohol. Although the sales tax and VAT seem similar, the main 
difference between them is concerned with how the government collects them. The sales tax is 
collected directly from consumers when they make a purchase. In contrast, the VAT is generally 
collected from producers instead, depending on the value they are adding up along the production 
chain (Stojkovic, Gasic, and Peric, 2013). 
Taxes are considered a central feature of government, as they can shape the relationship 
between government and society. However, the concept of tax capacity has been the subject of 
controversy in public finance literature. Fiscal or tax capacity is the ability of the government to 
obtain revenues and provide public goods and other basic needs. It is also defined as the "capability 
of a governmental entity to finance its public services" (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1982, p.2). However, George Chun-Yan Kuo (2000) stated that there 
is no single definition of tax capability. It can be defined either as the taxpayer's ability to pay or 
the government's ability to raise tax revenue. The first can include the income, expenditures, 
properties, and wealth of individuals. In contrast, the second is related to the government's 
willingness to manage and raise taxes in compliance with tax laws and regulations. Because tax 
capacity is a difficult concept, estimating the potential tax liability becomes even more 
complicated to undertake objectively. There are some examples in this regard, including the types 
of taxation that can be used, the tax bases and rates, whether the tax is progressive or not, issues 
of fiscal decentralisation, and comparing with similar economic situations in other nations (Chun-
Yan Kuo, 2000). 
Schneider (2006) clarified the role of tax capacity in public finance and its relation to social 
policy. He pointed out that tax capacity represents the relative scale and administrative capacity of 
the public sector. It also includes the power of the government to use private wealth for public 
purposes. On the other hand, the social policy represents a social contract that connects the public 
with the state. These two elements characterise the essence of public finance and the relationship 
between the public and the state. Along the same lines, Brautigam (2008) contended that taxation 
can play a significant role in developing and maintaining a state's power and shaping state-society 
relations. The political importance of taxation is that it aims to increase revenue and plays a vital 
role in state-building. He clarified this as follows: 
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The state-building role of taxation can be seen in two principal areas: the rise of a social 
contract based on bargaining around tax, and the institution-building stimulus provided 
by the revenue imperative. Progress in the first area may foster representative democracy. 
Progress in the second area strengthens state capacity. Both have the potential to bolster 
the legitimacy of the state and enhance accountability between the state and its citizens. 
(Brautigam, 2008, p.1) 
Regarding state institutions and tax capacity, Akanbi (2019) conducted an empirical analysis 
of the causality between the two. The author defined tax capacity as the ability to increase 
revenues, calculated by the tax revenue to GDP ratio. On the other hand, "state institutions (or 
institutions) ––i.e., rule of law, effectiveness of government, corruption control––are defined 
broadly as the traditions by which authority in a country is exercised" (Akanbi, 2019, p.4). Akanbi 
(2019) demonstrated that many developing countries need funding for vital social and 
development expenditure. Nevertheless, the question is whether improved state institutions lead 
to increased tax collection or whether increased tax collection enhances the improvement of state 
institutions. To examine the long-term causality between tax capacity and state institutions, Akanbi 
used a Panel Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) for 110 non-resource-rich countries during 
1996-2017. The results showed that tax capacity and state institutions enhance each other, and that 
they should work together for the best outcomes, particularly in developing countries. For 
example, weak (strong) institutions could discourage (encourage) tax capacity, which would 
eventually lead to further weak (strong) institutions. In other words, any changes in tax capacity 
would alter the institutional structure and vice versa. As a result, it is vital that countries improve 
their institutions and simultaneously increase tax capacity because this will help obtain higher 
growth and development. 
Besley and Persson (2013) mentioned that richer developed countries have more significant 
and powerful tax administrations and thus collect more revenue in the form of taxes than poorer 
developing countries. In fact, taxes differ in efficiency and ideal. In the optimal taxation theory, 
maximising efficiency is crucial for an ideal tax structure. There are two types of taxes: efficient 
and inefficient taxes. Efficiency taxes involve income and consumption taxes, whereas inefficient 
taxes involve corporate tax. Thus, richer developed countries depend on efficient taxes to support 





Besley and Persson (2014) further emphasised that tax revenues as a proportion of GDP in 
developing countries are lower than in advanced countries. In developing countries, the tax bases 
are usually between 10-20% of GDP, compared to in advanced economies where they are on 
average 40% of GDP. Although economic growth is an important factor for widening the tax base, 
it is not guaranteed to be achieved with high tax. To benefit from growth and economic 
development, the government should reform the tax system and invest in it. According to Besley 
and Persson, low tax to GDP levels in developing countries is due to specific reasons. The first 
reason is the economic structure. In developing countries, the informal sector is broader than in 
developed countries and is hard to tax administratively. Also, developing countries depend on 
various tax regimes, and indirect taxes are much more important in terms of raising revenue than 
direct taxes. Another reason is dependence on aid, as this can limit incentives to raise taxes. A 
further reason is a political commitment and government action on tax reform. For example, weak 
political institutions, which are the result of a weak legislature and judiciary, discourage the 
government's power to perform tax measures, leading to increased tax evasion (Besley and 
Persson, 2014). As a result, economic growth is closely related to the government's ability to 
administer taxes. 
To investigate the relationship between tax capacity and economic growth, Gaspar et al. (2016) 
examined whether there is a tipping point (i.e., a minimum point) in tax to GDP levels that can 
accelerate the process of growth and development. They used a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) to estimate the causal effect of a tipping point in tax-to-GDP ratios on GDP growth. Two 
different datasets were used: the first was a database of 139 countries between 1965 and 2011, 
while the second was based on a historical database for 30 developed economies for the period 
from 1800 to 1980. The results showed that the relationship between tax capacity and growth has 
a tipping point, where the minimum tax to GDP ratio is about 12.75%. This rate can significantly 
accelerate the process of growth and development. The findings also indicated that the GDP per 
capita rises dramatically when the tax-to GDP ratio exceeds the minimum rate (Gaspar et al., 
2016). 
Although our study is not closely related to the literature on optimal taxation, we will briefly 
highlight the main contributions to this literature. Starting with a simple definition of optimal 
taxation, it generally represents the interests between the competing society objectives of equity 
and economic efficiency, which maximises social wealth. More precisely, Mankiw et al. (2009) 
pointed out that "the standard theory of optimal taxation posits that a tax system should be chosen 
to maximise a social welfare function subject to a set of constraints" (p.148). Literature on optimal 
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tax usually considers that the social planner is characteristic of a utilitarian, which means the 
function of social welfare focuses on individuals' utilities. The social planner seeks to select a tax 
regime designed to maximise the welfare of consumers. However, some researchers suggest that 
the social planner is only interested in average utility, proposing a linear social welfare function in 
individual utilities (Mankiw et al., 2009). 
As the literature on optimal taxation is vast, we will only focus on the essential results, which 
are based on Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), and Mirrlees (1971). In 1927, Frank 
Ramsey made the most significant early contribution to optimal tax theory. In his famous paper, 
'A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation', Ramsey (1927) suggested that the planner collects 
revenues only in the form of commodities taxes. The main assumptions in his model were that 
there are no lump-sum taxes and considering linear taxes, not all commodities are taxed. Also, 
production prices are normalised to one. Government taxes are to increase total revenue and reduce 
the utility loss for agents in the economy. In his paper, he attempted to solve the issue of how to 
change tax rates on consumption under certain constraints. The purpose is to minimise the decrease 
of utility. Nevertheless, Mankiw et al. (2009) illustrated that literature on optimal taxation aims to 
provide the best tax system, where excluding some conceivable tax systems by assumption is an 
issue. Thus, the social planner should be allowed to consider all possible tax structures.  
Ramsey (1927) also proposed that the inverse elasticity rule be used to determine optimal 
commodity taxation. The inverse elasticity rule suggests imposing a high tax rate on commodities 
with low elasticity of demand and a low tax rate on commodities with high elasticity of demand. 
In other words, the more elastic the demand, the lower the optimal tax. However, one of the 
criticisms of this rule is that the price elasticity of demand for necessity goods is low, while it is 
high for luxury goods (Aytaç, 2018). 
Unlike Ramsey, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) suggested a different proposition that allows 
the planner to take into account a variety of tax systems. In their paper, they discussed the issue of 
imperfect information stemming from the social planner and taxpayers. Mankiw et al. (2009) 
explained the basic version of Diamond and Mirrlees' model, in which individuals are different in 
their ability to earn income. Although the planner is allowed to observe income, they are unable 
to observe the ability or effort of an individual to gain income. Thus, if the planner tries to raise 
taxes on those with a high ability to earn an income, the opportunity to get the same income will 
be discouraged. As a result, the optimal tax problem is the lack of information among taxpayers 
and the social planner. More precisely, the planner wants to tax high ability individuals and transfer 
this to low ability individuals; however, the social planner also wants to ensure that the tax system 
should not lead to those with a high capacity to pretend that they are at a low level. 
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Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) reached two main conclusions, namely, "the demonstration of 
the desirability of aggregate production efficiency in a wide variety of circumstances provided that 
taxes are set at the optimal level; and an examination of that optimal tax structure" (p.8). They 
clarified that the efficiency of production is ideal while a full Pareto optimum cannot be obtained. 
Commodity taxes imply that marginal substitution rates are not the same as marginal 
transformation rates in the optimum position. On the other hand, if there are no lump-sum taxes, 
income distribution is not in the best situation. However, the existence of optimum commodity 
taxes would demonstrate that aggregate production efficiency is desirable. 
In this regard, the marginal tax rates schedule is the centre of attention in the trade-off between 
equality and efficiency. In general, individuals' marginal tax rates increase when their income rises. 
This tax increase would have an efficiency cost on some individuals who are usually classified as 
lower-income earners. The reason for the efficiency cost is that high taxes would discourage 
individuals who earn a low income to work more. On the other hand, the tax change would not 
distort individuals who earn higher incomes. The reason is that although it would increase their 
average tax rate, it would not affect their marginal tax rate. In this case, if the marginal tax rate 
schedule is designed as the ability distribution, equality and efficiency would then be achieved. 
James Mirrlees (1971) analysed optimal income taxation in his paper, 'An Exploration in the 
Theory of Optimum Income Taxation'. In the paper, he considered the optimal non-linear income 
tax that maximises a given social welfare function. Mirrlees (1971) discussed that the complete 
equality of marginal social utilities of income no longer becomes attractive. The reason is that the 
tax system derived from this will lead to discouraging unpleasant work. In his model, the main 
assumptions were that intertemporal problems, differences in tastes and family size, and migration 
are all excluded. The government is expected to have complete information about the people who 
work in the economy and their utilities. Also, the administration costs of the optimum tax schedule 
are supposed to be insignificant. Mirrlees (1971) showed that the optimal marginal rate could not 
be negative and that it should be below 100% due to the fact that there is no one going to want 
such a marginal rate. Income tax is seen as a less effective tool to decrease inequality. As a result, 
he concluded that taxes in addition to income tax should be used to avoid income tax problems. 
He further suggested applying a tax schedule that relies on time worked and labour income. 
Numerous studies have investigated the effect of income tax and consumption tax on the 
economy. In this study, we examine both types of taxes, but with more attention to consumption 
tax. The reason is that consumption tax and its role in economic growth have received less 
attention, while income taxes, either personal or corporate taxes, are considered the most common 
types surveyed in economic growth literature.  
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Turnovsky (1996) evaluated the role played by consumption taxes on raising social welfare 
and economic growth. The author used an endogenous growth model to analyse this relationship. 
The study assumed that government expenditure causes a direct impact on the optimal 
consumption choices made by private agents. For an optimal economic outcome, the government 
must strike a balance between income and consumption taxes. The congestion level linked to the 
public good, and the government expenditure level affects the achievement of optimal economic 
growth. Similarly, the ratio of actual government spending to the estimated levels of optimal social 
spending also influences the first-best optimum for economic growth. Turnovsky (1996) 
confirmed that consumption taxes take a major role in shaping optimal fiscal performance. The 
author indicated that the United States (US) economy recorded low rates of savings (about 6.5%) 
and real gross national product (GNP) growth rate (about 2.6%) in the 1980s at a time when the 
government overlay relied on income tax. Under this tax regime, the US government ended up 
taxing both savings and consumption. The inherent weaknesses in this model prompted 
policymakers to debate the merits of using tax incentives to encourage growth. Consequently, they 
provided proposals for the adoption of a consumption tax regime as a partial or total replacement 
for income tax. 
Furthermore, Turnovsky's (1996) study findings showed that the government could choose to 
either influence the production decisions of private agents in its economy or influence their 
consumption decisions. Two fiscal instruments can be chosen to achieve the first-best optimum 
outcome. According to the author, the first fiscal tool by the government should focus on 
eliminating any distortions in the decisions of the private agents. In contrast, the other fiscal tool 
should focus on providing finance for government expenditure. Besides the use of income tax, the 
government can use public debt appropriately, rely on consumption taxes, or use both fiscal 
strategies to attain optimal economic growth. However, if there is no consumption tax, then the 
government should attain equilibrium by positioning itself as a net lender instead of a net debtor 
to the private sector. 
Similarly, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) used a theoretical model to assess whether 
consumption and income taxation directly affect economic growth. Their model included three 
sectors, where the first sector is the production of final goods and physical capital. The second 
sector is the production of human capital, while the third sector produces a non-market good, such 
as leisure activity taking the form of home production. The physical outputs in the economy are 
produced with constant returns to scale (CRS) by using two inputs, human and physical capital. 
The authors sought to determine whether these taxes influence the accumulation of physical and 
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human capital and consequently affect the rate of growth in an economy. They also discussed 
various channels by which taxes impact economic growth.  
In their model, one common assumption behind the support for expenditure taxes is that 
expenditure taxes are a viable strategy for eliminating bias against saving. The current tax system 
in advanced economies like the United States causes double taxation of savings through its 
emphasis on taxing personal incomes. By shifting from personal income taxes, economies will 
experience increased accumulation of capital and raise the living standards of its future 
generations. Specific leisure activities cause unique effects on economic growth. The level of 
technology used to achieve the accumulation of human capital and the reliance of a market sector 
to produce human capital also produce unique moderating effects on the relationship between 
consumption taxes and economic growth. The study findings showed that consumption tax has 
only one essential distortion, which affects the option between work time and leisure time in favour 
of the latter. Consequently, it causes a reduction in economic growth. This option is also affected 
by income taxes, which causes other distortions as well. The distortions of income tax can be seen 
in the reduction of capital accumulation and growth. In general, consumption and income taxes 
have various impacts on growth and welfare in endogenous growth models; however, consumption 
taxes have less impact on growth compared to income taxes (Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998). 
The effect of consumption tax on capital accumulation and productivity growth has been 
examined in a few studies. In this regard, Petrucci (2002) conducted a study using a one-sector 
endogenous growth with finite horizons. The author sought to determine the implications and 
effects of consumption taxes on capital growth/capital accumulation. The common assumption in 
this study was that the labour supply is inelastic to avoid the distortion of the intertemporal 
consumption-leisure caused by the consumption tax. Moreover, consumption taxes have the net 
effect of redistributing income from the current living generation to the future unborn generation. 
Another assumption considered in this study was that the consumption taxes are not supposed to 
cause any impact on the growth of the overall economy if the one-sector growth model is used.  
Petrucci's study findings indicated that the consumption taxes raise the current levels of savings 
among households while reducing the aggregate consumption. In effect, consumption taxes 
stimulate capital accumulation and increases the growth rate in the economy. For instance, suppose 
the government chooses to use the resources obtained from consumption taxes to finance 
unproductive public expenditure, then the economy will not experience the consumption taxes. 
The results also showed that when the government increases consumption taxes and compensates 
for this move by reducing its public debt, it stimulates capital accumulation, increases the long-
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run growth rate, and lowers the consumption-output ratio. In other words, increasing consumption 
taxes and reducing debt implies that the government would have more money to spend on 
development, which in turn increases job and investment opportunities and provides additional 
income from taxes. 
In a similar vein, El-Ganainy (2006) analysed theoretically and empirically the effect of value-
added tax, as a consumption tax, on capital accumulation, productivity growth, and economic 
growth. Theoretically, the author applied a two-sector endogenous growth model. Her model 
depends on the overlapping generation model of Diamond's (1965). The model was extended by 
introducing consumption taxes to evaluate the effect of this tax on growth. It included three sectors: 
households, competitive firms, and the government. The results indicated that consumption taxes 
influence capital accumulation and productivity growth through savings, which in turns stimulate 
economic growth. However, these impacts were theoretically unclear because they rely on the 
relationship between the parameters of utility, interest rate, and tax structure. Empirically, El-
Ganainy (2006) used the dynamic panel GMM-System estimators to estimate a panel of 14 
European Union (EU) countries during 1961-1995. The main results found that the VAT 
negatively affects the aggregate consumption level and positively affects physical capital 
accumulation and, therefore, contributes to GDP growth. However, productivity growth is found 
to be statistically insignificant, meaning productivity growth through the VAT has less impact on 
economic growth. 
Similarly, Nguyen, Onnis, and Rossi (2017) examined how the tax changes of income tax 
(personal and corporate taxes) and consumption tax can affect the macroeconomic variables33. 
Nguyen et al. (2017) empirically tested whether income tax and consumption tax shocks directly 
affect the UK's economy by using time-series data during 1973-2009. The study findings 
emphasised the significance of distinguishing the effects of direct taxes and indirect taxes when 
studying fiscal policies and their transmission mechanism. The results indicated that income tax 
shocks cause significant effects on investment, private consumption, and overall GDP in the short 
run. According to Nguyen et al. (2017), a reduction in the amount of consumption tax does not 
affect the GDP and the investment so much. They only cause a marginal expansionary effect on 
the levels of private consumption in the economy. Notably, consumption taxes produce less 
distortion in the economy when compared to income taxes.  
 
33 Nguyen et al. (2017) theoretically illustrated the reasoning of the impact of income tax and consumption tax. They pointed out 
that "taxing income (personal and corporate) depresses private investments and labour supply. Differently, taxing consumption 
would decrease current consumption, but it would increase savings and therefore investment. Higher investment would boost labour 




The role of taxes in reducing the rate of indeterminacy and lowering the chances for aggregate 
instability in the economy has been widely studied in the real business cycle literature. Although 
our study is in economic growth, understanding how taxes can overcome the fluctuations in the 
economy is also important to investigate in our study. In this literature, a balanced budget fiscal 
policy rule34 is an ongoing theme of debate and critique. In this regard, Giannitsarou (2007) 
conducted a study on the role of taxes in balanced budget rules and aggregate instability. Her paper 
was based on Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s (1997) work35. She argued that consumption taxation 
guarantees determinacy and should be favoured with respect to income taxation. Giannitsarou 
(2007) model was based on a standard neoclassical growth, the Ramsey model, with infinitely 
lived households, firm, and government. Her model was built on the absence of public spending 
externalities, and consumption taxes finance government spending. 
Giannitsarou (2007) demonstrated that if endogenous consumption taxes only finance the 
government revenues, any steady-state is saddle-path stable, and no indeterminacy arises. The 
reason is that the consumption tax is not a distortions tax, unlike income tax, where the latter may 
generate the possibility of indeterminacy. The author further discussed the policy implications if 
income and consumption taxes are combined. The numerical investigation showed three main 
results. First, if both taxes are exogenous (fixed), and if income tax is exogenous and consumption 
tax is endogenous, indeterminacy never arises. Second, if income tax is endogenous but 
consumption tax is exogenous, then indeterminacy can arise. Third, if both taxes are endogenous, 
then the range of indeterminacy becomes smaller. As a result, Giannitsarou (2007) concluded that 
consumption taxation is a better channel for financing government expenditure compared to 
income taxes. The reason is that considering only consumption taxes ensures that indeterminacy 
does not arise. Moreover, endogenous consumption taxes can reduce the possible occurrence of 
aggregate instability caused by income taxes. These fluctuations can also be removed if 
endogenous consumption taxes replace income taxes. 
Recently, Bambi and Venditti (2018) examined an endogenous framework to evaluate whether 
balanced-budget rules applied alongside endogenous taxes may cause aggregate instability in the 
economy. They used a neoclassical growth model, Barro (1990) endogenous growth model, with 
 
34 A balanced budget fiscal policy rule indicates that a country should not spend above its income. For instance, there should be a 
clear balance between the projected receipts and government expenditure. This policy refers to a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, which 
is the opposite approach of counter-cyclical. According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), the common narrative against the use 
of balanced-budget fiscal policy is linked to its tendency to increase aggregate demand (AD) through increased public expenditure 
and tax cuts during boom seasons, while reducing AD by taking fiscal contractions during recessions. 
 
35 Schmitt-Grobe and Uribe (1997) investigated that why a balanced budget rule can be destabilising. They demonstrated that if 
the government depends on only distortionary income taxes to finance its endogenous spending, it can face destabilising conditions 
when using a balanced-budget rule. In other words, if the balanced-budget rule determined the income tax, the indeterminate steady-
state in the economy can arise. 
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the productive government. The government expenditures are fed by time-varying consumption 
taxes and a balanced budget rule. They assumed that consumption tax relies on de-trended 
consumption; therefore, it transforms from a control variable to a state variable. The reason for 
this assumption is to obtain a constant tax on a balanced growth path (BGP). They further assumed 
that the utility function is CRRA, and the labour supply is inelastic. Bambi and Venditti (2018) 
found the same result as Barro (1990), where there is no transitional dynamics regarding the unique 
BGP. Therefore, this is consistent with Giannitsarou's (2007) conclusion, in which endogenous 
fluctuations did not previously have room. They have further shown that the unique BGP is not a 
long-run solution. However, suppose in terms of consumption that the tax rule is counter-cyclical. 
In that case, there would be sunspot equilibria dependent on self-fulfilling expectations, which 
relies on the consumers' decision for a consumption path. 
The literature on taxation and economic growth is central to our thesis because our study aims 
to contribute to this large literature. Although there are a large number of neoclassical growth 
models that investigate the effect of taxes on economic growth, many of them treated government 
revenues as a pure waste of resources. In other words, the government sector is assumed to be an 
unproductive sector. Moreover, a few studies in the literature examined only consumption tax in 
an economic growth model. However, Bambi and Venditti's (2018) paper is considered closely 
related to our study in terms of consumption tax that finance productive government spending. 
Their model used Barro's (1990) endogenous growth model and a consumption tax that finances 
the productive government sector. Even though we use a Barro (1990) type of production function, 
our models have some differences from the original Barro (1990) model as well as Bambi and 
Venditti (2018) model, particularly in the government budget constraint. In each chapter of our 
thesis, the productive government sector is financed by different sources of government revenues. 
More precisely, the government spending is financed by (i) only oil revenues, (ii) oil revenues and 
consumption tax, and (iii) oil revenues and personal income tax. Consequently, adding oil revenues 
with different taxes to finance productive government spending in Barro's (1990) model makes 
our study different from other studies. 
3.7 Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth in Saudi Arabia 
In general, from the standpoint of Keynesian Economics and the New Growth Theory, 
government spending is seen as having a prominent role and a driver of economic growth. 
Regarding the role of fiscal policy, Moreno-Dodson (2013) pointed out that the neoclassical 
growth models in the 1990s were focused on the rule of fiscal policy. Some of the key models 
include Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002), Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996), Futagami, Morita, 
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and Shibata (1993), and Barro (1990). Thus, this section of the literature review addresses the link 
between fiscal policy, i.e. the government spending and taxes, and economic growth in Saudi 
Arabia. This literature is examined in our study for three reasons. First is due to the primary role 
played by fiscal policy, especially government spending, and highlight the lack of studies on taxes 
in the Saudi economy. The second is to understand the relationship between fiscal policy and 
economic growth in Saudi Arabia more accurately, which is the subject of this study. The third 
reason is that our study aims to examine the efficiency of introducing new taxes in the Saudi 
economy, as proposed by the IMF.  
Starting with an early study about the government spending role in Saudi economic growth, 
Barri (2001) studied the link between government expenditure and economic growth during 1970-
1998. His study intended to determine the proper size of government expenditure as part of their 
GDP in the short and long term. It was also aimed to measure the productivity of those 
expenditures. Barri (2001) used a simple theoretical model based on the neoclassical production 
function, which includes the government final consumption expenditure, gross fixed capital 
formation, and labour. 'Barro's rule' is used in his model, where the rule states that "the right size 
of government expenditure is where the value of the productivity of that expenditure is equal to 
the unit" (p.62). 
In Barri's (2001) paper, he attempted to answer two main questions; is government expenditure 
in Saudi Arabia productive or unproductive? Is the size of government expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
appropriate, larger, or smaller than it should be? The results showed that government expenditure's 
productivity was positive and equal to 0.387, suggesting that the expenditure is productive. In the 
long term, the results showed that there was a correlation between the GDP and all government 
expenditure, gross fixed capital formation, and labour involved in the production. In the short term, 
the researcher found that government expenditure in Saudi Arabia is productive as the marginal 
productivity value of this spending is positive but less than one. According to 'Barro's rule', this 
result implies that government spending is larger than it should be, where its size is 29% of GDP, 
which is in line with almost the average world rate. 
Similarly, Al-Obaid (2004) also studied the relationship between economic growth and 
government expenditure and its direction. He tested the validity of ‘Wagner's Law’ in Saudi 
Arabia. Wagner's law is suggested by Adolph Wagner, which states that public spending increases 
with economic growth. The results of examining Saudi Arabia during 1970-2001 by the co-
integration test showed statistical support for Wagner's prediction in the relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP. Moreover, Alshahrani and Alsadiq (2014) empirically tested 
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the economic growth and government spending in Saudi Arabia. They investigated the impact of 
seven varieties types of government spending on economic growth in the short and long run. These 
types of government spending include housing, education, defence, health care, current and capital 
expenditures, public investment, and the impact of total expenditure and domestic private 
investment. Three different econometric techniques, Vector Auto Regression (VAR), 
Cointegration, and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), were used to estimate the impact of 
these expenditures on growth during 1969-2010. The results indicated that private domestic and 
public investments, as well as health care expenditure, have an impact on the long-run growth rate 
in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, trade openness and spending on the housing sector enhance 
the short-run production. 
Along the same lines, Alshammari and Aldkhail (2019) examined the effect of government 
spending on growth in Saudi Arabia. A simple econometric model was tested to measure the effect 
of government spending on growth during the period (1985-2017) using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method. Economic growth is the dependent variable in their model, while three 
types of spending (consumption, investment and government spending) are independent variables. 
For government spending, the results showed that it has a favourable implication on economic 
growth, i.e. increasing government spending contributes to a higher rate of economic growth. 
Similar to Al-Obaid (2004), Alrasheedy and Alrazyeg (2019) investigated the validity of the 
five various versions of Wagner's law and the Keynesian approach. The time-series data of Saudi 
Arabia during 1970-2017 was applied. The authors illustrated that the Keynesian approach showed 
that causality runs from government expenditure to economic growth (GDP), where Wagner's law 
suggested the opposite. Their paper analysed three tests, the stationary properties, Co-integration 
and Granger causality, to check the relationship between government spending and GDP. 
Alrasheedy and Alrazyeg (2019) used the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach of 
cointegration to verify the natural relationship between the variables in the long term. The results 
indicated that there is no evidence for the short-term effect of economic growth on government 
spending (Wagner's Law). However, all types of government spending as a share of income affect 
economic growth (Keynesian approach). 
Although these studies confirmed the significance of government spending to stimulate Saudi 
economic growth, our study is different from them in some respects. First, we provide a theoretical 
framework built on Barro's (1990) work to model Saudi economic growth where the evidence from 
previous studies is based on applied studies. Second, the previous studies in this literature ignored 
the role of taxes in Saudi's economic growth models. Third, as per our research, no research has 
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examined the possibility of compensating for any potential reduction in oil revenues by reforming 
the fiscal policy, i.e. current tax systems. Thus, this thesis aims to fill this gap in this literature by 
introducing consumption tax and personal income tax side by side with the source of oil revenues 
in a simple theoretical economic growth model that attempts to describe Saudi's economy. It also 
discusses how consumption tax, as suggested by the IMF, would compensate for any potential 
reduction in oil revenues. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we summarise all the themes discussed in this section. Starting with the 
economic growth models literature, we aimed to provide an overview of the different growth 
models. The fundamental reason for surveying this literature is due to the fact that our models in 
each chapter may represent a different growth model because of using different sources of 
government revenues. In the second theme, we focused on the literature on the structure of the oil 
market, particularly the oil sector in Saudi Arabia. Although this type of literature is not directly 
related to our study, we believe that this type of literature could give us a better understanding of 
how the oil sector works in order to link it with our growth models. For the third theme, which is 
the economic growth in oil-rich countries, we attempted to show the two opposite hypotheses on 
the possible impact of natural resources. Although our study does not intend to contribute to this 
debate in the literature, we believe that our study would show that if government revenues are used 
to finance productive government spending, then the natural resources could stimulate economic 
growth and eventually it could be a blessing. 
The fourth theme presented a review of literature on managing oil revenue fluctuations in oil-
rich countries. A series of recent studies in this area have indicated that the Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (SWFs) or saving financial surpluses from natural resources in an investment fund would 
be a solution to deal with fluctuations in resource revenues. However, the SWFs may suffer from 
some shortcomings, limiting or reducing the achievement of their primary objectives. Thus, we 
argue that reforming fiscal policy, in particular tax reforms, could be an ideal solution to offset or 
relieve the revenues fluctuations. Regarding the fifth theme, taxes and their roles in economic 
growth, it briefly addresses the public finance literature on tax capacity, the literature on optimal 
taxation stemming from Mirrlees, and the literature on institutions. However, it focuses more on 
the relationship between taxes and economic growth. In this regard, we found that only a few 
studies in the literature demonstrated consumption tax in an economic growth model. Besides, as 
far as we know, only Bambi and Venditti (2018) study has investigated the consumption tax in 
Barro (1990) endogenous growth model, where the government sector is productive. Thus, our 
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study would also contribute to this literature by extending Barro's model (1990) by providing 
different sources of government revenues to finance the productive government sector. In other 
words, our study would be original in providing an understanding of financing the productive 
government sector by (i) only oil revenues as an exogenous source of government revenues, (ii) 
oil revenues and consumption tax, and (iii) oil revenues and personal income tax. 
The last theme inspected the fiscal policy and economic growth literature in Saudi Arabia. A 
close look at this literature revealed that the previous studies have ignored the role of taxes in 
Saudi's economic growth models. To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis aims to introduce 
consumption and personal income taxes besides oil revenues in the Saudi economic growth. 
Furthermore, it investigates how consumption tax would mainly compensate for any potential 
reduction in oil revenues. Now, the next chapter will look at modelling the Saudi economy before 




4 Chapter Four: Modelling Saudi Economic Growth 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a theoretical paper about the economic growth in Saudi Arabia. We examine the 
case of the world's second-largest oil economy, Saudi Arabia, in terms of production and exports. 
As one of the oil-rich countries, the Saudi economy is highly dependent on oil revenues, which 
determine the fate of the whole national economy. Barro's endogenous growth model is extended 
to model the Saudi economy before implementing the proposed fiscal policy by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The extension of the Barro model in this chapter is based on two things; (i) 
ignoring any taxes36, and (ii) adding the oil sector and modified the budget constraint. The primary 
assumption in this chapter is that we only have one source of government revenues that finances 
government spending. This source is the oil sector profit, and the key feature of our model is that 
the oil sector is modelled and treated as an exogenous and monopolistic sector, where the growth 
rate is basically led by a growing demand for oil. We simplify the theoretical model by setting the 
oil sector maximises its profit, and then the government uses them to enhance the firms' production 
function. Despite the oil sector is an exogenous sector, it plays a central role in our economy 
because government spending is only fed by this sector. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that 
although we use Barro endogenous growth model with an exogenous source, our model could be 
represented as an exogenous or a semi-endogenous growth model where the growth is led by the 
growing demand for oil. 
This chapter aims to answer the first two research questions in this thesis. It is mainly based on a 
description of the Saudi economy and the impact on the economic growth of a negative shock in 
demand for oil. We examine in this chapter how our economy can be affected if there is a negative 
shock to the demand for oil by focusing on the impact of reducing the growth rate of government 
spending on the whole economy. Thus, we work on an endogenous growth model with an 








4.2 Model Description 
The model setup is organised to represent the Saudi Arabia economy where we assume that Saudi 
Arabia is a partially open economy and has four sectors: oil, government, households, and firms' 
sectors37. Oil and government sectors have limited access to deal with abroad. The oil sector simply 
exports oil abroad and receives revenues. It also maximises its profit as a monopolist, and then the 
government gets oil profits and purchases of imported goods. On the other hand, households and 
firms' sectors are assumed to be domestic agents where they both do not deal with abroad.  
I. Oil Sector: 
Although many studies in energy and non-renewable resources economics, starting from 
Hotelling's rule38, have paid much attention to exploiting non-renewable resources optimally and 
distributing them among generations, the model in this study will not deal with it for several 
reasons. (i) The main purpose of this study is to treat the oil sector as an exogenous and 
monopolistic sector where it only maximises its profit in each period separately, and then the 
government sector collects that profit. (ii) One of the main objectives of the thesis is to examine 
how to compensate for any reduction in oil revenues by suggesting tax reforms to maintain the 
sustainable growth rate, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Thus, this study 
focuses on economic growth rather than the optimal extraction of non-renewable resources such 
as oil. (iii) Introducing the analysis of the optimal extraction oil between generations over time 
may make the model difficult and take it away from the purpose of this study. Therefore, what we 
basically want to study in this chapter is what happens in terms of growth if there is a negative 
shock to the demand for oil. Then, in the following chapters, we will introduce consumption tax 
and personal income tax alongside oil revenues to study the impact on economic growth and how 





37 We ignore the discussion of the foreign sector in our economy as a fifth sector. The reason is that this sector has only to deal in 
our model with the government sector, as we will see later. 
 
38 Hotelling's rule comes from Harold Hotelling's paper 'The Economics of Exhaustible Resources' who analysed the optional 
extraction between present and future. Hotelling's rule links the price of non-renewable natural resource, as a physical asset, with 
interest rate of financial asset, ignoring the extraction costs. It states that the optimal extraction path of a non-renewable resource 
is when the resource price increases at the interest rate. If the appreciation rate of non-renewable resources is greater (less) than the 
interest rate, the extraction of the non-renewable resources would (would not) be optimal (Hotelling, 1931). 
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Before studying the oil sector, it is worth looking at the oil demand data to have a clear picture of 
the most important determinant of oil demand. By looking at the data, we have observed in recent 
years that there was a more growing demand for oil over time, which could depend on many 
factors39. One possible reason that caused a positive trend in demand for oil over time could be 
due to the economic growth of the rest of the world, where some countries are demanding more 
oil. By using the available data provided by the World Bank data and BP statistical review of world 
energy, we have found a significant (strong) positive relationship between world real GDP and 
world oil demand40.  
In general, any change in the world real GDP growth would lead to changes in the world oil 
demand41, which would lead to changes in oil profit. Changes in oil profit would lead to changes 
in the government's revenues, which would end up affecting government spending. Finally, this 
would affect the economic growth of a country that heavily depends on exporting oil, such as Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, relying on oil revenues and then on public spending as a significant driver of 
economic activity has made the Saudi economy more sensitive to changes in the global oil markets. 
As a result, the profits of the oil sector are essential for our study because they are the only source 
of government revenues that are used to finance government spending.  
II. Government Sector: 
The government sector involves two sides: the revenue side and the spending side. In this chapter, 
there is only one source of government revenues which is oil revenues. Thus, the government 
receives oil profits from the oil sector and then spends it on purchasing imported goods from 
abroad. The transaction between the government and foreign sector is only based on exchanging 
oil revenues with imported goods. Then, the government sector provides public goods (e.g. 
infrastructure, legal framework) as positive externalities to the firms in order to enhance their 
production. Moreover, it is also assumed that the government has no access to international 
financial markets (lending and borrowing), i.e. it just spends all what it receives. 
 
39  As we understand from the principles of economics that there are several factors that affect the demand for any commodity. The 
main factors include the price of the commodity itself, the income of individuals, individuals' tastes and consumption habits, 
government policies of taxes and fees, prices of other goods, and other factors that have a direct or indirect impact on the quantities 
that individuals want and can purchase from goods or services. Regarding the oil, it is also a commodity, where its demand is also 
affected by such factors. The most important of these factors are the price of the oil itself, expected future oil prices (especially for 
speculators and hedgers), alternative commodity prices (e.g. coal, gas, renewable, nuclear, etc.), supplementary commodity prices 
(e.g. cars, plane tickets, tanker traffic, etc.), derivative prices (e.g. gasoline, diesel, petrochemicals, etc.), global economic activity 
(e.g. growth, contraction). There are also secondary factors such as taxes, nature fluctuations, political turmoil, and wars that also 
affect the demand for oil. 
 
40  The details of this relationship can be found in chapter two (section 2.5.4). 
 
41  For instance, due to the recent spread of Coronavirus that hits one of the large economies in the world, China, and other countries 
as well, many factories and companies have entirely or partially stopped working. Thus, some reports of international organizations, 
such as IMF (2020b) and IEA (2020), recently expect that the world economic growth and the world oil demand would slow down 
significantly due to this crisis. 
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III. Households Sector: 
The households supply factors for production to the firms and demand goods and services from 
the firms. They maximise their utility over time. It is assumed that the households' utility is a 
function of only consumption, where labour supply in the model is completely inelastic. 
IV. Firms Sector: 
The firms' sector is assumed to be not dealing with abroad, and it is represented by the final non-
oil goods sector. This sector receives positive externalities from the government to increase its 
production function. All firms act in a perfectly competitive market, and they maximise their 
profits at each date.  
The below diagram  shows a summary of the economy's structure for this chapter, where each 
arrow indicates what each sector in our economy provides and receives. 
 
Diagram 3: The structure of the economy in chapter four 
 
4.3 Model Setup 
The main sections in our model of this chapter include the agents in the economy, equilibrium, 
analysis of the steady-state, comparison of the Ramsey model and our model, analysis of the 
stability, the transitional dynamics in our economy, numerical simulation, and finally a discussion 
of a special case of our model. Thus, let us begin with the details of the agents in the economy. 
The main agents in the economy are the oil, government, households, and firms' sectors. Each 
sector will be studied in more details. 
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4.3.1 Oil Sector (Monopolist Sector) 
Oil is the only commodity exported abroad, which can be used to cover the cost of imported goods. 
Thus, the oil sector maximises its profit, and then the government takes that profit to finance its 
spending. We assume that the international capital flows (lending and borrowing) do not exist, so 
the current account has to be balanced (CA=0). The reason for making this assumption is to avoid 
an accumulation of Net Foreign Assets (NFA) and to simplify the model.  
We also assume that the demand for oil is derived entirely from abroad and then is derived by 
world economic (GDP) growth. Therefore, the growth rate of the oil demand is considered here to 
be exogenously given. Moreover, the oil sector is considered in the model to have an oil demand 
growing potentially with a positive rate over time. Therefore, the oil sector profit grows over time. 





where  is the growth rate of  which is the global GDP growth rate, and  is exogenously given. 
In equation (4.1),  is the oil demand,  is the slope, and  is its relative price in terms of the 
final output, which is controlled by the monopolist. In equation (4.2), we assume that  is not 
constant, but it grows over time because we want to show that the oil demand grows over time and 
then to show the path of change in price and quantity. 
Combining (4.1) and (4.2) leads to the following time-varying demand function: 
 
 
In general, the monopoly's profit is given by the following equation: 
 
In this formula, .  is the total revenue (TR), and ( ) represents the total cost (TC). Profit is 
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Although it is difficult in reality to obtain accurate data on production costs due to the difference 
from one country to another, the fact is that some oil-rich countries may have very low production 
costs depending on their oil characteristics42. In this study, we assume there is no intermediate 
input used in the oil sector; therefore, the cost function is assumed to be zero in the model,      
( ) = 0. 
Profit maximisation for the monopolist is a sequence of static problems. Each maximising profit 
at a single point in time takes the oil demand as given, so the monopolist solves, 
  
subject to  
 
Substituting the constraint (4.3) into the objective function (direct substitution method), and setting 




The optimality condition is that we must have marginal revenue (MR) equal to marginal cost (MC), 
to obtain the optimal price and quantity. Nevertheless, since the cost function in the model is 
assumed to be zero, then the marginal cost is zero too, MC=0. Thus, the optimal price is, 
 
and the optimal quantity, 
 
42  In practice, when remaining oil reserves reduce, oil extraction becomes more expensive. The reason for the high costs in this 
case is due to the need to drill deeper wells or pump water or carbon dioxide to maintain the pressure inside those wells (Van Der 
Ploeg, 2010). However, in reality, oil production cost in some oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia is very low. According to 
Alobaid and Atya (1994), Saudi oil is characterized by lower production costs compared to production costs in other regions due 
to the following reasons: availability of large reserves, advanced technology and geological nature of Saudi oil wells, which are 
characterized by low dry wells, abundant production, and low most of the depth of wells. 
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Now we substitute the result of equation (4.4) and (4.5) inside the objective function. Then, we get 
the monopolist's profit ( ): 
 
From equation (4.6), the growth rate of the oil demand  and the monopolist's profit  is . The 
oil profit is exogenous because the growth rate that we treated as exogenous, in equation (4.2), is 
the growth rate of the intercept determined the demand for oil function. Thus, the growth rate of 
oil profits is not , but it is , which grows all the time (short run and long run). As a result, the 
oil profit is treated here as exogenous because the oil sector is independent of the rest of the 
economy. 
4.3.2 Government Sector 
The government budget contains two sides: revenues and spending.  The revenues side of the 
government sector comes only from the profit of the oil sector, which is assumed to own, and they 
are used to purchase imported goods from abroad to enhance the production function of the final 
goods sector. Following the example of Barro's endogenous growth model, government spending 
is treated as current government spending43. Assuming that the government sector cannot access 
the international financial market, and there are no taxes44, the government sector simply spends 
all the profits received by the oil sector in purchasing imported goods. So, the government budget 
is in balance and can be written as: 
 
where  is the government spending and  is the oil sector profits. 
 
 
43  In spite of the fact that, in order to capture the idea of that government spending is on 'infrastructure' and that this has positive 
externalities, the government spending should be treated as capital spending, we follow Barro's endogenous growth model to 
consider them as current spending. 
  
44  In fact, the current tax system in Saudi Arabia is very limited. Thus, we do not model taxes in this chapter; however, new taxes, 


















            
    TC
                                                                                                                                        











    
                                                                     
95 
 
We define the growth rate of government spending as ≡ / , which can be written as,  
 
 
We can now see that government spending grows at the rate of  every period, including the 
short-run. As yet, the government has no instrument to react from a shock to government spending. 
Thus, in the case of having a negative shock on , then the government revenues would be 
changed, affecting government spending and its growth rate. Once the government spending is 
affected, the public goods provided to the firms would also be affected. Finally, the economic 
growth rate would as well be impacted accordingly. 
4.3.3 Households Sector 
The households maximise their utility function, which is a function of consumption subject to the 
budget constraint, with preferences represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function and parameter > 0. The utility of households depends only on consumption. So, the 
households supply completely inelastically their labour, which means that they supply at each date  
= 1  to the firms. It is assumed that there is a unit measure of identical infinitely-lived 
households. From solving the household's problem, we find the households' capital accumulation 
equation and Euler equation. 
The households have no access to international trade, where goods can be either consumed or 
invested domestically. Moreover, there is no transfer45 in the model. So, the consumer's budget 




Where , ∈ (0,1) are the discount factor and the constant depreciation rate of capital, 
respectively.  is the gross capital income,  is the labour wage,  is the consumption, and 
= − +  is the gross investment.  
 
45 Although we assume that there is no transfer to households in our model for simplicity, the households in Saudi Arabia receive 
subsidies in terms of reduced energy bills, where these subsidies are represented a very small percentage of the oil profit. However, 
the government has recently worked on energy price reform through the gradual cancellation of government subsidies on energy 
products as a goal to be achieved by 2030. The purpose of the energy price reform is to adjust pricing and focus on supporting 
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So now, we can rewrite the capital accumulation as: 
 











Substitution (4.9) into (4.10) leads to the Euler equation: 
 
4.3.4 Firms Sector 
Following Barro (1990) by introducing positive externalities from the government's purchases of 
goods and services, the production function used in this economy is the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. The total output in period t, , is produced by firms using two inputs, namely, physical 
capital, , and labour, . Government spending, , is positive externalities46. All firms are 
assumed to be identical, and they act in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, each firm produces 
output  using the following Cobb-Douglas production function, 
 
 
For equation (4.12), there are two different interpretations, i.e. not two different versions of the 
production function, of the same production function. 
 
46 Cornes and Sandler (1996) clarified that the production of the private sector will be impacted by the activities of the government. 
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(i) For given , the above equation shows (IRS) in ,  and  all together. 
 
(ii) For given  and , the aggerate level displays (CRS) in both private inputs of capital, , 
and labour, . Likewise, for given  and , the production function also shows (CRS) in  
and  together as in Barro's (1990) version. 
The version of Barro's (1990) endogenous growth model with public spending assumed that both 
the aggregate labour supply and technology level are constant. The reason is that an increase in 
scale, , raises the marginal product of capital and raises economic growth. In this case, the 
economy benefits from a greater scale. The reason is that the government service is assumed to be 
nonrival and can therefore be spread costlessly over additional users. Thus, Barro assumed zero 
population growth to study steady-state. Consequently, the above general production function, 
equation (4.12), with Barro's (1990) assumptions becomes such that: 
 
However, we start from the general production function with government spending, equation 
(4.12), 
 
The firm's problem of maximising profits is that they decide how much capital and labour to 
demand in order to maximise their profits by taking the rental rate of capital, , and wage per unit 
of labour, , as given, subject to the firms' production function: 
 
 
Substituting the production function into the firms' objective function (direct substitution method) 
gives the firms' problem: 
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The first-order conditions of the profit maximisation problem: 
 
 
For the equilibrium purposes, we convert the variables in terms of per government spending units 
(PGSU), by dividing them by government spending, . Thus, the output PGSU can be written as: 
  
where ≡ /   is the output PGSU, and ≡ /  is the capital PGSU. 
Since we have now obtained the output PGSU, it would be more appropriate for consistency to 
find the capital income PGSU and labour income PGSU. 
Dividing both sides of the capital income, , by  to get capital income PGSU: 
 
The share of capital income PGSU: 
 
Similarly, the labour income PGSU can be obtained by dividing both sides of the labour income, 
, by : 
 
The share of labour income PGSU: 
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Equilibrium occurs when the households' supply of inputs equals the firms' demand for inputs and 
when the households' demand for outputs equals the firms' supply of outputs at every point of time. 
According to the general equilibrium theory (Walrasian general equilibrium), the prices will adjust 
to match the supply from the households and the demand from the firms. In this regard, the prices 
will adjust in such a way that capital supply and capital demand are equalised, and that is the 
definition of capital market clearing. Furthermore, the total amount of production is completely 
used for consumption and investment purposes. 
The market-clearing condition is that  = + 47, where  is the total resources in the economy 
that are used for consumption, , and investment, . However, the capital accumulation equation 
and Euler equation at the equilibrium are affected by boosting the government spending to the 
firm's sector. To see that, we start with the capital accumulation equation: 
  
 
We divide it by government spending, , to get PGSU variables. As we defined earlier, the ratio 
of capital stock over government spending as ≡ /  and the ratio of labour over government 
spending as ≡ / , we now define the new ratio ̂ ≡ /  as a consumption PGSU. So, 




Now, the right-hand side is only per government spending variables, but the left-hand side is not. 







47  The government spending, , is not entered in the resource constraint of the economy because it is imported goods from abroad 
and is not purchased any goods from the domestic market, as we assumed in the government sector. In other words, home-goods 
are not used in government spending.  
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Considering that the profit of the firms is zero, equation (4.18), and assuming that the aggregate 
labour is = 1, as Barro (1990) where there is no population growth in the steady-state, the 
capital accumulation at equilibrium can be rewritten as, 
 
where = , and  = / =  is the growth rate of government spending. 
 
The capital accumulation at equilibrium implies the law of motion for the stock of capital PGSU. 
It is a nonlinear function of the last period's capital PGSU and the current period of consumption 
PGSU. 
On the other hand, we multiply both sides of the Euler equation, equation (4.11), by /  and 
do some algebra. After that, the Euler equation at equilibrium becomes, 
 
which describes the optimal consumption PGSU choice of the household between today and the 
future period. 





These two equations (4.19) and (4.20) plus transversality condition with  given are the main 
equations that describe the market equilibrium of our economy. 
 
1
ˆlim       0





t t t tt
G
β λ k










ˆ ˆ ˆˆ .     (1 )   
1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ    (1 )                                                                                  (4.19)
t
t
t G t t t
t t t t
G
k γ y δ k c




   









   1
ˆ










c γ β R δ
c






    
    
101 
 
Before moving on to the steady-state analysis, it is worthwhile to take stock of the accounting 
identities. In the model, there is one export commodity, oil, and imported goods purchased by the 
government. Thus, the balance of trade, exports and imports, is assumed to be balanced in the 
model, such that, 
 
 
In this case, there is no chance of building up (NFA) credit48. As a result, the trade balance equation 
would be the same as the government budget constraint (recalling that government revenue equals 
the value of oil exports), where they are all in balance. 
Moreover, to compare our model with Barro's model (1990), the tax rate is one of the main 
determinants in Barro's model. However, our model shows only one determinant of the growth 
rate, which is the exogenous shift rate of the oil demand. Consequently, our model differs from 
Barro's model in determining the growth rate, which means it is an exogenous growth model 
instead of being an endogenous growth model. 
4.4 Analysis of the Steady-State 
A steady-state of a sequence { } is defined as a point ∗ such that, if  = ∗, then  = ∗ for 
all ≥ 1. In words, if we start there, then we always stay there. Thus, in this section, we show that 
a steady-state in capital PGSU, ∗, and consumption PGSU, ̂∗, exist49. 
 
 
If the economy has = ∗ and  ̂ = ̂∗, then moving forward in the time period will not change 
the capital stock and consumption. Thus, as in the Solow model, the steady-state can be seen as 
the long-run equilibrium of the economy where all the variables remain constant forever, which 
means that ∆ = 0, and there are no changes in consumption PGSU, ∆ ̂ = 0. 
 
 
48 Even though this assumption may not be realistic, but it is true that some emerging markets have some restrictions that prevent 
capital flows and outflows. Thus, we assume in the model that building up (NFA) does not exist for simplicity. 
 
49 The star * denotes steady-state. The steady-state ∗, ̂∗  is mathematically a fixed point of the dynamic system, equations (4.19) 
and (4.20) determining our economy. 
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A steady-state can be fund analytically using the fundamental two equations in the economy (4.19) 
and (4.20), taking into consideration that at the steady-state = = ∗ and ̂ = ̂ = ̂∗. 
Starting from the Euler equation, 
 
At the steady-state, this ratio ̂ / ̂  will be equal to one. Then, we obtain:  
 
The capital accumulation equation is, 
 
 
At the steady-state, we have that = = ∗. Therefore, 
 
These expressions show the equations for the steady-state values ̂∗ and ∗, where everything in 
the economy grows at the rate of government spending, which is  = . This, in fact, represents 
an exogenous growth rate. Thus, this is a different conclusion from Barro's conclusion, where the 
main determinant of the economic growth in our model is the growth rate of oil profits, . 
In the steady-state, the level of capital and consumption must be growing if government spending 
is growing. To see that clearly, suppose that the economy has converged to a steady-state at period 
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This ratio = /  is the gross growth rate of the capital stock. When we have arrived at the 
steady-state, this expression says that the growth rate of the capital stock must be equal to the 
growth rate of government spending, which is / . Therefore, in the steady-state in which 
capital PGSU is not growing, it must be the case that capital is growing at the same rate as 
government spending.  
Regarding consumption, this ratio = /   is the gross growth rate of consumption. It 






4.4.2 The Effect on the Steady-State 
This section analyses the effect on the steady-state when there is a negative shock of oil demand. 
It is assumed that the shock is a permanent reduction in the growth rate of government spending, 
.  






and the transversality condition lim
→
= 0, with  given. Thus, when a negative shock 
on demand for oil occurs, the steady-state will be affected. To see that, we start with the steady-
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From this equation, we can find a direct effect when  changes. To see the change of  at the 




Since , , ∈ (0,1), > 0, and ≥ 150, then it is clear that the sign of equation (4.23) is 
negative. Therefore, we conclude that there is a negative relationship between the capital PGSU, 
∗, and  at the steady-state, meaning that if  falls, then the capital PGSU, ∗, rises. 
On the other hand, we have already found the steady-state equation (4.22), which we now point it 
out as (4.22)' just to make it easier to follow, 
 
 
We observe that ̂∗does not only depend on  but also depends on ∗. Thus, we need to consider 
the total effect, which is not only the 'direct effect (DE)' of  ̂∗ but also the 'indirect effect (IE)' of 
̂∗ on ∗. To look at the change of  at the steady-state, we first substitute the expression for ∗ 
into ̂∗,  
 
and then we take the derivative of  ̂∗ with respect to : 
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Looking at equation (4.22)', raising  has three effects on ̂∗: there is one 'direct effect (DE)' at a 
given value of ∗, and two 'indirect effects (IE)'. The derivative of equation (4.22)' with respect to 
, holding ∗ constant, gives us the 'direct effects (DE)', which is corresponded to the third 
expression in equation (4.24), 
 
Since we have shown in equation (4.23) that − +  is positive, then the 'direct effect 
(DE)' must be here negative, < 0. 
Regarding the two 'indirect effects (IE)', they operate through the fall in ∗. Looking at equation 
(4.22)'', we can see that they work in the opposite direction and are also corresponded to the 
equation (4.24). To see that, ∗  in equation (4.22)' is corresponded to the second expression in 
equation (4.24), − +
( )
, which is negative because of ( − 1). While 
(1 − − ) ∗ in equation (4.22)' is corresponded to the first expression in equation (4.24), 
( )
( )
− + , which is positive because (1 − − ) and ( − 1) are 
both negative. In summary, the two 'indirect effects (IE)' conflict with each other, so the sign of 
the 'net indirect effect (NIE)' is unclear yet.  
Let us now consider only the ambiguous sign of the 'net indirect effect (NIE)' further. In this case, 
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The first part of the 'net indirect effect (NIE)' is negative because of ( − 1). For the second part 
of (NIE), since (1 − − ) is negative because of ≥ 1, the ( )  will be negative too. 
While − 1 +  is positive as shown in equation (4.23), then                                
− 1 + will be positive. Thus, all this part ( ) − 1 + will be 
negative. However, to determine whether it will be greater or less than one, it indeed depends on 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, . Thus, if  is sufficiently large, then this whole part  
( ) − 1 +  is going to be negative and less than one. In this case, the 'net 
indirect effect (NIE)' will end up with a negative sign. As a result, this proves that (provided      
≥ 1), the 'net indirect effect (NIE)' of raising  on ̂∗ becomes unambiguously negative 
(recalling that raising  causes falling ∗). Given that the 'direct effect (DE)' of raising  on ̂∗ 
is negative, it then follows that the overall effect is negative too. 
We have shown in the analysis of the steady-state section that if the growth rate of government 
spending, , declines, then the growth rate of consumption, capital, and output will be declined 
too. Thus, if there is a permanent reduction in , the model predicts that the key variables in the 
new steady-state will grow at the new lower level of . Looking at the consumption as one of the 
primary endogenous variables, we have proved that ̂∗/  is negative. The negative sign of 
̂∗/  means that although the consumption will grow at a lower rate, the consumption PGSU, 
̂ , will be higher (recalling that consumption PGSU is ̂ ≡ / ).  
In reality, we are indeed indifferent about the PGSU variables. Thus, we have just used these 
variables and built our model to assist in analysing the model. However, what the policymakers 
and others may be interested in are the variables in terms of level. Therefore, we use the log scale, 
where a variable growing at a constant rate appears linear. The below diagram displays the 
exogenous change, government spending, , in the solid line, which will initially grow before 
time ̃. Time ̃ refers to the time when the growth rate of government spending declined. In other 
words, it presents a time when new information and the implementation of a new regime occurs. 
Before time ̃, ( > ̃), it is assumed that the agents do not expect and know about shocks, but 
they, on the other hand, predict to carry on. However, when new information about a permanent 
reduction in  comes along, the agents predict and know that a change in government spending 
is occurred at and after time ̃, ( ≤ ̃). Then, they correctly anticipate that the growth rate will be 
lower forever. Therefore, the agents in our model are considered to be not perfect foresight but 
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almost perfect foresight because their correct anticipation starts from the time ̃ and after, where 
they expect before the time ̃ that government spending is growing. 
      
 
Diagram 4: The path of growing consumption when there is a permanent reduction in the growth rate of 
government spending   
On the other hand, we know from the steady-state that the level of consumption grows at the same 
rate as government spending. Thus, since the government spending grows at a slower rate, if ̂∗ 
did not change, the growth rate of consumption would just follow the solid line, which means there 
is no upward or downward jump. However, ignoring the transitional dynamics, the new steady-
state at and after time ̃ will be like the dashed line, where it shows an upward step relative to the 
old steady-state. The reason is that ̂∗/  is negative, which tells us that the new steady-state 
must be higher. High consumption PGSU implies that the consumption grows faster than the 
government spending along the transition path. 
Two factors can explain the result in which a fall in  raises ̂∗. These two reasons can be seen 
from our previous discussion regarding the direct effect and the net indirect effect. The first reason 
comes from the direct effect, which means that a fall in  reduces the investment needed, i.e. the 
investment needed to provide the new government spending units with the same amount of capital 
PGSU as the existing units of government spending. This can be seen in equation (4.22)', i.e. the 
term − ∗ . Thus, it leaves more output available for consumption in the steady-state. The 
second reason comes from the net indirect effect. We have found theoretically that if  is 
sufficiently large (small), the net indirect effect is negative (positive). Thus, if  is sufficiently 
large (small), the fall in  raises (reduce) the steady-state value of capital PGSU. In turn, this 
increases (decreases) ̂∗ even at a given value of , because the economy is on the upward-sloping 
(downward-sloping) part of the 'hill', which gives ̂∗ as a function of ∗ 51. The reason for raising 
(reducing) ∗ is intuitively due to that a fall in  works in a similar way to a productivity 
improvement that raises (reduces) the marginal product of capital.  
 
51 The reason why  matters for the sign of the net indirect effect is that it can alter the slope of the relationship between ̂∗ and ∗, 
i.e. the hill-shaped relationship. 
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Now, let us explain the situation in which the sigma is sufficiently large. Generally, in the case of 
raising , if agents save and invest more in period t (therefore sacrificing some consumption in 
period t), the extra output which this yields in period t+1 is 'diluted' because it has to be divided 
between a larger number of units of government spending. However, we are in the opposite 
situation, i.e. the case of lowering . In this case, a lower  reduces this 'dilution' effect, meaning 
the reward to a sacrifice of consumption PGSU in period t is higher in terms of the gain which it 
enables in consumption PGSU in period t+1. In other words, the incentive to save and invest is 
increased, which can be seen in the Euler equations for consumption, where lower  raises 
̂ / ̂ . 
Again, in reality, the slowdown of oil profits growth rate and then the growth rate of government 
spending are undesirable for Saudi's economy. However, although Saudi's economy is worst off 
due to the slow growth rate of oil profits, there is some kind of partially offsetting effect. In other 
words, although consumption is growing more slowly, it is indeed increased relative to its previous 
trajectory. As a result, the model rejects the thought that everything will remain in the same 
proportion to government spending and therefore the whole economy will just grow at a slow rate, 
but where the ratios to government spending are no different from what they were before the 
slowdown. The model, however, shows that there is some partially offsetting shift in consumption 
which may not be obvious. 
Let us now link the analysis in this chapter and our case study in chapter two. By looking at the 
historical data presented in chapter two for Saudi Arabia, it seems that they are consistent with our 
model in this chapter. More precisely, our model demonstrates that the growth rate of government 
spending is the growth rate of oil profits. Thus, in the case of a negative shock on oil demand, 
government revenues would change, affecting government spending and, eventually, the economic 
growth rate. Both our results and the historical data confirm that oil revenues are closely related 
to Saudi's GDP. From the historical data, we can see clearly that the recession period of 1982-2002 
witnessed a decline in GDP at current prices. This decline in GDP was associated with the oil crisis 
at that time, particularly the period between 1982-1989. During this period, GDP and oil revenues 
were moving in the same relative direction, where the negative impact on GDP was due to the 
sharp decline in oil revenues. Similarly, the Iraq and Kuwait war and the Asian financial crisis of 
the 1990s significantly affected Saudi oil revenues, which declined by half. This drop indeed had 
a significant impact on GDP, which fell by 11.4%. In addition, the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009 caused the price of oil to decline by 35.6% and oil revenues by 55.8%, which in turn led to 
a fall in GDP of 17.45%. Consequently, our results in this chapter correspond to the historical data 
for Saudi Arabia, where oil revenues have a strong relationship with economic growth. 
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4.5 Comparison of the Ramsey Model and Our Model 
This section studies the discrete-time Ramsey model in decreasing technological progress and 
compares it with our model if the oil profit growth (i.e. government spending growth rate) declines. 
We found that the two models seem similar52. Therefore, the comparison of the Ramsey model 
and our model can be highlighted as follows: 
(i) In the Ramsey model, it is used a general Cobb-Douglas production function, which contains 
the total factor productivity, , capital stock, , and population or labour, . However, in 
our model, we apply Barro's (1990) production function by assuming the constant technology 
level and introducing government spending as positive externalities to enhance the firms' 
production function. Both models display the same constant returns to scale (CRS). 
 
(ii) In the Ramsey model, technological progress is not constant, but it grows over time. In the 
model, we assume that there is no population growth; therefore, the capital and consumption 
grow in the long run at the same rate of technological progress, . However, we follow 
Barro (1990) in our model by also assuming that there is no population growth in the steady-
state because we normalise the aggregate labour (i.e. working population) to one ( = 1). 
Moreover, we introduce the oil sector as a monopolistic and exogenous sector in our model, 
which essentially feeds the government sector. Thus, we have a government spending 
growth, which is basically led by a growing demand for oil. The government spending in our 












52 The comparison between the main equations in both models is in Appendix A.1. 
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4.6 Analysis of the Stability of Our Economy  
The stability of the solution of a system relies on the characteristic equation. The characteristic 
equation of a square matrix is used to find the eigenvalues of that matrix, and the eigenvalues are 
important to check on stability. Thus, the characteristic equation takes the form, 
 
 
where   is called the eigenvalue of a matrix, the  is the trace of the matrix, which is the sum of 
a matrix diagonal elements, and the  refers to the determinant of the matrix, which is the 
difference between the product of the two diagonal elements. 
In discrete-time, an eigenvalue of a matrix is stable if the absolute value is less than one, i.e. lies 
inside the unit circle, such that | | < 1, and it is unstable if the absolute value is greater than one, 
i.e. lies outside the unit circle, such that | | > 1. 
 
Thus, the characteristic equation has to be satisfied, and an eigenvalue to be stable should be lying 
inside the unit circle. 
To analyse the stability in our economy, we begin to construct the linear approximation to the 
system around steady-state. In the steady-state, PGSU variables will stay constant                           
̂ = ̂∗, = ∗, = ∗ ∀ .   
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We start with the capital accumulation equation (4.19) and find the first-order Taylor 




The first-order Taylor approximation of capital accumulation: 
 
 
Then, we use the steady-state, which is the expression for ∗ in equation (4.21). We substitute it 
into the first-order Taylor approximation of capital accumulation and rearrange it. Thus, we obtain: 
 
On the other hand, considering the Euler equation (4.20), we find the first-order Taylor 
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Where Φ∗ denotes the bracketed expression in (4.20), Φ∗ = ∗ + 1 − . Particularising 




By substituting the approximation of capital accumulation equation (4.25), we obtain: 
 
The capital accumulation equation and the Euler equation describe the low of motion in this 
system. Thus, when we linearise them around the steady-state, as shown in (4.25) and (4.26), we 
realise that there will be two eigenvalues in this system. The linearised capital accumulation 
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To check for the existence of a unique solution of a linear perfect-foresight model, Blanchard and 
Kahn (1980) showed three different propositions. These propositions state that (i) if the number of 
eigenvalues of a matrix outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined 
variables, then a unique non-divergent solution exists. (ii) if the number of eigenvalues of a matrix 
outside the unit circle is greater than the number of non-predetermined variables, then a non-
divergent solution to the system does not exist. (iii) if the number of eigenvalues of a matrix outside 
the unit circle is less than the number of non-predetermined variables, then an infinite number of 
non-divergent solutions exist. 
The dynamic system has two different variables in our model: a predetermined variable and a non-
predetermined variable. The predetermined variable is the capital PGSU, , because we know 
from the definition of capital PGSU that ≡ = , which implies that all variables in  cannot 
jump. On the other hand, the non-predetermined variable is the consumption PGSU, ̂  because 
the definition of consumption PGSU shows that ̂ ≡ = , which contains only one jumper 
variable that is consumption. Thus, although , which is equal to , cannot jump, ̂  becomes a 
non-predetermined variable. 




The solution to this quadratic equation for  is the two eigenvalues. We know that (i) the constant 
term equals the determinant ( ) of the matrix A (product of eigenvalues, . ) and (ii) the 
coefficient on  equals minus the trace ( ) of matrix A (the sum of eigenvalues, + ). 
Rankin (2007)53 provided an exposition of a test for the number of stable eigenvalues of the 
dynamical system to find saddle-point stability. He explained that for given particular restrictions 
on the signs and ranges of possible values of the model's coefficients, such tests might help to 
determine whether saddle-point stability holds. However, in discrete-time systems, a method of 
transforming the eigenvalues is applied because a stable eigenvalue is the one that lies inside the 
unit circle, unlike in continuous-time where a stable eigenvalue has a negative real part. This 
method goes beyond most of the mathematical economic textbooks, where they usually only 
provide conditions for all eigenvalues of a system to be stable. 
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Now, we apply the test, explained by Rankin's (2007), to our characteristic equation to have 0, 1, 
or 2 stable eigenvalues. This test will equivalently produce conditions for 0, 1, or 2 of the original 
eigenvalues  to lie inside the unit circle. The characteristic equation of a system takes the form, 
 
 
where  is the eigenvalue and a, b, c are the coefficients for the characteristic equation. 
The below table shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for 0, 1, or 2 of the eigenvalues  
to lie inside the unit circle. 
 
  
The first row in the table presents how many eigenvalues that lie inside the unit circle. The second 
and third rows show the necessary and sufficient conditions from the characteristic equation that 
must be consistent with 0, 1, or 2 eigenvalue numbers.  
Returning to our model, since we have one predetermined state variable in the model, , it should 
follow that we need one stable eigenvalue for saddle-point stability. Therefore, looking at the 
above table and converting the table's coefficients (a,b,c) to our coefficients from our characteristic 
equation54, the necessary and sufficient condition is the one that is in the middle of the above table, 
such that, 
 
In our model, this condition holds with no additional assumptions. Therefore, we can conclude 
that exactly one eigenvalue lies inside the unit circle. As a result, the steady-state ∗, ̂∗  is a 
saddle-point. 
 
54  By converting the table’s coefficients (a,b,c) to our coefficients from our characteristic equation, we got that                                       
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4.7 The Transitional Dynamics in Our Economy 
In the transitional dynamics, we use a phase diagram to show the characteristics of a dynamic 
system. In our case, the phase diagram contains two variables: the variable on the vertical axis is 
the consumption PGSU, ̂ , and the variable on the horizontal axis is the capital PGSU, . We 
analyse in this section the transitional dynamics before and after the negative shock for oil demand 
to occur. 
4.7.1 The Transitional Dynamics Before the Negative Shock for Oil Demand 
Before the negative shock of oil demand, we assume that our economy is at its steady-state level 
(E) in Diagram 6. In this diagram, the arrows indicate the dynamic behaviour of ̂  and . The 
arrows change as the place of economy change in four different possible regions.  
To analyse the dynamics of the model through a phase diagram, we first rewrite the key two 




it follows that,  
 




substituting  into the Euler equation, it follows that,  
 
The phase diagram is built based on two curves relating  to ̂ . Each curve of them coincides 
with one of the two zero change cases: ∆ = − = 0 (capital accumulation), and 
∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0 (Euler equation). 
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First, when ∆ = − = 0, the equation (4.27) becomes, 
 
We can rewrite equation (4.29) as: 
 
 
We can also draw ̂  as a function of  (treating  as given), as follows: 
 
Diagram 5: Drawing equation ̂   as a function of  
 
The second diagram shows that ̂  as a function of  is a 'hill shaped', where  is the value of 
 which maximises ̂ , such that, 
 
 
For low values of  ,  ̂ / > 0, while for high values of  ,  ̂ / < 0. Therefore, 
equation (4.29) gives us a concave function (bell curve), as shown in the above diagram. 
To track the directions of motion, we look at the ∆ = − = 0 curve. Below the  
∆ = 0 curve described by (4.29), the consumption PGSU is 'lower' at any point below the 
curve than it is on the curve, so that ̂ < + 1 − − , which, taken to the capital 
accumulation equation, it means: >  and the arrows point to 'right', showing the expected 
direction of capital PGSU in that area. 
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Above the ∆ = 0 curve, the consumption PGSU is 'higher' at any point above the curve than 
it is on the curve, so that ̂ > + 1 − − , which implies <  and the arrows 
indicate to 'left'. 
On the other hand, we set ∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0 in equation (4.28) to express ̂  as a function of 
 as,  
 
We can further rewrite equation (4.30) as, 
  
 
This equation shows an explicit relationship between  and ̂ . If ≥ 1, then the right-hand 
side of the equation (4.30)' is greater than zero, / − 1 + > 0. This is consistent with the fact 
that the marginal product of capital has to be positive for any positive capital stock. 
The slope of the curve, of equation (4.30), is 
 
The slope is positive because + 1 − > 0 for all . Therefore, the slope shows a positive 
relationship in the ̂ ,  space. 





and the marginal product function is only defined over the positive real line. 
As shown in (4.31), the curve has a positive slope, and along it, ̂ → ∞ as → ∞. Therefore, it 
will cross the horizontal axis one time. 
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From equation (4.28), it follows that ∆ ̂ < 0, the right of the ∆ ̂ = 0 curve implies that 
 
 
The capital PGSU, , is 'high', this implies that the marginal product will be 'small', and the 
consumption PGSU will be expected to 'decline', ̂ < ̂ . Thus, to the right of ∆ ̂ = 0 curve, 
the arrows indicate to 'down', displaying the expected direction of consumption PGSU in that 
region. 
In the same way, from equation (4.28), it follows that ∆ ̂ > 0, the left of the ∆ ̂ = 0 curve 
implies that 
 
The capital PGSU, , is 'low', which means that the marginal product will be 'big', and the 
consumption PGSU will be expected to 'grow', ̂ > ̂ . Therefore, the arrows point to 'up'. 
 
Diagram 6: Phase diagram of the transitional dynamics before the negative shock for oil demand 
 
Diagram 6 shows the saddle path and some other unstable dynamic lines. The diagram shows four 
different regions (I, II, III, and IV). The arrows point toward the steady-state when the economy is 
in region (I) or region (III), where we have already discussed these two regions.  
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On the other hand, the reasons for the perfect foresight time path will not lie in the two regions  (II 
and IV) are based on the following: picking any value of consumption PGSU, ̂ , in region (II), 
above its saddle path, would lead to zero capital PGSU, , and consumption PGSU, ̂ , would be 
infinite time. It is because the households would consume more over time by sacrificing capital. 
As a result, there will be no more capital at the next period where capital was already completely 
used in the previous period. In other words, ̂  moves toward infinite with negative . For region 
(IV), picking any value of consumption PGSU, ̂ , in this region, below its saddle path, would lead 
the households to invest more over time by decreasing their consumption. Furthermore, they will 
keep doing that until the consumption goes to zero. In other words, this region leads to negative ̂  
and infinite .  
There is a restriction in the model that capital stock and consumption have to be positive. 
According to that restriction, capital PGSU and consumption PGSU should follow the non-
negatively constraint. Thus, if that restriction violated, then the path in both regions (II and IV) 
cannot be an equilibrium path. Consequently, for any given , ̂  has to start either in the region 
(I) or region (III). 
4.7.2 The Transitional Dynamics When a Negative Shock for Oil Demand Occurs 
We want to investigate here how our economy will move from the old steady-state (E) to the new 
steady-state (E') if there is a permanent fall in . In this case, both the loci ∆ = 0 and   
∆ ̂ = 0  will be shifted by the change in . To see how the negative shock on demand for oil 
will affect the transition dynamic of our economy, we look at the loci  ∆ = 0 and ∆ ̂ = 0. 
A- The locus ∆ = 0:  
We have proved in the steady-state section that there is a negative relationship between the 
consumption PGSU, ̂ , and  at the steady-state. Thus, if there is a negative shock on demand 
for oil, meaning  decreases, the consumption PGSU will increase. However, this does not tell 
us the exact movement of ∆ = 0 curve. Thus, we looked back at equation (4.29) and found 
that it is obvious that holding  constant, declining  must rise ̂ . Consequently, the ∆ = 0 





B- The locus ∆ ̂ = 0:         
              
Although we have found in the steady-state section that if  falls, the capital PGSU, , will 
increase, that does not ensure that the ∆ ̂ = 0 locus will move to the right (i.e. move down). 
Thus, to determine the shift, whether the move to the right or left, we need to return to equation 
(4.30). Taking the derivative of ̂  with respect to , holding  constant, gives us, 
 
The first part of  ̂ /  includes, − +  which is positive, as shown in equation 
(4.23). The second part contains, 
( )
− + , which is negative because of 
( − 1), but it is still unclear if it is greater or less than one. The reason is that both 
( )
 
and − + depend on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, . Therefore, if  is 
sufficiently large, then 
( )
− +  is negative and greater than one. As a result, 
holding  constant, then ̂ / > 0, which implies that the ∆ ̂ = 0 locus will move to the 
right (down) due to the reduction in , as shown in Diagram 7.  
Due to the negative shock, both curves would change, which then lead to the new steady-state at 
point (E'), as shown in Diagram 7. However, we need to take into consideration the following 
points: 
- At t=0, the initial stock of capital cannot be changed at this date, which implies that  is 
predetermined. 
- Since the negative shock of oil demand is a shock, i.e. it is not announced, the new curves and 
arrows will start to work immediately, whereas the old curves and arrows will disappear 
forever. 
- The equilibrium path exists and is a unique path converging to (E'). 
1 1
1
( ) ( ) and greater than 1 if σ is sufficiently large
( ) ( )
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From these points, the households at t=0 will adjust their initial consumption PGSU in order to be 
on their new optimal equilibrium path. However, the initial jump of consumption PGSU is not 
apparent yet, where the slope of the saddle path can be helpful to determine if the initial 
consumption PGSU jumps, whether up or down on impact. Thus, from our analysis of the stability, 








 is a stable eigenvalue56, while  and  are the first and second vectors in the first row of 
matrix A, respectively. The sign of the slope of the saddle path is positive because < . 
Now, the equation for the saddle path can be written as, 
 
The saddle path equation (4.32) combines the initial value of   with the initial value of ̂ , where 
the slope determines the original value of  either below, above, or exactly at the original value 
of ̂ . Thus, to find the initial jump in consumption PGSU, the short-run consumption PGSU, we 
take the derivative of the initial consumption PGSU with respect to the growth rate of government 
spending, , 
 
55 A full proof of the saddle path and its slope can be found in Appendix A.2. 
 
56 The general formula for  is = ± ( ) ( ). As a long as we have shown in section 4.6 that if  is sufficiently large, then 
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It should be noted first that although it is true that the coefficient on − ∗  in (4.32) also 
depends on , in fact the derivative of this coefficient w.r.t   will drop out of the overall formula 
for ̂ / , because we will evaluate this overall formula in an initial situation where                 
− ∗ = 0  (i.e. we will evaluate it in the pre-shock steady-state), which means that the derivative 
of the coefficient w.r.t.  will be multiplied by zero. For (4.32)’, we have already calculated both 
the ∗/  and ̂∗/  in the steady-state section, finding that the sign of ∗/  was clearly 
negative, and the sign of ̂∗/  was also negative, but if  is sufficiently large. Thus, rewriting 


































   














dc γ σ γδ
dγ αAβ Aα Aα α β
γ δ
αAβ αA αA















   
   
   
     
   
   












The sign of (4.32)" is theoretically ambiguous because its expression becomes complicated. Thus, 
the initial jump, whether up or down, in consumption PGSU appear to be possible in the phase 
diagram. As a result, given the ambiguity over whether ̂  falls or rises on impact, we will proceed 
to investigate further using numerical simulation in the next section. 
Although the initial consumption PGSU is possible to jump whether up or down, we only consider 
in the below diagrams the case in which the consumption PGSU initially jumps down on impact. 
Thus, Diagram 7 and Diagram 8 below display the transitional dynamics and the impulse responses 
that follow the dynamic responses of consumption PGSU, capital PGSU, and output PGSU to the 

























4.8 Parameterisation and Solution 
We now investigate how a permanent shock in demand for oil would affect the economy. Suppose 
we predict that in a particular time, there will be a drop in the growth rate of government spending 
. In this case, the economy will grow more slowly for many decades because the oil demand 
would not carry on growing at the same rate as before. Thus, it is essential to look at an expected 
future change due to that decline. Consequently, we use in this section a numerical solution to link 
our previous theoretical results in the steady-state and the phase diagram analysis with the 
numerical solution.  
In fact, there is occasionally no analytical solution for some dynamic and stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models. Thus, numerical solutions are applied to clarify the theoretical 
properties of each model and discuss the impacts of interventions in economic policy (Novales, 
Fernández and Ruiz, 2014). If a model is complicated and not possible to have an analytical 
solution, then numerical solutions become an alternative solution. In our model, although we have 
used the analytical solution, we are also using the numerical solution to find the magnitude of the 
steady-state and match the numerical solution with the analytical solution, which has been shown 
in the steady-state analysis section. 
Dynare software is employed to simulate the main two nonlinear equations, capital PGSU and 
consumption PGSU, and other conditions in the model, under standard parameter values. We apply 
a 5% decline in the growth rate of government spending, which is caused by the negative shock 
on oil demand. All agents are almost perfect foresight in the model, where they correctly anticipate 
the lower growth rate forever when and after the shock occurs. As a result, the economy will move 
to a new steady-state, as will be shown in the solution section. 
4.8.1  Parameterisation 
The simulation takes the parameter values that are standard and commonly used in the literature, 
where they can be reasonable yearly. The value of the depreciation rate, the discount factor, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and the production function parameter are summarised below. 





Notation Description Value 
 Depreciation Rate 0.1 
 Discount Factor 0.95 
 Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 2 - 0.1 




We assume that there is a permanent negative shock in demand for oil, where the growth rate of 
government spending, , decreases by 5%, e.g. from 1.1 to 1.05. However, we have found in 
section 4.7.2 that it was theoretically ambiguous to determine the initial jump of consumption 
PGSU. Thus, we assume here two different values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, , 
because we believe that  would be critical to determine whether the initial consumption PGSU 
falls or rises on impact. By using Dynare software to simulate the model, the solution can be seen 
in Figure 32 and Figure 33. These figures display the dynamic responses of several PGSU variables 
in the economy to a permanent shock under two assumptions regarding the value of . The first 
assumption is to set  sufficiently large, as shown in Figure 32, while the second is to be 
sufficiently small, as shown in Figure 33. 
Under the calibration considered here with a sufficiently large value of  ( . .  ≥ 0.5)57, the 
simulation in Figure 32 shows under this assumption that consumption PGSU would first jump 
down in the short-run on impact. The economic explanation is that the initial jump in consumption 
is affected by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). The IES is one of the main 
parameters for household consumption and saving, where it is important to determine policy and 
welfare evaluations (Okubo, 2011). It defines in discrete time, in the case of the utility function 
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), as 1/ . If  is high, then the households have a lower 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. It implies that the households would not 
have a desire over time to bear a significant difference in consumption level. On the other hand, if 
 is sufficiently small ( . .  < 0.5), the consumption PGSU would jump up on impact, as shown 
in Figure 33. Consequently, the transitional dynamics in these figures show the movement from 
the old steady-state to a new steady-state under two assumptions of , where all PGSU variables 
in the economy have been affected. In other words, changing the value of  causes the steady-state 
to change. Thus, the impact of the steady-state values on PGSU variables are summarised in the 





57 According to our model and the parameter values used, we have calculated the value of  and found that the value of 0.5 is a 
turning point for the initial consumption PGSU to jump either up or down. 
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The dynamic responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy to a permanent shock 
(with, e.g. = 2): 
Table 3: The steady-state responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy to a permanent negative shock 
in demand for oil (with e.g. = 2): 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.10 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.05 
Output PGSU 0.940605 Output PGSU 1.12348 
Capital PGSU 0.830647 Capital PGSU 1.42307 
Consumption PGSU 0.774476 Consumption PGSU 0.910018 









The dynamic responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy to a permanent shock 
(with, e.g. = 0.1): 
Table 4: The steady-state responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy to a permanent negative shock 
in demand for oil (with e.g. σ=0.1): 
 
 
Figure 33: The dynamic responses of a number of variables in the economy to a permanent shock, with σ=0.1 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.10 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.05 
Output PGSU 1.41663 Output PGSU 1.43826 
Capital PGSU 2.87309 Capital PGSU 3.00815 
Consumption PGSU 0.842008 Consumption PGSU 0.987043 
Interest Rate 0.162712 Interest Rate 0.15778 
128 
 
4.9 A Special Case of Our Model 
This section discusses the key variables in the model in level variables as a special case, unlike the 
variables of PGSU. The reason is that it would be interesting for the policymakers to examine the 
impact of government spending on other level variables, which have meaning in contrast with the 
variables of PGSU. Thus, we convert our key variables in the model to be in the level term by 
setting the growth rate of government spending in our previous setup equals one (i.e. = 1) and 
then find the steady-state equations in each level variables . To move from our previous model to 
this particular case, we use the same setup as before, and we just set = 1. The government 
spending is treated in this section as an exogenous variable and assumed to be hold constant over 
time ( = ,∀ ), but it enters into the firms' production function as positive externalities. Then, 
we investigate what would happen for the level variables if the government spending decline, 
which may be due to the shock of oil demand. 
In this special case, we only show the equilibrium and steady-state equations and how the steady-
state equations are affected when we change the level of government spending. Moreover, we 
provide a numerical solution for this special case.  
4.9.1 Equilibrium 
The key equations at equilibrium are the capital accumulation equation and Euler equation, 
respectively, 
 
where 1 α αt t tY A K G








These two equations (4.33) and (4.34) plus transversality condition with  given are the main 
equations that describe the market equilibrium of our special case economy. 
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4.9.2 Analysis of the Steady-State 
We find in this particular case the steady-state equations of the two key equations in the economy 
(4.33) and (4.34) as well as the output, where at the steady-state, = = ∗,                           
= = ∗, = = ∗, and = = ∗. 
From the Euler equation (4.34), we obtain:  
 
The output at the steady-state:  
 
From the capital accumulation equation (4.33), we get: 
 
These expressions show the equations for the steady-state values in level ∗, ∗and ∗. 
 
4.9.2.1 The impact of changing government spending on the steady-state of capital stock: 
Starting with the steady-state equation (4.35), we can find a direct effect when government 




Since , , ∈ (0,1),   is constant at 1, then it is clear that the sign of ∗/ ∗ is positive. 
Therefore, we conclude that there is a positive relationship between the level of capital stock, ∗, 
and the level of government spending, ∗, at the steady-state, meaning that if ∗ falls, then the ∗ 
will also fall. 
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4.9.2.2 The impact of changing government spending on the steady-state of output: 




We can see that the sign of ∗/ ∗ is positive, meaning that if the level of government spending 
declined, then the output level should decrease too.  
4.9.2.3 The impact of changing government spending on the steady-state of consumption: 
Although we have already found the steady-state equation (4.37), we notice that ∗ does not only 
depend on ∗ but also depends on ∗. Thus, we need to consider the total effect, which is not only 
the 'direct effect (DE)' of ∗ but also the 'indirect effect (IE)' of ∗ on ∗, as shown in equation 
(4.37)'. 
To look at the change of ∗ at the steady-state, we take the derivative of equation (4.37)' with 
respect to ∗: 
 
Looking at equation (4.40), we found that ∗/ ∗ > 0. The reason is that the first part of the 
bracketed expression is positive, as we have shown in (4.38), and the second part is also positive 
because (1/ )(1/ − 1 + ) > . Therefore, the whole bracketed expression is positive. As a 
result, we can conclude that there is a positive relationship between the level of consumption, ∗, 
and the level of government spending, ∗, at the steady-state, meaning that if  ∗ falls, then ∗ 
will also fall. 
In brief, changing government spending would change all the level variables in the same path. This 
fact is consistent with what we mentioned early that government spending is the economy's main 
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4.9.3 Parameterisation and Solution 
In this section, we simulate this special case by using Dynare software. We apply a 5% decline in 
the level of government spending. As before, all agents are almost perfect foresight. They correctly 
anticipate the reduction in government spending once and after it happens. As a result, the 
economy in this special case will also move from an old to a new steady-state, as it will be shown 
in the solution section. 
4.9.3.1 Parameterisation 
The parameter values used here are the same as before. We also assume two different coefficients 
of relative risk aversion, . The first one is to be sufficiently large, while the second is to be 
sufficiently small.  
4.9.3.2 Solution 
We assume that there is a permanent reduction in the level of government spending, where 
government spending, , declined by 5%, i.e. from 2 to 1.90. By using Dynare software to 
simulate the model, the solution can be seen in Figure 34 and Figure 35. These figures display the 
dynamic responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent shock under two 
assumptions regarding the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, . The first assumption 
is to set  to be sufficiently large (e.g. = 2), as shown in Figure 34, while the second is to be 
sufficiently small (e.g. = 0.1 ), as shown in Figure 35. 
The steady-state responses of level variables, Table 5 and Table 6, can confirm our theoretical 
results, in which all level variables would decrease when the level of government spending 
decreases. Moreover, when we compared our simulation results with the two different coefficients 
of relative risk aversion, = 2 and = 0.1, we found that all the values of steady-state variables 
are identical in the long run because   does not enter into the steady-state equations. However, 
changing  only affects the short-run level of consumption because it enters into the Euler 
equation, i.e. equation (4.34). The impact is that when  is sufficiently large, the short-run level 
of consumption would jump down on impact. On the other hand, if  is sufficiently small, the 
short-run level of consumption would jump up on impact. Figure 34 and Figure 35 show the 





The dynamic responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent shock 
(with, e.g. = 2): 
Table 5: The steady-state responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent negative shock in 
government spending (with e.g. σ=2): 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Level of Government Spending 2.0 Level of Government Spending 1.90 
Level of Output  2.92392 Level of Output  2.77772 
Level of Capital  6.32172 Level of Capital  6.00563 
Level of Consumption  2.29175 Level of Consumption  2.17716 
Interest Rate 0.152632 Interest Rate 0.152632 
Investment 0.632172 Investment 0.600563 
 
 
Figure 34: The dynamic responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent reduction in 




The dynamic responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent shock 
(with, e.g. = 0.1): 
 
Table 6: The steady-state responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent negative shock in 
government spending (with e.g. σ=0.1): 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Level of Government Spending 2.0 Level of Government Spending 1.90 
Level of Output  2.92392 Level of Output  2.77772 
Level of Capital  6.32172 Level of Capital  6.00563 
Level of Consumption  2.29175 Level of Consumption  2.17716 
Interest Rate 0.152632 Interest Rate 0.152632 
Investment 0.632172 Investment 0.600563 
 
Figure 35: The dynamic responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a permanent reduction in 




In summary, this chapter is built up a theoretical framework to study the economic growth in Saudi 
Arabia. The model is derived from Barro's endogenous growth model, but without taxes, where 
the government has only one source of revenues: oil revenues. The oil sector is one of the main 
sectors in our economy, where the growth rate is led by a growing demand for oil. This sector 
maximises its profits as a monopolistic and then transfers them to the government sector because 
it wholly owns it. We assumed that the government provides public goods (e.g. infrastructure, 
legal framework) as positive externalities to the firms to enhance their production function instead 
of supplying that profits as a transfer to households. For simplicity, we also assumed both 
households and firms to have no excess to the international market, including financial markets.  
In the model setup, we have found that the growth rate of government spending is the growth rate 
of oil profits, . That means everything in the economy of this chapter grows at the rate of 
government spending, which represents an exogenous growth rate. Therefore, this conclusion is 
different from Barro's conclusion, where the main determinant of the economic growth in our 
model is the growth rate of oil profits, which is  . The main objective of this chapter is to examine 
how our economy can be affected if there is a negative shock to the demand for oil. In other words, 
how the economic growth in our model would be affected if the growth rate of government 
spending declines, ( . .  ↓ ≡ ↓ ). For this reason, we have studied the steady-state properties 
and how a shock (i.e. a permanent reduction) in the growth rate of government spending would 
affect the steady-state position. We have found that if Gγ  falls, then both the capital PGSU, ∗, and 
the consumption PGSU, ̂∗, at the steady-state would raise. Moreover, we have arrived at an 
interesting result that although the level of consumption would grow at a slower rate due to the 
reduction in , the consumption PGSU would be higher. Higher consumption PGSU would give 
us an indication that there would be partially offsetting the effect of the reduction in . In other 
words, although the level of consumption is now growing slowly, it is indeed increased relative to 
the previous trajectory. Thus, our model has shown that there is some partially offsetting shift in 
the level of consumption, which may not be obvious. 
In the stability section, we realised that there would be two eigenvalues in this system by 
linearising the capital accumulation equation and the Euler equation. Moreover, the dynamics 
system has one predetermined variable, which is capital PGSU, ∗, and one non-predetermined 
variable, which is consumption PGSU, ̂ . By applying Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions and 
the test explained by Rankin (2007), we concluded that we need one stable eigenvalue and one 
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unstable eigenvalue. Then, we have found that the steady-state ∗, ̂∗  is saddle-point. Regarding 
the transitional dynamics in our model, we have built up a phase diagram to show the 
characteristics of a dynamic system before and after the negative shock for oil demand to happen. 
Once the shock occurs, i.e. reduction in , it was essential to study the saddle path properties to 
find out its slope. The reason for studying the slope of the saddle path is that it can help us identify 
the initial consumption PGSU, i.e. short-run of consumption PGSU, to jump up or down on impact. 
After all, we have discovered that the initial jump of consumption PGSU is theoretically 
ambiguous, meaning that both situations appear to be possible in the phase diagram. Therefore, 
using numerical simulation would be an appropriate method to apply in this case. 
Furthermore, we have provided a numerical solution to simulate the model under a permanent 
negative shock in the government spending growth rate. We assumed that the growth rate of 
government spending declined by 5%. Due to the theoretical ambiguity over whether the initial 
consumption PGSU jumps down or up on impact, we assumed that the initial consumption PGSU 
could be determined by the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  . Thus, we set two values of : 
one is sufficiently large ( . .  = 2), and one is sufficiently small ( . .  = 0.1). The 
simulation results have shown in both cases of  that all PGSU variables would increase when the 
shock occurs. However, when  is sufficiently large (small), the short run of consumption PGSU 
would jump down (up) on impact. 
Finally, we have studied the level variables as a special case. Even though our focus in the whole 
thesis is on economic growth, examining the level variables could be interesting for policymakers 
to understand the impact of government spending on other level variables. Therefore, we have 
found that government spending would have a significant effect on other level variables. The 
simple reason is that government spending, which is fed by oil profits, is the main engine in our 
model. Moreover, in this special case, we have also shown a numerical solution that simulates this 
case when there is a reduction in the level of government spending. Like the simulation in PGSU 
variables, we set two values for , sufficiently large and small values. The simulation results of 
this special case display that all level variables decline when the government spending decline. 
Furthermore, when we compare the results of this case under the two assumptions of , we have 
found that all values of steady-state variables are identical in the long run. The reason is simply 
due to that  does enter in their equations. However, the value of  only changes the short run of 
the level of consumption, where the large (small) value of  causes the short-run of the 
consumption level to jump down (up). In the next chapter, we will model Saudi economic growth 
with a consumption tax. 
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5 Chapter Five: Modelling Saudi Economic Growth with 
Consumption Tax 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five is based on a strong motivation regarding actual policy discussion in fiscal policy in 
Saudi Arabia. Thus, this chapter is considered an extension of the fourth chapter. We extend the 
model by introducing consumption tax, as suggested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and modifying the model accordingly. In this chapter, there are two sources of revenues, oil 
revenues and consumption tax, that finance government spending. The primary purposes of this 
chapter are to generate additional revenues to the government away from oil since the country does 
not have enough taxes, examine the impact of introducing a consumption tax on economic growth, 
analyse the real effects of this tax on the key level variables, and find the amount of this tax that 
can keep government revenues constant when there is a reduction in oil revenues. In other words, 
this chapter seeks to examine what would be the amount of consumption tax that could compensate 
for the decrease in oil revenues associated with the case of negative shocks in demand for oil. We 
study in this chapter the main agents in the economy, equilibrium, analysis of the steady-state, 
stability, transitional dynamics, and numerical solution.  
5.2 Model Description 
The economy has five sectors named households, firms, oil, government, and foreign sectors. 
Households sector own factors of production, namely capital stock and labour. They provide factor 
services to firms and buy the final good, and they also pay consumption tax to the government. 
Moreover, the households sector has no access to international markets. The oil sector is like in 
chapter four, where it is an exogenous and monopolistic sector. It only maximises its profit58 each 
period of time separately, and then the government receives its profit because the government 
owns this sector. Thus, the government sector collects the oil profit from the oil sector plus 
consumption tax from the households sector. Then, the government spends all its revenues on 
purchasing imported goods, and it has limited deals with international markets. The transaction 
between the government sector and the foreign sector is that the government sector exports oil and 
the home-produced goods as a consumption tax and then exchanges them with imported goods. 
Finally, these goods are used to enhance the firms by entering into their production function. Thus, 
 
58 To distinguish here between the two terms, the oil profits and revenues, the oil profits term is used to refer to the oil sector itself, 
while the oil revenues term is used to refer to what the government sector receives from oil sector. 
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the firms' sector benefits from these goods as positive externalities. Diagram 9 below summarises 




Diagram 9: The structure of the economy in chapter five 
 
The current chapter is different from chapter four in three aspects. The first aspect concerns the 
accounting identity and government budget constraint, while the second and third aspects are about 
the balance of trade and level variables, respectively.  
For the accounting identity (national level) and government budget constraint, the government 
now levies a tax on consumption where the households hand over some resources, which are 
domestically produced resources, to the government. Thus, the households give this fraction to the 
government sector as a source of tax revenue. Then, the government converts that into imported 
goods, which is physically different goods, by selling them in the international market. Thus, the 
government is not only selling oil abroad, but it has to sell as well some part of the domestic 
produced output in the international market, namely the part which is obtained in tax revenue from 
the domestic households. Similar to the fourth chapter, we assumed that the government spends 





Moreover, looking at the trade conditions, there will be a relative price of domestic goods to 
imported goods. Thus, we treat this relative price as being exogenous and fixed in world markets. 
As a result, the market-clearing condition would be different from the one in the fourth chapter. 
The accounting identity59 would be now like,  
 
where expo rts ct tX τ C  
Rewriting the resource constraint of the economy gives us, 
 
That means the government now exports the domestically-produced good. Therefore, if we assume 
that the relative price of the imported good in terms of domestic good is exogenous and normalised 
to one60, then the government budget constraint can be written as, 
 
Regarding the balance of trade, we had in chapter four a single type of export: oil revenues and a 
single type of import, which is the government purchasing goods. However, we now have two 
types of exports: oil revenues and some fraction of the domestically produced output received 
through the consumption tax, and one type of import, which is the government purchasing goods. 




The third aspect is regarding the level variables, which will be discussed in section 5.5. 
 
 
59  We should note that the reason for not including government spending in the resource constraint is that the economy imports 
goods. Thus, in terms of physical commodities, they are imported goods not domestically produced goods. It is also worth noting 
that the notation  does not stand in the following equation for GDP, it stands for the output of one sector. This is one sector of 
GDP, which represents the non-oil sector. 
 
60 However, if the relative price is assumed to be exogenous but fixed at some value other than one, , this would introduce some 
new notation. Thus, we set it to be one for simplicity. 
        t t t tY C I X
     t t tG π X
   1     ct t tY τ C I
where exports ,  which is identical to the government budget constraint.
                                 Trade Balance = Exports  Imported Goods  =  0 
   

 c tt Cπ τ
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5.3 Model Setup 
The main agents in the economy are the government, households, and firms sectors. However, the 
model will include the oil sector revenues, which have been discussed and found in the fourth 
chapter. 
5.3.1 Government Sector 
The government budget contains two sides: revenues and spending. The revenues side includes 
two sources of revenues that are revenues of the oil sector and consumption tax. The revenues are 
used to purchase imported goods from abroad, and then the government provides public goods 
(e.g. infrastructure, legal framework) to enhance the production function of the final goods sector. 
The government sector is simply assumed to spend all the revenues on purchasing imported goods. 
Moreover, it cannot access the international financial market (lending and borrowing). So, the 
government budget is in balance and can be written as: 
  
 
where  is government spending,  is the revenues from the oil sector, and  is a constant 
consumption tax. 
From equation (5.1), we define the growth rate of government spending as  ≡ / , 
 
 
where / =   is the growth rate of the oil profits, which we have found in the fourth 
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5.3.2 Households Sector 
The households maximise their utility function, which is a function of consumption subject to the 
budget constraint, with preferences represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function and parameter > 0. The utility of households depends only on consumption. So, the 
households supply completely inelastically their labour, which means that they supply at each date 




where , ∈ (0,1) are the discount factor and depreciation rate, respectively.  is the gross 
capital income,  is the labour wage,  is the consumption,  is the consumption tax, and      
= − +  is the gross investment. So now, we can rewrite the capital accumulation 
as: 
 




The first-order conditions: 
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5.3.3 Firms Sector 
Following Barro (1990) by introducing positive externalities from the government’s purchases of 
goods and services, the production function used in this economy is the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. The total output in period t, , is produced by firms using two inputs, namely, physical 
capital, , and labour, . Government spending, , is a positive externality. All firms are 
assumed to be identical, and they act in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, each firm produces 
output   using the following Cobb-Douglas production function.  
 
 
where  is the constant and exogenously given  technology level in the economy, and  is the 
output elasticities of capital, labour, and government spending. 
The firm's problem is to maximise their profits by taking the rental rate of capital, , and wage 
per unit of labour, , as given, subject to the firms’ production function: 
 
The first-order conditions of the profit maximisation problem: 
 
For equilibrium purposes, we convert the variables in terms of per government spending units 
(PGSU). Thus, the output PGSU can be written as:  
 
where ≡ /  is the output PGSU, and ≡ /  is the capital PGSU. The firms’ profit is 
zero and given by: 
 
1 1
1 1    ˆˆ                                          (5.10)  
α α α
α α α α αt t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t
Y A K L G Y A K L G y A k L
G G G
 
     
 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ        1  0                      (5.11)t t t t t t t ty R k w l y αy α y      
1 1 0    1 ( )                                               5.7α α αt t t t αY A K L G
   
1 1
, 
              
t
t t t t t t tK L





  0            0
                                                                                     (5.8)
  0   1       
α α αt
t t t t
t
α α α t





dπ α A K L G R
dK
YR α A K L G α
K





   
  
   
   1
  0
                      1      1                                             (5.9)  
t
α α α t
t t t t
t








The capital accumulation equation and Euler equation at the equilibrium are affected by boosting 
the government spending to the firm's sector. To see that, we start with the capital accumulation 
equation: 
 
We divide it by the government spending  to get PGSU variables. As we defined earlier, the 
ratio of capital stock over government spending as ≡ /  and the ratio of labour over 
government spending as ≡ / , we now define the new ratio ̂ ≡ /  as a consumption 
PGSU. After some algebra, the capital accumulation becomes, 
 
 
Considering that the profit of the firms is zero, equation (5.11), and assuming that the aggregate 
labour is = 1, as Barro (1990) where there is no population growth, the capital accumulation at 
equilibrium can be rewritten as, 
where ˆˆ  αt ty Ak . 
We divide both sides of equation (5.12) by  to get the growth rate of capital PGSU, 
 
On the other hand, we multiply both sides of the Euler equation, equation (5.6), by /  and 
do some algebra. After that, the Euler equation at equilibrium becomes, 
  
The transversality condition is: 
 
 
These two equations (5.12) and (5.14) plus transversality condition with  given are the main 
equations that describe the market equilibrium of our economy in terms of PGSU variables. 
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5.4 Analysis of the Steady-State 
Since our model contains two sources of government revenues, namely oil revenues and 
consumption tax revenues, we write the growth rate of government spending as61, 
 
 
At the steady-state, we have = = ∗, ̂ = ̂ = ̂∗. Therefore, the steady-state 
equations can be then written as,  
 
From the growth rate of government spending, equation (5.2), we know that the growth rate of the 
oil profits is . However, consumption is also growing. Thus, it is worth noting that for any model 
where the government is financed by two or more sources, in order for the steady-state to not 
degenerate into one in which one of these sources ends up being negligible as proportion, it has to 
be in the steady-state that all these sources of revenues grow at a common rate. In our model, the 
reason is that either the share of oil revenue or consumption tax revenue in the financing of the 
government spending would tend to zero or would tend to one over time. 
Even though it is unlikely to have a steady-state in which the two sources of revenues grow at a 
different rate, thinking of an equilibrium in which one of these shares tends to zero, and the other 
tends to one could be a valid equilibrium to consider. Thus, we will next discuss the possibilities 
for the steady-state by combining the two sources of government revenues. 
5.4.1 The Possibilities for Steady-State 
Suppose we only consider the government budget constraint, equation (5.1). In that case, we can 
identify three logically possible ways in which the growth rate of government spending, equation 
(5.2), could reach a steady-state value.  
 
61 In Appendix B.1, we show how we arrived at, equation (5.15), the growth rate of government spending when we combine the 
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We start with rewriting equation (5.2) as, 
 
 
This expression, equation (5.2)’, shows that but with an exception62 to be mentioned below, we 
need /  to be constant over time in order for  to be constant over time. Thus, we can see 
that as → ∞, there are two ways we can imagine how /  could tend to be constant over time: 
(i) The share of consumption relative to oil revenues tends to zero, as time tends to infinity, such 
that: 
/ 0   t tC as t              
 
(ii) The share of consumption relative to oil revenues tends to some finite value and strictly 




[[If either (i) or (ii) hold, then the growth rate of government spending tends to the exogenous growth 
rate, as time tends to infinity, such that: 
 
Nevertheless, there are differences between the steady-states implied by (i) and (ii). (i) could occur 
if  grows asymptotically at any rate lower than , whereas in order for (ii) to occur,  needs 
to grow asymptotically at exactly the rate of .  
Looking at these two possibilities, it seems intuitive that the economy would be unlikely to tend 
to a steady-state of type (i). The reason is that this steady-state would imply that the economy 
would not be able to take advantage of its growing oil revenues.  
Moreover, there is a third possibility for how  could tend to a time-invariant value. We can also 
rewrite the growth rate of government spending, , equation (5.2), as: 
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Looking at the expression in equation (5.2)”, and then considering a situation where: 
(iii) The share of oil revenues relative to consumption tends to zero, as time tends to infinity. 
Moreover, the growth rate of consumption tends to some finite value and strictly positive 




If (iii) holds, then the growth rate of government spending tends to the endogenous growth rate, 
as time tends to infinity, such that: 
 
 
It is clear that for this situation, (iii), to arise, we need that > , (i.e. consumption grows 
asymptotically faster than the oil revenues).  
In brief, we consider the government budget constraint alone and then show three possible types 
of steady-states. Two of these steady-states involve that government spending, , grows at the 
rate of . One of these two steady-states involves that consumption grows at a slower rate than 
, while the other involves that consumption grows at the rate . The third possible type of 
steady-state involves that government spending, , tends to the endogenous growth rate when 
consumption grows asymptotically fast compared to oil revenues. 
5.4.2 Two Types of the Steady-States 
The first type is that the consumption grows at the same rate as the oil revenues, which means 
everything grows at the rate of  (i.e. = ). The second type is that the consumption grows 
faster than oil revenues, which means everything, in this type, grows at the rate of                             
(i.e. = ). In both types, we will find the steady-state equations. 
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5.4.2.1 Type One of Steady-State ( = ): 




The growth rate of government spending, in this type, is written as, 
 
 
As a result, everything in the economy of this type grows at the rate of , which represents an 
exogenous growth rate, and the steady-state equations can be now written as,  
 
From the steady-state equations, (5.18) and (5.19), we can conclude that if the consumption grows 
at the same rate of  and the consumption tax is time-invariant, then the steady-state is one where 
all variables grow at the rate of . 
Before we move to type two of the steady-state, it is worth noting that we used Barro's endogenous 
growth model63 with only consumption tax, and we thought at the beginning that our model would 
be an endogenous growth model. However, our model is still an exogenous growth model if we 
make the consumption grow as oil. The reason is that even though we introduced an exogenous 
consumption tax, we came to the result that there is only one determinant of the growth rate, 
meaning all variables grow at the rate of , which is exogenous, as in chapter four.  
 
63 Barro model (1990) studies income tax as a one source of government revenues in an endogenous growth model, but we study 
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5.4.2.2 Type Two of Steady-State ( = ): 
In this type, the growth rate of government spending, , is equal to the growth rate of 
consumption, . In other words, we look at the case where the consumption grows faster than oil 
revenues. The growth rate of consumption is, 
 
 
In this type, the growth rate of government spending can be written, 
 
 
Since the consumption grows faster than oil revenues, then  / → 0  as → ∞. In other words, 
oil revenues, , becomes infinitesimal in comparison to consumption, . Therefore, the growth 
rate of government spending in this type would end up being = . As a consequence of that, 
everything in the economy of this type grows at the rate of , which represents an endogenous 
growth rate, and the steady-state equations can be then written as,  
 
The steady-state equations (5.20) and (5.21) confirm that the steady-state in this type is the one 
where all variables grow at the rate of . In the next section, we examine two different special 
cases of the model to find out if one or both of them is/are possible to occur and what would happen 
in the economy accordingly. 
5.4.3 Two Special Cases of the Model 
Let us now consider two different special cases for the growth rate. Since we have shown in 
equation (5.1) that we have two sources of revenues in our model, we want in this section to study 
them separately in order to investigate what our growth model would represent. The first case is 
when we have only one source of government revenues, namely oil revenues. The growth rate is 
, which represents an exogenous growth model. The second case is when we have a pure 
consumption tax revenue as the only government revenue source. The growth rate is  , which 
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In fact, we want to examine these two different cases for two reasons. The first reason is to check 
if it is possible or not to have > 1 because if it is not possible (i.e. we only have < 1), then 
we would have a model of 'endogenous shrinkage' of the economy, not of 'endogenous growth'. 
The second reason is to compare these two cases (i.e. if  >  or < ) because we want to 
find out whether a case two steady-state can really exist in our model and whether or not our model 
would have multiple steady-states.  
More precisely, if we are in a situation in which we can only have > , then the steady-state 
would be the one which we have found in chapter four. On the other hand, if we can have a situation 
where < , then a case two steady-state would seem possible because /  will tend to zero 
asymptotically, as discussed in situation (iii) in section 5.4.1. We believe that one could be a 
preferable steady-state, while the other could be an undesirable steady-state. The preferable steady-
state in this situation is the endogenous growth rate one, while the undesirable steady-state is the 
exogenous growth rate one. Now, we discuss the two cases of growth in more details. 
5.4.3.1 First Case of Growth Rate (only oil revenues as a source of government revenues): 
The first case is when we have only one source of government revenues, namely oil revenues. This 
case indeed has been done in chapter four, where we have found that the growth rate of government 
spending is , which represents an exogenous growth model64. Moreover, the stability and the 
transitional dynamics of this case have been previously analysed. Consequently, since the steady-
state of this case has been discussed in more details in chapter four, we focus now on the second 
case. 
5.4.3.2 Second Case of Growth Rate (only consumption tax as a source of government 
revenues): 
The second case has only a pure consumption tax revenue as one source of government revenues, 
representing an endogenous growth model. This case needs to be considered in more details and 
understood better. In addition, we seek to study in the second case the stability and the transitional 
dynamics, if possible, in section 5.6. Thus, the government budget constraint and the growth rate 




64  The government budget constraint and the growth rate of government spending in the first case are: 
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The capital accumulation, in this case, 
 
We can note that ̂  now turns out only to depend on  , i.e. moving from endogenous to 
exogenous variable. As we will see later, this conversion is beneficial to solving this particular 
case of the model. 
On the other hand, the Euler equation, 
 
At the steady-state, we have = = ∗ and ̂ = ̂ = ̂∗; therefore, the capital 
accumulation equation (5.22) and the Euler equation (5.23) in a steady-state can be written 
respectively as, 
 
Equations (5.24) and (5.25) together constitute a pair of simultaneous non-linear steady-state 
equations in the endogenous variables ∗,  . Therefore, they lie down the steady-state 
equilibrium of this case. 
We now try to characterise how the two endogenous variables, ∗,  , behave in response to 
changes in exogenous parameters. More precisely, we want to understand how an increase in 
consumption tax, , affects . Although equations (5.24) and (5.25) are non-linear in ∗,   
and hence we cannot obtain an explicit solution for ∗,  , we can try to rewrite the equation to 
understand how  responses to a change in . 
We need at the beginning to simplify the algebra by restricting some parameters. The reason is 
that without restricting some parameters, we cannot find an explicit solution (i.e. solving for ∗ as 
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We substitute (5.25)’ into (5.24) in order to reduce the system to a single equation in ∗ alone and 
to eliminate : 
 
Although we still cannot solve this equation, we can try to solve how ∗ behaves as a function of 
  by using a diagram.  
Rearranging (5.26) gives us, 
 
Now we can sketch (5.26)’, where the left-hand side (LHS) has the same shape as the 'intensive 
form' production function. The right-hand side (RHS) has a decreasing linear form, 
−(1 − − + ) ∗, with a vertical intercept of 1 + (1/ ). Thus, ∗ can be depicted in 









Diagram 10: Drawing equation (5.26)’ 
 
Let us suppose that  increases. In this case, the vertical intercept of the RHS function shifts down, 
and the slope is unchanged, as shown in Diagram 11. 
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Diagram 11: Drawing the change of consumption tax in equation (5.26)’ 
 
Therefore, it is unambiguous from Diagram 11 that the intersection moves to the left due to 
increasing  , so that ∗ falls, as shown above. 




Before carrying on our analysis, it is worth considering the maximum value for consumption tax, 
. In general, the consumption tax is different from income tax in some characteristics and 
functions. In terms of their rates, income tax takes the rate between zero and one, where the value 
that maximises the growth rate can be found as in Barro (1990). The value that maximises 
government revenues can also be seen in the 'Laffer's curve' theory65. On the other side, 
consumption tax could be between zero and one in some situations (e.g. sales tax), while it could 
be more than one (i.e.  >100%) in some other situations (e.g. taxes on soft and energy drinks, 
Tobacco and Alcohol, and oil and its derivatives). Thus, mathematically, it is obvious that the 
maximum value for the consumption tax could be infinite ( = ∞), which is unlike income tax. 
Regarding our model, the maximum value for the consumption tax would produce the most 
significant possible reduction in the vertical intercept of the RHS function, lowering it to one, since 
1/  then equals zero. This would lead to the lower possible value of ∗, and thus (via (5.25)’) to 
the highest possible value of . However, it should be noted that = ∞ implies in our model 
 
65 The Laffer curve demonstrates a theoretical relationship between tax rates and government revenue levels as a result. The main 
idea of the Laffer curve is that at a certain tax rate, government revenues will be at their maximum value, and if the tax rate increases 









     
152 
 
̂ = 0, since ̂ = 1/ . In other words, the ratio of consumption PGSU, / , is driven to zero, 
which means that at the growth maximising steady-state, there is no consumption. All of the output 
is devoted either to investment or government spending (in the latter case, via consumption tax 
revenues being exchanged on the international market by the government for government 
spending, such that  = (1 + ) + ). As a result, the maximum value for the consumption 
tax in our model could not correspond to welfare-maximisation. 
In fact, the previous analysis has not shown clearly that if it is possible or not to have > 1. Thus, 
we now try to investigate that in more details because knowing either > 1 or < 1 would help 
us to understand the possibility of having endogenous growth in our model.  
By looking at (5.25)', we can see that, in the limit as → 1 and = 0, we may have  > 1, 
unless ∗ → 0. However, since ∗ is an endogenous variable and will, therefore, change as 
→ 1 the possibility that ∗ → 0 needs to be considered.  
To see what happens to ∗, and thus to ∗  as → 1, we consider again (5.26).  





On the diagram, this can be depicted as the special case in which the RHS line is horizontal. Hence, 
it is obvious from the diagram that there is no discontinuity in the behaviour of ∗ as → 1. 
Therefore, we conclude that, for < 1, but arbitrarily close to one, ∗ will be arbitrarily close to 
the value in the above expression. 
We deduce that, as → 1, ∗  tends to 
 
 























































Although we cannot just set = 1 in the model because this makes households' lifetime utility 
infinity even in a steady-state, we can make  arbitrarily close to one, which is still being less than 
one. This means we can make  arbitrarily close to the value in the above formula. 
However, by looking at the above formula of , equation (5.27), we found that it depends on the 
value of  and . As a result, by making  arbitrarily close to one, we obtain two possible 
situations for . The first possible situation is that if  is close to one and    is very small (i.e. 
 is close to zero, so that  1/ = ∞), then / [(1 − ) /(1 + )] / → 0, meaning that 
/ [(1 − ) /(1 + )] / < , then we obtain < 1. The second possible situation, on 
the other hand, is that if  is zero and   is any positive value, or if                                                     
/ [(1 − ) /(1 + )] / > , then we must have > 1. Therefore, we now can see that 
> 1 is possible to obtain in our model, which in turn implies to have the possibility of                
> , because  is an exogenous parameter, and we can choose a value of , which is greater 
than one and less than . 
What we have discussed previously is the two special cases of the model. Thus, we now return to 
the general situation, i.e. we go back to our entire model. As long as both cases, >  and           
<  would be possible to occur, we need now to understand what would happen in the 
economy if one of these cases occurs. Let us start with the case where > . In this case, 
although it starts out a situation where oil revenue is a significant share of government revenues, 
if the economy converges to the  steady-state, then oil revenue would shrink over time as a share 
of the government budget. The reason is that the long-run endogenous growth rate, to which the 
economy's path is tending, is greater than . That means the share of consumption tax revenues 
in total government revenues must become 100%, and the share of oil revenues must tend to zero. 
Thus, this case would produce long-run behaviour that is different from the case where  <  
because the latter case would show the opposite since the economy at the steady-state would 
converge on . The reason behind that is because the  steady-state, in this case, would dominate 
since oil revenues remain very important, and that is unlike the consumption tax revenues, which 
would tend to zero over time. 
Now, there is one fundamental question that needs to be investigated. The question is, what would 
happen in the dynamics if we are in a situation where >  66. In fact, this is an essential 
question because we know that if we consider this case, it seems possible that we will not converge 
to a steady-state where the growth rate is , but will converge to a steady-state where the growth 
 




rate is    since it is simply higher than . As a result, what happens during the transition, if any, 
of this case is a key important thing that needs to be checked and studied. Thus, section 5.6 attempts 
to answer this question. However, before we move on to the stability and transitional dynamics in 
the pure consumption tax case, it is crucial to study whether both types of steady-state can exist 
for the same set of parameter values or whether there is just one. 
5.4.4 Existence of Steady-States of Both Types 
This section investigates if both types of steady-states can exist for the same set of parameter 
values. The first type of steady-state (I) is the exogenous growth steady-state, where /  tends 
to a finite, non-zero, value, and the growth rate is . The second type of steady-state (II) is the 
endogenous growth steady-state, where /  tends to infinity, and the growth rate is  where  
> , and  is a function of   amongst other parameters.  
We attempt in this section to draw a diagram (not a phase diagram), but in the space of  ̂∗ and ∗. 
This diagram contains some curves in which if they have two points of intersection that represents 
two simultaneous steady-states but of different types. However, after all67, we have found a 
contradiction, in which two conditions completely conflict with each other. These conditions are 
(i) /  cannot be negative and (ii) > , where if one of them holds, then the other cannot 
hold and vice versa. Therefore, since there is an unavoidable contradiction between the two 
conditions, we conclude that type (I) and type (II) steady-states cannot exist for the same set of 
parameter values.  
What we have indeed found is that for a given set of parameter values, the steady-state will be 
either of type (I) or type (II), i.e. there will be a single type of steady-state. In more precise detail, 
- If  is sufficiently high (for a given value of  ), then the steady-state will be of type (I), i.e. an 
exogenous growth steady-state. 
- If  is sufficiently low (for a given value of  ), then the steady-state will be of type (II), i.e. an 
endogenous growth steady-state. 
As a result, there can still be two steady-states, but they cannot exist for the same set of parameter 
values. In other words, for one set of parameter values, either the steady-state will be the exogenous 
growth steady-state and will not exist any other type, or for a different set of parameter values, 
instead, the only type of steady-state will be the endogenous growth steady-state. 
 




What we have shown previously is that we hold consumption tax, , constant and set different 
values of   to find out that the steady-state will be either of type (I) steady-state, i.e. exogenous 
growth steady-state, or type (II) steady-state, i.e. endogenous growth steady-state. Since this 
perception is just about the steady-state, leaving aside stability and transitional dynamics, we can 
further imagine another way to think about it. Thus, we would now study the properties of the 
economy and how it responds to an increase in consumption tax, contrary to what we have done 
before. In other words, we hold   constant and discuss at length the different values of  . The 
main reason for investigating consumption tax is due to the fact that it is a policy parameter, where 
the authority cannot set   because it is exogenous and out of their control, but they can change 
consumption tax instead. Thus, we aim now to discover how and when the economy could move 
from a steady-state to another if consumption tax changes. 
We start with making   at a certain fixed value, and we consider different values of  . Suppose 
that, initially, the economy is in a steady-state with no consumption tax, i.e. = 0. Then, its 
growth rate will be clearly type (I) steady-state, which is  . Now, suppose that the government 
introduces a consumption tax, but at first sets at a low level, i.e. the value is positive but still close 
to zero. If it allows the economy to settle into a new steady-state, then that steady-state will again 
be one in which the growth rate is  . Then, suppose the government increases the consumption 
tax, but also still quite close to zero. Likewise, the economy will once move to settle into a type 
(I) steady-state, which is still a growth rate of  . This cycle of events could then be repeated 
several times. Although the economy will have each time some disturbance, adjustment, and 
transitional dynamics, it will settle into type (I) steady-state. The reason behind that is due to the 
fact that   may still be sufficiently high compared to  , as discussed previously. However, at a 
certain value of  , (let us call this value a critical value of  , such as ̅ ), the economy will now 
turn out to type (II) steady-state, in which the growth rate becomes now  > . In other words, 
at this point, instead of returning the economy to a growth rate of  , it switches now to a growth 
rate of  . This represents a complete switch of the regime, where the economy converges to a 
different type of steady-state, which is a higher growth rate, i.e. permanent higher growth rate, 
which depends now on  . The explanation is that taxes would enable to provide sufficient 
government spending to maintain growth through the firms' production function. 
In the diagram below, we attempt to show how and when the economy could move from one 
steady-state to another if we change consumption tax. We sketch a consumption tax, , in the 
horizontal axis and the steady-state growth rate in the vertical axis. The flat part in the diagram 
represents the type (I) steady-state for the lower values of  . However, at a certain value of  , 
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i.e. at the critical value of  , we move to type (II) steady-state. In other words, as we gradually 
increase , eventually the economy will pass from an exogenous growth steady-state to an 
endogenous growth steady-state. We could interpret the critical value of  at which this switch 
occurs as being the 'take-off' point for the economy, i.e. the curve at that point becomes upsloping 
because high  produces a high growth rate. Thus, as  is increased, beyond this point, the 
steady-state growth rate of the economy is eventually 'freed' from the growth rate of oil profits; 
whereas, until it is reached, the steady-state growth rate is tied to the growth rate of oil profits. The 











Diagram 12: How and when the economy could move from one steady-state to another one when consumption tax 
changes 
 
Let us now imagine the story to be a possible scenario for the Saudi economy. First of all, suppose 
the authority in Saudi Arabia follows the advice by the IMF to implement a very low consumption 
tax, e.g. = 5%, in order to see what would happen in the economy by this change. In fact, 
according to our model, a bit of thing would undoubtedly occur in the economy. For instance, there 
will be a shock, the steady-state will shift, and also the level of variables would somewhat change. 
However, the steady-state type will still be type (I), meaning we still remain in the low range of 
consumption tax, as shown in the above diagram. Similarly, if the authority decides to raise 
consumption tax further, but still at a lower level, e.g. = 10%. Although this slight increase in 
 would cause some adjustment and transitional dynamics in the economy, the economy, as 
explained previously, would still in the growth rate of  . However, there exists a critical value 
of  , and let us suppose this critical value is  ̅ = 25%. Thus, the increase in  would not help 
the economy to move to another steady-state unless it passes this critical value. More precisely, if 
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the Saudi authority decides again to raise the consumption tax, e.g. from 20%  to 30%, then they 
may believe at the beginning that they will be at the type (I) steady-state, but since they have 
already passed the critical value, ̅ = 25%, then the economy will be at the type (II) steady-state, 
which is the endogenous growth one. Moreover, if the authority raises more the consumption tax, 
e.g. = 35%, then the growth rate would increase as well because the economy now in type (II) 
steady-state, where we know that within type (II) steady-state range, an increase in  increases 
the growth rate indeed. 
The motivation behind studying this aspect is our conclusion in section 5.4.3.2, which discussed 
the case in which we have only consumption tax as a source of government revenues to show how 
endogenous variables respond to change in consumption tax. In that section, after simplifying the 
key equations, we have arrived at a result that increasing consumption tax at steady-state would 
fall the capital PGSU, ∗, and would eventually increase the endogenous growth rate, . Thus, we 
attempted to link this conclusion with the first case, which is considered oil revenues as the only 
source of government revenues. After all, it is obvious that if the consumption tax increases, it 
implies that the endogenous growth rate would increase too. This result ensures that  > 1, which 
is the condition to have  > . However, if the consumption tax decreases, the endogenous 
growth rate would decline as well. In this case,  would not be guaranteed to be greater than one. 
In other words,  would be most likely less than one, < 1. This scenario implies that the 
economy would return to type (I) steady-state, which is the exogenous growth steady-state. This 
type of steady-state is now higher than type (II) steady-state because   is assumed to be  ≥ 1. 
As a result, low rates of consumption tax in our model implies that  > , while high 
consumption tax rates imply that  < . In between of them, there is a critical value of 
consumption tax, ̅ , that could determine when the economy could turn out from one type of 
steady-state to another one. 
To summarise our perception of this policy implications, if consumption tax sets to be at low 
values, then nothing very significant would happen. Indeed, something in the economy would 
change, but not a huge change would happen. However, at a certain point of consumption tax, the 
economy would have significant change, where it moves from the exogenous growth steady-state 
to the endogenous growth steady-state. The latter type would be a better situation because it is 
higher than the exogenous growth steady-state. 
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5.5 Analysis of the Effect of Consumption Tax on the Level Variables in a 
Type (I) Steady-State 
Like the previous chapter, any level variable, discussed in this section and henceforth, refers to a 
variable that is not a ‘growth rate’68. Since each level variable is constantly growing, even in the 
steady-state, we cannot attempt to solve for a single, time-invariant, value of it, such as 
consumption, ∗. However, what we can do instead, for each level variables, is to calculate how 
increasing consumption tax, ↑ , affect its steady-state value relative to oil revenues, . 
Comparing its value with  is helpful because we know that the growth path of  is unaffected 
by ↑ .  
In this section, we want to understand how the level variables respond when we change the 
consumption tax. From our analysis in the first case where we set both consumption and oil 
revenues to grow at the same rate as  69, we know that changing the consumption tax, , does 
not affect the steady-state growth rate, which remains at . It is also apparent that from equations 
(5.18) and (5.19) that changing consumption tax does not affect the capital PGSU steady-state, ∗, 
because it does not enter in equation (5.18). However, it has an impact on the consumption of 
PGSU steady-state, ̂∗. Nevertheless, changing the consumption tax, , will generally affect the 
level variables, and this is an effect which could not be consisted in chapter four.  
Therefore, let us now consider and study the key endogenous level variables when changing the 
consumption tax. In other words, we want to examine for any steady-state time path it whether lies 
above or below the level which it would have had at the previous consumption tax. 
To do that, we first analyse the effect of changing the consumption tax, , on the capital PGSU 
steady-state and consumption PGSU steady-state. For simplicity, let us define                                  
∗ = ∗ + (1 − − ) ∗. As long as the steady-state of capital PGSU, ∗, is independent of 
consumption tax, then ∗ would be constant. However, if consumption tax changes, the 
consumption PGSU steady-state would be negatively affected, such that, 
 
68  In chapter four, we have discussed the level variables as a special case. 
 














Equation (5.19)’ shows that increasing consumption tax, , reduces the consumption PGSU, ̂∗. 
So now, we want to find out how increasing the consumption tax would affect ̂∗. The reason is 
that knowing how ̂∗ is affected by changing  would help us in analysing the level variables 
because all of them would contain ̂∗, as we will see. 








The sign is positive, which implies that if  increases, then ̂∗ would also increase, such as: 
  
5.5.1 Level of Government Spending 
We start with the level of government spending, , because other variables, such as consumption 
and capital stock, are determined relative to, , by determining ̂  and . So, we divide the 




Substituting the steady-state of consumption PGSU in equation (5.29) gives us, 
 
 
Taking the derivative of (5.29)’ w.r.t. , gives us 
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Since ∗ is not affected by changing consumption tax, , and we do not have endogenous labour 
supply in our model, there is a positive effect on output working through government spending. 
Thus, if consumption tax increases, then the level of government spending relative to the  would 







Diagram 13: The time path of government spending relative to the  
 
The intuition behind this result is that introducing a consumption tax would increase government 
revenues which would, in turn, increase government spending70. 
5.5.2 Level of Capital Stock 
The capital PGSU can be written as, 
 
 
Dividing both sides by , 
 
We know that the capital PGSU at steady-state, ∗, equation (5.18), is constant over time and 
independent of consumption tax, but the level of government spending relative to the  is affected 
by changing the consumption tax. Thus, increasing the consumption tax would increase /  , as 
shown before, and then increase the level of capital relative to the , by the same proportion. The 
reason for increasing capital stock can be explained by increasing government spending, which in 
turn encourages firms to have more capital. The diagram below shows the time path of capital 
relative to the . 
 
70 Since it was assumed in our model that the government sector spends all its revenues, then the government revenues must equal 
government spending. 
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Diagram 14: The time path of capital stock relative to the  
 
To compare our results in the level of capital stock with the standard Ramsey growth model, we 
discover that the steady-state level of capital stock is not affected by a consumption tax in the 
Ramsey model with both income and consumption taxes. Thus, the long-run process of capital 
accumulation is not affected by taxing consumption (Novales, Ruiz and Fernández, 2014). 
However, in our model, the consumption tax would positively impact the level of capital stock. 
The reason is that increasing the consumption tax would increase government revenues, which is 
reflected in increased government spending. High government spending implies more positive 
externalities enters in firm's production function. This, in turn, enhances the firms' production 
function and leads to an increase in their level of capital and output. 
5.5.3 Level of Consumption 
We know that the consumption PGSU and the government budget constraint are written, 
respectively as ̂ = /  and = +  , then the level of consumption relative to  can 
be written as, 
 
 
Substituting the steady-state of consumption PGSU in equation (5.31) gives us, 
 
 
Equation (5.31)’ shows that the change in the time path of consumption relative to the  is 
ambiguous when we change the consumption tax. Therefore, let us take the derivative of (5.31)’        
w.r.t. ,  
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The sign of ( / )/  is still ambiguous because the value of ∗ is crucial here. ∗, in fact, 
depends on many parameters. To see that, 
 
Let us now investigate ∗ further. Thus, substituting the steady-state of capital PGSU into this 
gives us, 
 
where the parameters and their conditions are , , ∈ (0,1), ≥ 1, > 0. Let us now try to 
find out the possible values of ∗. Thus, if we assume that , , = 1 and = 0, then, 
 
 




So now, ∗ depends on the value of the discount factor, , which measures the patience to consume 
now or in the future. In this case, if  is sufficiently close to zero, meaning we are not very patient 
to consume more in the future, then ∗ < 1. However, if  is sufficiently close to one, meaning 
we are very patient to consume more in the future, then ∗ > 1. As a result, if the value of ∗ is 
greater than one, ∗ > 1, that means increasing consumption tax increases the time path of 
consumption relative to the tπ , as shown in the below diagram, ( ) . If, however, the value of 
∗ is less than one, ∗ < 1, that means increasing consumption tax decreases the time path of 
consumption relative to the , as shown in the below diagram, ( )  71. 
 
71 In Appendix B.3, we attempt to study what happens not just as  changes, but also as , , ,  and  change. 
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Diagram 15: The time path of consumption relative to the  
 
The reason for increasing the level of consumption when we increase consumption tax may be due 
to the fact that the households benefit from increased government spending through the firms. That 
means the firms could somehow pass on some of the positive externalities received through the 
government to the households. Examples of this may be high wages or a high rental rate of capital. 
5.6 Are There Any Transitional Dynamics in Pure Consumption Tax Case, 
Type (II) Steady-State? 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 have discussed the steady-state. Thus, we move now to study the dynamics 
of our model. In this section, we go back to the question of the stability and the transitional 
dynamics in the pure consumption tax case, i.e. type (II) steady-state. Our purpose here is to find 
out if there are any transitional dynamics in this case, i.e. the 'pure consumption tax case'. 
To analyse that, we start with the capital accumulation equation (5.22) and Euler equation (5.23). 
In this case, we get from the definition of consumption PGSU that ̂ = 1/ . Thus, since the 
consumption tax, , is exogenous, then ̂  is exogenous here too. The capital accumulation 
equation becomes,  
 
On the other hand, from the Euler equation and the definition of consumption PGSU, we obtain  
̂ / ̂ = 1. That is true even if the economy is not in a steady-state. Hence, Euler equation (5.23) 
can be now written as, 
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If we combine equations (5.22)’ and (5.23)’ to eliminate , we obtain, 
 
Equation (5.33) is an implicit first-order difference equation in . From this equation, we can see 
that there are no other endogenous variables. Thus, this equation in principle should be sufficient, 
by itself, to determine the time path of . 




Thus, it is clear from the definition of consumption PGSU that there is no dynamics in ̂ . The 
reason is that the consumption tax, , in our model, is time-invariant. On the other hand, from the 
definition of capital PGSU, we understand that capital stock, , is undoubtedly a predetermined 
variable while consumption, , is generally a non-predetermined variable. Thus, if  can jump, 
when something unexpected happens, then  must also jump. Therefore,  becomes a non-
predetermined variable because for  to be a predetermined variable, all of the variables which 
comprise it, must be predetermined variables (i.e. as soon as one of the components of  can 
jump, it must be the case that  itself can jump as well). 
We know from Blanchard and Kahn (B-K) (1980) that if the number of eigenvalues of a matrix 
outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, then a unique non-
divergent solution exists. In the case of pure consumption tax,  is a non-predetermined (jump) 
variable. We have also shown that there is only a single first-order different equation, equation 
(5.33), which is the law of motion for the capital PGSU. That means that it will produce only one 
eigenvalue in this system. However, the question now is to investigate whether the implicit 
differential equation, equation (5.33), for  is stable or unstable. After all72, we found that this 
single eigenvalue is unstable. Thus, when we apply the conditions of B-K, we found that it is also 
satisfied since we have one unstable (outside the unit circle) eigenvalue, and  is a non-
predetermined variable. As a result, because of  is a non-predetermined variable in period t, it 
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can jump to its steady-state. In general, the equation of , equation (5.33), will not determine a 
time-varying path for . As a result, there is no transitional dynamics in this case, according to 
B-K conditions. So, the economy jumps to a new steady-state, following any shock. 
Even though we have found in the pure consumption tax case the same result as in the Barro model 
(1990) that there is no transitional dynamics in both models, there are some apparent differences 
between our case and the Barro model (1990). One of them is that Barro is assuming income tax 
in his original model, while we are assuming, in this case, consumption tax instead. Another 
difference is regarding the method of proof. In Barro, the reason for the absence of the transitional 
dynamics is that the Euler equation is the only difference equation, where the interest rate in his 
model, , is exogenous, which depends on a set of other exogenous parameters. Thus, since the 
growth rate of consumption in his model does not depend on consumption, the growth rate does 
not change over time. Therefore, there is no transitional dynamics73, where the growth rate of 
consumption, capital, and output all equal the same constant. On the other hand, the only difference 
equation in our model is equation (5.33), which has explained previously. 
5.7 Analysis of the Stability of a Type (I) Steady-State  
Since we have found in section 5.6 that the steady-state is unstable and there is no transitional 
dynamics in type (II) steady-state, we now analyse the local stability of a type (I) steady-state. This 
section combines the two sources of government revenues, oil revenues and consumption tax 
revenues. If both sources of government revenues are simultaneously considered, then the growth 
rate of government spending can be written as, 
 
 
To analyse the stability in our model, we construct the linear approximation to the system around 
the steady-state, where the PGSU variables in the steady-state will stay constant all the time. So 
now, we start with the capital accumulation equation, 
 
 
73  In the AK model, where Barro model (1990) is a version of it, consumption is a non-predetermined (jump) variable. Thus, there 
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and then find the first-order Taylor approximation of it around the steady-state, and then evaluate 
the coefficients in the steady-state74, 
 
Then, we consider the Euler equation,  






So now, we find the first-order Taylor approximation of the Euler equation and then evaluate its 
coefficients in the steady-state obtaining: 
 
We first substitute the approximation of Euler equation (5.35) into (5.34) and then substitute again 
what we obtained into (5.35). After some algebra, we get the two linearised equations of the system 


















74  The steady-state of capital accumulation equation and Euler equation can be written respectively as,  
∗ = ∗ + (1 − ) ∗ − (1 + ) ̂∗   and  = ∗ + 1 − . 
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The two pair of equations  and ̂  allow us to move from knowing  and ̂  to knowing 
 and ̂ . These two equations describe the law of motion in this system and define the 
dynamics in  and ̂ . Thus, by linearising these two equations, as shown in equations (5.34)' and 
(5.35)', we understand that there will be two eigenvalues in this system. 
The linearised capital accumulation equation (5.34)’ and Euler equation (5.35)’ can be now 







The above coefficient matrix A has a trace, 
 
 
We know that ≥ 1 and < 0. Thus, if   is between zero and one75, then > 1. 
The determinant ( ) of the matrix A is, 
 
The eigenvalues of the matrix are the solutions to the characteristic equation, 
 
 
75  The value of  will be verified later. 
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To apply Blanchard and Kahn (1980) test for a unique non-divergent rational expectation solution 
to exist, if we have two state variables that are non-predetermined, then we would need two 
unstable (outside of the unit circle) eigenvalues for the test to be satisfied. However, although both 
 and ̂  in our case are non-predetermined variables, both do not move or jump freely76. The 
reason for not having the freedom of movement is that there is an implicit relationship, or some 
restrictions, between  and ̂  that must hold in the period of the shock. Due to this relationship 
between them, we need one stable eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue. The nature of this 
relationship will be discussed in more details in the transitional dynamics section. 
So now, we put into practice the test, explained by Rankin (2007), for our characteristic equation 
to have 0, 1, or 2 stable eigenvalues77. This test will equivalently produce conditions for 0, 1, or 2 
of the original eigenvalues  to lie inside the unit circle. 
Looking at the table explained in chapter four and converting the table’s coefficients (a,b,c) to our 









The necessary and sufficient condition for stability in our model requires that the above ratio 
should be negative and between zero and one. The sign of the numerator is clearly negative because 
of the sign of ; however, the sign of the denominator is still ambiguous since the value of  is 
crucial here (i.e. it is unclear at first sight if it is greater or less than one in absolute value). Thus, 
we consider the expression for  again.  
 
76 In general models, if all variables are non-predetermined variables, then they all jump freely, which means they all jump to the 
steady-state when an unexpected shock happens. However, we believe in our case that they cannot jump immediately to the new 
steady-state. 
 
77 This test has explained in detail in chapter four. 
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The sign of the expression for  is obviously negative because of α < 1, and it contains two values 
of steady-state variables, ∗ and ̂∗, which are endogenous variables. These two steady-state 
variables depend in fact on the value of , , and other exogenous parameters, as shown in 
equations (5.18) and (5.19). In other words, they both may change as we change  and . 
Looking at these two steady-state equations, we have earlier found that if  is sufficiently high 
(for a given value of ), then we would have an exogenous growth steady-state. Besides, the 
steady-state of ∗ shows that if  tends to infinity ( → ∞), then ∗ tends to zero ∗ → 0 . 
That, in turn, makes the second steady-state of  ̂∗ smaller because it is a function of ∗, where ∗ 
shrinks as  getting higher. Therefore, we can conclude that if  is set to be high enough, then 
both ∗and ̂∗ would be less than one. Now, the expression for  is clearer, which is − < 1 78. 
Consequently, if  is sufficiently high, then the whole expression for  is negative and between 
zero and one. 
According to that, the above ratio becomes unambiguously negative and between zero and one, 
because of (1 − ̂∗)(1 + ) becomes positive in the denominator. It then implies that one 
eigenvalue lies inside the unit circle. As a result, the steady-state ∗, ̂∗  is a saddle-point in this 
type of steady-state, i.e. type (I) steady-state. That indeed confirms our early speculation that there 









78  We prove algebraically in Appendix B.5 that  is negative and less than one. 
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5.8 The Effect of Consumption Tax on the Transition Path of Variables in the 
Neighbourhood of a Type (I) Steady-State 
This section studies the transitional dynamics in type (I) steady-state by using a phase diagram. 
The purpose of this section is to find out what happens in the short and medium terms when 
consumption tax, , is raised. We divide this section into two parts: the first part is the transitional 
dynamics before changing the consumption tax, while the second part is the transitional dynamics 
when we change consumption tax. The reason for that is to find out how the two variables,  and 
̂ , in phase diagram move. Moreover, we study the relationship between  and ̂ . 
5.8.1 The Transitional Dynamics Before Changing Consumption Tax 
To analyse the dynamics of the model through a phase diagram, we first rewrite the two 




it follows that,  
 




substituting  into the Euler equation, it follows that,  
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The phase diagram is built on the basis of two curves relating   to ̂ . Each curve of them 
coincides with one of the two zero change cases: ∆ = − = 0 (capital accumulation), 
∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0 (Euler equation). However, the two key equations of our economy, (5.36) 
and (5.37), are both functions of , ̂ , ̂ . Thus, to find the stationary locus for , we need 
to substitute out ̂ 79 from the RHS of equation (5.36), then we impose that = . Therefore, 
we got after arrangement, 
 
We can further draw ̂  as a function of  (treating  as given and  as sufficiently close to 
zero), as follows: 
 
Diagram 16: Drawing equation ̂  as a function of  
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If  is given and  is sufficiently close to zero, then the second diagram shows that ̂  as a 
function of  takes approximately a 'hill shaped' 80, where  is the value of  which 
maximises ̂ , such that, 
 
For low values of  ,  ̂ / > 0, while for high values of ,  ̂ / < 0. Therefore, 
equation (5.36)’ gives us a concave function (bell curve), as shown in the above diagram. 
Below the ∆ = 0 curve described by (5.36)’, the consumption PGSU is ‘lower’ at any point 





taken to the capital accumulation equation, it means: >  and the arrows point to 'right', 
showing the expected direction of capital PGSU in that area. 
Above the ∆ = 0 curve, the consumption PGSU is ‘higher’ at any point above the curve than 




 which implies <  and the 
arrows indicate to 'left'.  
On the other hand, we set ∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0 in equation (5.37) to express ̂  as a function of 
 as, 
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We can further rewrite equation (5.37)’, 
  
This equation shows an explicit relationship between  and ̂ . If ( ) ≥ 1, then the right-hand 
side of the equation (5.37)" is greater than zero, ( ) / − 1 + > 0. This is consistent with the 
fact that the marginal product of capital has to be positive for any positive capital stock. 
The slope of the curve, of equation (5.37)’, is 
 
The slope is positive because + 1 − > 0 for all . Therefore, the slope shows a positive 
relationship in the ̂ ,  space. 





and the marginal product function is only defined over the positive real line. 
As shown in (5.38), the curve has a positive slope, and along it, ̂ → ∞ as → ∞. Therefore, it 
will cross the horizontal axis one time. 
From equation (5.37), it follows that ∆ ̂ < 0, the right of the ∆ ̂ = 0 curve, implies that 
 
 
The capital PGSU, , is ‘high’, this means that the marginal product will be 'small', and the 
consumption PGSU will be expected to 'decline', ̂ < ̂ . Thus, to the right of  ∆ ̂ = 0 curve, 
the arrows indicate to 'down', displaying the expected direction of consumption PGSU in that 
region. 
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The capital PGSU, , is ‘low’, which means that the marginal product will be 'big', and the 
consumption PGSU will be expected to 'grow', ̂ > ̂ . Therefore, the arrows point to 'up'.  
5.8.2 The Transitional Dynamics When We Change Consumption Tax 
 
In this section, we want to study how changing consumption tax would affect the transitional 
dynamic, moving from the old steady-state to a new one. In particular, we examine how the        
∆ = 0 and ∆ ̂ = 0 loci would change when we increase the consumption tax. 
 
A- The locus ∆ = 0:  
 
Equation (5.36)’ shows that consumption tax affects the consumption PGSU. Moreover, we have 
demonstrated at the steady-state that the consumption PGSU is negatively affected by changing 
consumption tax. Thus, taking the derivative of equation (5.36)’ w.r.t. consumption tax gives us, 
 
If we use the fact that at the steady-state = ∗ + 1 −
/
, (5.39) can be simplified 
to, 
 
Thus, if we increase the consumption tax, the consumption PGSU would decline. As a result,   
∆ = 0  locus would shift the bell curve down. 
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B- The locus ∆ = : 
  
Although we have shown in the steady-state section that capital PGSU is independent of 
consumption tax, ∆ ̂ = 0 locus would be determined by taking the derivative of equation 
(5.37)’ w.r.t. consumption tax, 
 
The sign is negative in (5.40); therefore, we can conclude that ̂ / < 0 implies that the 
∆ ̂ = 0 locus will move down due to the increase in consumption tax. 
Before we construct a phase diagram for this system, we consider the phase diagram in the Ramsey 
model81. In his model, we know that  is a predetermined variable, while ̂  is a non-
predetermined variable. Thus, when an exogenous shock (i.e. a permanent shock) occurs,  
cannot jump, but ̂  can jump. Consequently, in the Ramsey model and ours in chapter four, the 
economy would move initially to the point that is vertically above or below the old steady-state. 
Thus, it jumps to that point, and then it will converge to the new steady-state. This indeed 
represents the conventional Blanchard and Kahn (B-K) type solution. However, what would 
happen in our case is slightly different from the conventional B-K type solution. The reason is that 
although  and ̂  in our model are completely non-predetermined variables, they both cannot 
jump freely because there may be some relationship between them, which has to be held.  
The relationship between  and ̂  can be found both geometrically and analytically. Let us begin 
with the geometrical approach, the relationship between them can be described in a new locus in 
the phase diagram. This locus is equivalent to the vertical line through  in Ramsey’s phase 
diagram and ours in chapter four. Thus, once the shock happens, the economy will still have to 
jump on the saddle-point, but there is a predetermined locus (a new diagonal line) along which  
and ̂  have to jump. In the conventional case of Ramsey, this locus is a vertical line through the 
initial point, and  does not jump, but ̂  jumps. In our case, both  and ̂  jump, but they cannot 
jump anywhere, they both have to jump to somewhere on that new locus (i.e. the diagonal locus). 
 
81 Our phase diagram in chapter four is quite similar to the one in the Ramsey model, where the differences are in terms of variables 
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In other words,  and ̂  both have to jump in some relationship, and this relationship given by 
the diagonal line, which is slightly different from the conventional case. Thus, we need to study 
more the exact relationship between them, particularly the new diagonal line. 
Since we have found that the system is saddle-point stable, then if  and ̂  have to jump 
somewhere on the diagonal line, there is only one point to which they can jump, such subsequence 
the economy will converge and that where the diagonal line intersects the saddle path, at point (A) 
in the below phase diagram. Then, the local stability properties for the steady-state would remain 
as usual (i.e. the economy at this point will proceed along the saddle path as standard). 
To prove our anticipation that both  and ̂  can jump but cannot jump at the moment of impact 
freely, we need to study the relationship between them using an analytical approach. In fact, the 
new thing relative to this relationship is that  can jump, but once  jumps, then ̂  has to jump 
in a certain ratio. This ratio has to be underline some restrictions, which need to be explored more 
fully. Thus, this is a sort of conventional of B-K type solution, where the principle of B-K still 
applies in our model (i.e. it is just a new jump locus). 
To show this relationship more clearly, we start with the government budget constraint and the 




We can see from the definition of capital PGSU that  can jump because  can jump, but the 
numerator, , cannot jump. Also, from the definition of consumption PGSU, it is obvious that 
both numerator and denominator can jump. Although  and ̂  can jump, the ratio in which they 
jump is not entirely free. That means that they will jump according to some restrictions on how 
they can jump, which will implicitly define some kind of locus once we linearise it. Moreover, 
since ̂  can jump, then that will determine how  and ̂  also jump. In other words, we cannot 
have independence jump in  and ̂ , because they have to jump in a certain way consistently. 
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First, rearranging the definition of the capital PGSU as, 
 
Solving for : 
 
 
Then, by dividing the numerator and denominator of consumption PGSU by , we get: 
 
 
Now, we substitute equation (5.41) into (5.42) and then simplify it to obtain: 
 
 
Equation (5.43) shows that ̂  is expressed as a function of , where the endogenous variables are 
, ̂ , and , while the exogenous variables are  and . This equation is not linear, and it is 
the equation of the new diagonal line in the below phase diagram, which we call it locus (D). 
Moreover, equation (5.43) tells us that when the shock occurs, there is some relationship between 
 and ̂ , which is described by this equation.  
To know the slope of this new diagonal line, we take the derivative of equation (5.43) w.r.t. , 
 
 
The slope tells us that there is a negative relationship between  and ̂  (i.e. the diagonal line 
moves from left to right, downward slope). 
The new diagonal locus, (D), should pass below the old steady-state, (E), i.e. it should be shifted 
down. The reason for this is due to the fact that consumption tax, , i.e. the shock variable,  
directly enters into equation (5.43). Thus, when  increases, even if   remained at its old steady-
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Moreover, although the new steady-state should lie vertically below the old one82, there is still a 
key question that is whether the jump locus, i.e. locus (D), passes below or above the new steady-
state. To discover that, we need first to differentiate equation (5.43) w.r.t.  and hold  constant 
at its initial steady-state value. 
 
 
Equation (5.43)' tells us how much the (D) locus moves down when  increases. However, the 
question to determine whether the jump locus passes below or above the new steady-state has not 
been answered yet. Thus, we need to compare equations (5.43)' and (5.19)' 83 to see which is larger.  
When we compare (5.43)' and (5.19)', the algebraic calculation in Appendix B.6 shows that the 
(D) locus in the phase diagram should shift downwards by more than the steady-state shifts. The 
reason is that increasing the consumption tax would have a larger impact on (5.43)', compared to 
(5.19)'. As a result, the economy must jump down from its initial steady-state position (E) to the 
intersection of the saddle path with the jump locus (D) and then converge to its new steady-state 
(E') from below. 
The below phase diagram combines the steady-state values before and after the shock (i.e. 
changing consumption tax). The black loci display the economy before the shock, at point (E).  
The red loci show the economy after the shock, at point (E'), where ∆ = 0  locus shifts the 
bell curve down, and ∆ ̂ = 0 locus moves down, as a consequence of the shock. The green 
locus, locus (D), is the diagonal line that describes the relationship between  and ̂ , as we have 
discussed previously. The blue dotted line is the saddle path, where the intersection between the 
diagonal line and the saddle path at point (A) is the saddle-point stable. Besides that, the blue 
arrows indicate the dynamic behaviour of  and ̂ . Thus, since the shock in our model is 
permanent shock, these arrows will start to work immediately, which means that a unique path 
converging to (E') exists. 
  
 
82  We know from section 5.5 that the consumption tax does not affect the capital PGSU, but it affects the consumption PGSU 
negatively. For this reason, we understand that increasing consumption tax implies that the new steady-state, (E'), should be 
vertically below the old steady-state, (E). 
 













       
 
Diagram 17: Phase diagram of the transition dynamic when a consumption tax increases 
 
Consequently, our result can now confirm our anticipation that there is a limit or a restriction on 
how  and ̂  can jump relative to each other. In other words, given one of them jump, the other 
one must also jump because if the other one does not follow that, the equation (5.43) is then 
violated. Thus, equation (5.43) can describe the relationship between  and ̂ , which represents 
the diagonal line in the phase diagram. Moreover, according to the conventional B-K condition, if 
there are two non-predetermined variables, it should be the case that we need two unstable 
eigenvalues. However, we have confirmed in our model that although we have two jump variables, 




5.9 Parameterisation and Solution 
In this section, we use a numerical simulation under standard and commonly used parameters in 
literature84. Similar to chapter four, we use Dynare software to simulate the model in three parts. 
The first part deals with PGSU variables, while the second and third parts study the level variables. 
In the first part, we want to examine whether the PGSU variables would change when we introduce 
a consumption tax, e.g. = 5%. In other words, this part aims to show the transitional dynamics 
for the PGSU variables. Also, we know from our previous analysis in existence steady-state that 
there will be an exogenous or an endogenous growth steady-state under a particular set of 
parameter values. Thus, we pick out a particular set of parameter values to determine what type of 
steady-state we must be in. This part also makes some sensitive analysis in our simulations 
regarding the consumption tax thresholds. 
In the second part, we investigate what would happen to the level variables when introducing the 
consumption tax and keeping the oil revenues unchanged. Moreover, we would examine two cases 
of introducing a 5% consumption tax rate in level variables in this part. The first case is that when 
 is sufficiently close to one, the second is when we set  to be sufficiently close to zero. The 
reason behind doing this exercise is to verify our theoretical result in the level variables section 
and particularly in the level of consumption since it has shown up an interesting result. The third 
part provides a numerical exercise to study the possibility of lowering oil revenues in our economy 
and how the consumption tax can compensate for that reduction. We also try to find out the 
required rate of consumption tax not only to compensate for any potential decline in oil revenues 
but also to guarantee the level of government spending unchanged. In fact, we need to fix the level 
of government spending to ensure that economic growth is not affected. In other words, we play 
in this part with the two sources of government revenues by finding how one source of revenues, 
i.e. consumption tax, can offset any reduction in the other source, i.e. oil revenues. 
5.9.1 Part One: Introducing a Consumption Tax and What Type of Steady-State We Are 
in (PGSU Variables) 
In this part, we introduce consumption tax in our model to see how the PGSU variables can change, 
i.e. the dynamic responses of the PGSU variables. This part also pursues to find out what type of 
steady-state we are in under a given set of parameter values. The simulation results in Table 7 and 
Figure 36 show the steady-state and the dynamic responses of the main PGSU variables in the 
economy. 
 
84  The parameter values used here are the same as in the fourth chapter, where we set  = 1, = 0.33, = 0.95, = 0.1, = 2. 
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Table 7: The steady-state responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy: 
 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.1 
The Growth Rate of Government 
Spending 1.1 
Consumption Tax 0 Consumption Tax 0.05 
Output PGSU 0.9406 Output PGSU 0.9406 
Capital PGSU 0.8306 Capital PGSU 0.8306 
Consumption PGSU 0.7744 Consumption PGSU 0.7375 
Interest Rate 0.3736 Interest Rate 0.3736 
 
 
Figure 36: The dynamic responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy 
 
To compare the above table with our conclusion in the steady-state section, we find that they are 
consistent with each other. More precisely, the capital PGSU, output PGSU, and interest rate are 
not affected by introducing the consumption tax since their equations are independent of 
consumption tax. However, the consumption PGSU is affected, where introducing a 5% 
consumption tax rate would lead to a decline in the consumption PGSU by 4.76%.  
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The figures above are also consistent with our phase diagram. Specifically, introducing the 
consumption tax in our model would generate additional government revenues and then raise 
government spending. This, in turn, would raise the growth rate of GDP, even though only 
temporarily. As we can see from the above figures, the growth rate increases only in the short and 
medium run and then tends back to its steady-state asymptotically. Although we have not carefully 
studied how the growth rate of government spending itself behaves during the transition, it is 
obvious that if the government spending suddenly rises in the impact period, since the level of 
capital, , is predetermined, then the capital PGSU, = / , should suddenly drop. 
Moreover, if  drops on impact, then it will rise over time, meaning the level of capital and 
output,  and  , grow faster than the level of government spending along the transition path. 
The reason behind this fact is the temporary boost in growth. Therefore, the transitional dynamics 
for  and  show that they initially fall and then return to their old steady-state. The reason is 
that the consumption tax, , does not affect the steady-state of both the capital PGSU and the 
output PGSU, but it affects the level of government spending. Regarding consumption PGSU, ̂ , 
a consumption tax would decrease the consumption PGSU, moving from one steady-state to 
another one. However, during the transition path, consumption PGSU jumps initially downwards 
in the impact period and then tends to its new steady-state, which is less than the old one. 
Therefore, the initial jump of  ̂  is unlike the one of , where the latter adjusts gradually 
downwards over time. 
On the other hand, we have found theoretically in the existence of steady-state of both types that 
the type of steady-state depends on  and . For , if it is sufficiently high, then the steady-
state will be an exogenous growth steady-state (i.e. > ). On the contrary, if  is sufficiently 
low, then the steady-state will be an endogenous growth steady-state (i.e. < ). However, since 
 is out of the authority’s control, we focus on varying  instead, since it is a policy parameter. 
We know that for a different set of parameter values, but under some restrictions in parameter 
values,  would be greater than one, i.e. to ensure that we have endogenous growth instead of 
endogenous shrinkage. These restrictions, as shown in equation (5.27), are that  should be close 
to one, = 1, and = 0. By using these parameter value restrictions as well as other standard 
parameter values in equation (5.27), we can verify that  is greater than one (i.e. = 1.0003). 
Consequently, under these parameter value restrictions, we can also confirm that  would be    
>  too. In other words, we could have endogenous growth steady-state under these 
restrictions because if it is otherwise, then  is turning out below  and then the actual steady-
state becomes the exogenous growth steady-state. Therefore, if we compare  under its 
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restrictions with two values of , (one is high, e.g. = 1.01 and one is low, e.g. = 0.1), we 
can conclude that when  is high, then the actual steady-state is the exogenous growth steady-
state because < ⇒ 1.0003 < 1.01. However, if  is low, then the actual steady-state in 
this case would be the endogenous growth steady-state because > ⇒ 1.0003 > 0.1. 
We can now also provide a simple numerical exercise to show when the economy could move 
from one type of steady-state to another one if we hold  constant and change consumption tax. 
In this exercise, we attempt to find out the critical value that allows the economy to change its 
steady-state position. We assume that  is fixed at 1.01, and then we increase  using the formula 
of  in equation (5.27) to find its possible values. The below table displays our calculation for   
and the potential type of steady-state for each value of . 
 
Table 8: The calculation for  and the potential type of steady-state for each value of : 
 
   Steady-State Type 
10% 1.0011 1.01 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
20% 1.0038 1.01 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
30% 1.0074 1.01 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
36.4% 1.0100 1.01 =  Critical Value 
40% 1.0115 1.01 <  Endogenous Growth Steady-State 
50% 1.0157 1.01 <  Endogenous Growth Steady-State 
60% 1.0199 1.01 <  Endogenous Growth Steady-State 
 
The above table shows that the critical value is 36.4%, which implies that if the authority sets the 
consumption tax at < 36.4%, then the economy would have exogenous growth steady-state. 
On the other hand, if the authority sets the consumption tax at > 36.4%, then the economy 
would move to the endogenous growth steady-state. Thus, according to our formula and 
simplification, the above table clarifies that it is possible to discover the critical value. However, 
it should be noted that even though our simple numerical example does not reflect exactly the real 
world because of our simplifying and some parameter restrictions, it is helpful to get a better 
understanding regarding the idea of how to achieve the critical value and how the economy could 
turn out from one type of steady-state to another one. 
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Let us now make some sensitive analysis in our simulations regarding the consumption tax 
thresholds and the parameters. The critical value discussed in our model can be defined as the tax 
threshold or the value of the switching regime, i.e., from exogenous to endogenous growth steady-
state or vice versa. Thus, to determine which variables affect the consumption tax thresholds in 
our model, we look at equation (5.27) and solve it for consumption tax. By doing so, equation 








At the critical value, we understand that  is equal to . Thus, it is obvious that the consumption 
tax threshold, equation (5.27)', depends on four parameters, namely , , , and . However, 
their effects on the tax thresholds seem to be theoretically ambiguous since equation (5.27)' is a 
non-linear equation. Thus, it would be better to use a numerical solution to find out the tax 
thresholds within different sets of parameter values. 
Before we start our experiment, it is worth mentioning that there are plausible parameters used in 
the literature. According to Mitra, Hosny, Abajyan, and Fischer, it is assumed that the value of the 
production function parameter, , is within the range of 0.40 to 0.67 for oil-exporting countries 
and 0.25 to 0.40 for oil-importing countries. On the other hand, the physical capital depreciation 
rate, , is also estimated to be between 0.05 and 0.15 for these countries (Mitra et al., 2015). 
Similarly, the IMF's selected issues report regarding Saudi Arabia empirically showed that the 
share of physical capital in emerging and developing economies is assumed to be 0.67 because the 
capital in these countries has a high rate of return due to its scarcity (IMF, 2013). Moreover, 
Aljebrin (2013) specifically estimated Saudi's production function for GDP for 1984-2011, finding 
that the elasticity of output relative to capital and labour were 0.67 and 0.57, respectively. 
To see how the tax thresholds change, we start this experiment by varying  and keeping other 
parameter values constant. As mentioned previously, the values of  will be within the range 
referred to in the literature as empirical evidence. We then keep making the same calculations for 
all other parameters. We provide figures that display how the consumption tax thresholds vary 
when we change the other parameter values in each experiment. We then discuss at the end of this 
section these tax thresholds. 
 
 
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Let us begin by varying the values of  and holding other parameters fixed at = 1.01,               
= 0.05, and = 1. 
 
Figure 37: The consumption tax thresholds response to changes in  
Next, we change the value of  and keep all other parameters constant. 
 
Figure 38: The consumption tax thresholds response to changes in  
Similarly, we alter the values of  and fix all other parameters constant. 
 
























































Finally, we vary the values of  and hold all other parameters constant. 
 
Figure 40: The consumption tax thresholds response to changes in  
As illustrated in the above figures, our numerical solutions show that higher  implies lower 
consumption tax thresholds. Similarly, higher  provides lower consumption tax thresholds. 
However, if either  or  is higher, the consumption tax thresholds would then be higher too. 
 
5.9.2 Part Two: Keeping Oil Revenues Unchanged and Introduce Consumption Tax (Level 
Variables) 
This part seeks to explore how the key endogenous level variables in our model, such as the level 
of consumption, capital stock, government spending, and output, can be changed if we introduce 
a consumption tax, keeping both the growth rate of our economy85 and oil revenues unchanged. 
The purpose of studying this part is to find out whether this simulation matches our results in the 
theoretical section of level variables. According to our model, if the consumption tax is introduced, 
then the level variables in our economy will be changed accordingly. However, we have found 
that the value of ∗ is crucial in our model, which depends on the value of the discount factor,  
Thus, determining the value of  and then the value of ∗ is, in fact, more important to track the 
time path of consumption relative to the , where the other level variables are less sensitive to the 
value of ∗. Thus, we discuss in this part two different cases to find out how the main level 
variables respond to the change in the consumption tax.  
 
85 As we have shown in the level variables section, the growth rate of government spending, = , enters into the equation of 





















5.9.2.1 Case One: Introducing 5% consumption tax and keeping oil revenues unchanged: 
 is sufficiently close to one (e.g. =0.90): 
In the first case, we set  to be sufficiently close to one, so that the value of ∗ will be greater than 
one, ∗ > 1. Therefore, introducing a consumption tax rate of 5% would increase all endogenous 
variables in our economy. More precisely, the level of consumption would increase by 3.68%, 
while the level of capital stock, government spending, and output would all increase by almost the 
same percentage, 8.86%. The reason for increasing these variables is that government spending 
plays a crucial role in our economy. Thus, introducing a consumption tax would boost government 
revenues, which is reflected in increased government spending. High government spending 
implies more positive externalities enters in firm's production function. This, in turn, enhances the 
firms by increasing their level of capital stock and output. Since the firms receive some positive 
externalities, they may somehow transfer them to the households in terms of goods and services. 
Moreover, this case also shows that the level of investment would also increase by 8.89% due to 
the introduction of a 5% consumption tax rate. The increase in the level of investment can be easily 
seen from its equation86. We understand from the neoclassical theory87 that increasing the level of 
consumption would decrease the level of investment. However, our model shows that although the 
level of consumption increases due to consumption tax, the level of investment would also 
increase. The reason is that the level of output changes, and its increase is higher than the increase 
in the level of consumption88. 
The intuition behind increasing the level of investment is that introducing a consumption tax leads 
to an increase in the government spending level. That implies that the firms would receive more 
positive externalities; therefore, the level of investment would increase. The higher investment 
would encourage the firms to create more employment. Thus, starting from introducing 
consumption tax to increase the investment level would eventually benefit the economy. 
Consequently, according to our model, if we introduce a 5% consumption tax rate, set  
sufficiently high, and keep the oil revenues constant, then the economy will benefit positively from 
that. The table below shows the steady-state responses of a number of level variables in the 
economy to a change in consumption tax. 
 
 
86 We know that the investment PGSU equation can be written at steady-state as / = ( − 1 + ) ∗, which allows us to rewrite 
the level of investment as = ( − 1 + ) ∗. . Thus, since rising consumption tax does not affect ∗, but it increases , then it 
should eventually raise the level of investment. 
 
87  We know in the neoclassical growth models that the resource constraint of a closed economy is  = +   and   = . 
Thus, if  is unchanged, then increasing consumption decreases investment/savings. 
 
88  Note that, in our model, = (1 + ) + , which can be also written as  = −(1 + ) . 
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Table 9: The steady-state responses of a number of level variables in the economy when we introduce a 5% 
consumption tax rate and keeping oil revenues unchanged, where =0.90: 
 
Consumption Tax = 0 Consumption Tax = 5% 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Level of Government Spending 2 Level of Government Spending 2.1772 
Level of Output  3.6753 Level of Output  4.0010 
Level of Capital  1.2824 Level of Capital  1.3960 
Level of Consumption  3.4188 Level of Consumption  3.5445 
Investment 0.2564 Investment 0.2792 
Interest Rate 0.4444 Interest Rate 0.4444 
 
 
5.9.2.2 Case Two: Introducing 5% consumption tax, and keeping oil revenues unchanged: 
 is sufficiently close to zero (e.g. =0.10): 
In the second case, we set  to be sufficiently close to zero, i.e. = 0.1, so that the value of ∗ 
will be less than one, ∗ < 1. Introducing a 5% consumption tax rate would increase all the main 
level variables in our economy except the level of consumption. More precisely, the level of capital 
stock, government spending, and output would all increase by almost the same percentage, 0.94%. 
In contrast, the level of consumption would decline by 3.86%. The table below shows the steady-
state responses of a number of level variables in the economy to a change in consumption tax, 
under the assumption of setting  sufficiently close to zero. 
Table 10: The steady-state responses of a number of level variables in the economy when we introduce a 5% 
consumption tax rate and keeping oil revenues unchanged, where =0.10: 
 
Consumption Tax = 0 Consumption Tax = 5% 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Level of Government Spending 2 Level of Government Spending 2.01887 
Level of Output  0.394614 Level of Output  0.398336 
Level of Capital  0.010385 Level of Capital  0.010482 
Level of Consumption  0.392537 Level of Consumption  0.377371 
Investment 0.002077 Investment 0.002096 
Interest Rate 11.2 Interest Rate 11.2 
If we compare case one, section 5.9.2.1, and case two, section 5.9.2.2, we can confirm our previous 
result discussed in section 5.5.3, which can be summarised in the below table: 
Table 11: The impact of   on /  when  is sufficiently close to one and sufficiently close to zero 
 
The value of  The value of ∗ The impact of  on /  
If  is sufficiently close to one ∗ > 1 ↑ 




5.9.3 Part Three: Decreasing Oil Revenues and Changing Consumption Tax (Level 
Variables) 
Since we understand that government spending plays an essential role in our economy, it is then 
apparent that any reduction in government spending would cause a negative impact on economic 
growth and the whole economy. In more precisely, we know that before introducing the 
consumption tax, the government budget constraint is = , while after introducing the 
consumption tax, it becomes like, = + . Therefore, if oil revenues decline, government 
spending will be negatively affected, whether with or without consumption tax revenues, since the 
oil revenues remain one of the main sources of government revenues. Thus, this part aims to study 
how the consumption tax can compensate for any possible reduction in oil revenues and the rate 
of consumption tax that can guarantee the government spending to be unchanged. In other words, 
what the amount of consumption tax that can maintain stable government revenue and equally 
stable government spending when the oil revenues decline by a certain percentage. The purpose 
of making government spending fixed in this part is because we want to keep the economic growth 
not affected by changing government spending. 
To see that, we begin with the government budget constraint and derive a formula for the 
consumption tax, which ensures the government spending unchanged, such that, 
 
 
̃  is the required consumption tax rate that compensates for any reduction in oil revenues. ̅  is the 
target government spending, which is assumed to be constant all the time in this exercise, i.e. we 
assume that = 1.  and  are the oil revenues and the level of consumption, respectively.  
We start the numerical exercise when there is no consumption tax ( = 0); therefore, from the 
government budget constraint ( = + ), we know that the government spending will be 
equal to the oil revenues at the target value ( = = ̅). We assume that the target government 
spending in this exercise equals 2, ( ̅ = 2). 
Equation (5.45) depends on the level of consumption, which can be found in equation (5.31)' and 
can also be written as: 
  
 







   














Equation (5.46) depends on the target government spending, ̅ , oil revenues, , and ∗. However, 
the value of ∗ is crucial89 to determine the required tax rate that can compensate for any reduction 
in oil revenues. In more precisely, if ∗ tends to infinity ( ∗ → ∞), then the required tax rate tends 
to zero ( → 0). In other words, a high value of ∗ implies a less required consumption tax rate 
to offset any fall in oil revenues. 
According to our calculation, under our used parameter values, the value of ∗is 1.7190. We keep 
this value of ∗unchanged and vary the oil revenues. We initially decline the oil revenues by 1% 
and find the required tax rate that can compensate for this reduction. We then carry on declining 
oil revenues to determine the appropriate tax rate for each decline in oil revenues. To be more 
precise, we give an example of how this exercise works. Suppose first that the target government 
spending is 2, which can maintain the economic growth rate unchanged91. Thus, if the oil revenues 
declined by 5% (from 2 to 1.90), the required tax rate to compensate for this reduction is 3.01%. 
As a result, based on our formula in equation (5.46), this tax rate can ensure that not only it 
compensates for the 5% reduction in oil revenues, but also the government spending, and 
eventually the economic growth rate would remain unchanged at 2. 
Table 12: A numerical exercise on how different tax rates can compensate for different declining in oil revenues to 
keep the government spending stable and unchanged at 2: 
 
89 The value of ∗ is the crucial one here because both ̅  and  do not change the tax rate (i.e. if  ∗ = 0, then =
̅
̅ = −1). 
 
90 We obtained the value of ∗ by using its simplified equation in section 5.5.3. 
 
91  On the other hand, the oil revenues also initially set to be at 2, because if there is no consumption tax, then = = ̅ = 2. 
Target  
(Value) 




Required Consumption Tax 
(Rate) 
2 0% 2.00 0.00% 
2 1% 1.98 0.59% 
2 2% 1.96 1.18% 
2 3% 1.94 1.79% 
2 4% 1.92 2.40% 
2 5% 1.90 3.01% 
2 10% 1.80 6.21% 
2 20% 1.60 13.25% 
2 30% 1.40 21.28% 
2 40% 1.20 30.53% 
2 50% 1.00 41.32% 
 *
                                                 (5.46)












According to our model and depending on the parameter values chosen, the above table shows all 
possible required rates of consumption tax that can compensate for any reduction in oil revenues 
and keep the government spending unchanged. 
5.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we summarise our model and highlight the main results we obtained in each section 
of this chapter. First of all, the model of this chapter is built upon chapter four, where we extended 
the Barro model (1990) by introducing a consumption tax as recommended by the IMF. One 
fundamental difference from chapter four is in the government budget constraint. In chapter four, 
we only have one source of government revenues, namely oil revenues, whereas we included in 
the current chapter a consumption tax as an additional source of government revenues. Thus, the 
government budget constraint in this chapter has two sources of revenues: oil revenues and 
consumption tax revenues. 
Since we have two different sources of government revenues, we came to a result that we cannot 
have a steady-state in our model in which one of these sources of government revenues grows at 
a different rate from the other. Thus, we discussed three possible types of steady-state. Two of 
these steady-states involved that government spending, , grows at the rate of . One of these 
two steady-states involved that consumption also grows at the rate , while the other involved 
that consumption grows at a slower rate than . The third possible type of steady-state involved 
that the consumption grows faster than oil revenues.  
However, at the beginning of analysing the steady-state, the growth model in this chapter was not 
obvious because the two sources of government revenues did not tell us what our economy would 
eventually represents. Therefore, we studied these two sources separately (i.e. two cases of growth 
rate). The first case is when we have only one source of government revenues, namely oil revenues, 
and the growth rate of this case represents an exogenous growth model. The second case is when 
we have a pure consumption tax revenue as an only source of government revenues, and the growth 
rate of this case represents an endogenous growth model. Because of the first case discussed in 
more detail in chapter four, we focused on the second case (i.e. pure consumption tax case). By 
studying the second case, the endogenous growth model, we found that there are some restrictions 
in parameter values (i.e. the discount factor, , should be close to one, = 1, and = 0) that must 
hold, in order for  to be greater than one. This result can ensure us to have endogenous growth 
steady-state in our model. Consequently, since  is possible to be > 1 (of course with the above 
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restrictions), then it would also be possible to obtain > , because  is an exogenous source 
and can be less than . 
Besides that, we examined if both types of steady-state, the exogenous and the endogenous growth 
steady-state, exist for the same set of parameter values. Our proof showed that there is an 
unavoidable contradiction between two conditions. These two conditions are: for the exogenous 
growth steady-state to exist, this ratio /  cannot be negative, and for the endogenous growth 
steady-state to exist, we need  >  . These two conditions are indeed essential for each steady-
state to exist. Therefore, we came to a result that both types of steady-state growth rate cannot 
exist for the same set of parameter values. We also found that if  is sufficiently high (low) for a 
given value of , then the steady-state will be an exogenous growth steady-state (an endogenous 
growth steady-state).  
We have also studied how and when the economy could move from a steady-state to another one 
when we set   constant and vary consumption tax. The reason behind investigating this further 
was due to the fact that  is exogenous and out of control. Thus, the policymaker would be 
interested in focusing on the policy parameter. Then, we have concluded that the economy will 
switch from the exogenous growth steady-state to the endogenous growth steady-state at a certain 
value of consumption tax. This transformation would provide a higher growth rate because high 
taxes would help provide sufficient government spending to enhance the firms' production 
function. Thus, we have shown the possibility of a switching regime as we change the policy 
parameter. This is a crucial result in our model because the switch from one type of steady-state 
to another is unusual in most growth models. Regarding the transitional dynamics in a pure 
consumption tax case, we found that there is only one eigenvalue that is unstable. We then 
conclude that there is no transitional dynamics in this case, which has also confirmed by Bambi 
and Venditti (2018). 
In the level variables, we studied these variables with the two sources of government revenues. 
The primary reason for studying the level variables in our model is understanding how our level 
variables respond to a change in consumption tax. Our results showed that if we increase 
consumption tax, then the level of government spending and the capital stock would increase. The 
intuition behind increasing the level of government spending is simply due to the increase in 
government revenues with a consumption tax, while increasing the capital stock level is because 
firms receive positive externalities from the government sector. Regarding the level of 
consumption, increasing consumption tax would generally cause a decrease in consumption level 
because people would save more when consumption tax is high since their purchasing power 
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decreases. However, we found an interesting result that although consumption tax is increased, the 
level of consumption in our model may increase or decrease, depending on the value of the 
discount factor, . In this regard, we discovered that if  is sufficiently close to zero, then 
increasing consumption tax would decrease the level of consumption. If, however,  is sufficiently 
close to one, then increasing consumption tax would increase the level of consumption. The 
intuition behind the latter result may be due to the fact that the households get an advantage from 
increasing government spending through the firms. More precisely, the firms could somehow pass 
on some of the positive externalities, which received through the government, to the households. 
Examples of this may be high wages or a high rental rate of capital. 
Regarding the stability and transitional dynamics in our economy, we at the beginning speculated 
that there are one stable eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue due to the relationship between 
 and ̂ . Then, we confirmed that is true by applying the test provided by Rankin (2007). 
Subsequently, we concluded in this section that the steady-state is a saddle-point, if  is 
sufficiently high. On the other hand, we drew a phase diagram to show the characteristics of a 
dynamic system and compared it with the one in the Ramsey model and chapter four. In the 
Ramsey model,  is a predetermined variable, while ̂  is a non-predetermined variable. In our 
current model, however, both  and ̂  are completely non-predetermined variables. Although 
both variables are jump variables, they cannot jump freely, unlike the conventional Blanchard and 
Kahn type solution, because we believed that there might be some relationship between them, 
which has to be held. We then proved the relationship between  and ̂  both geometrically and 
analytically. Geometrically, it represents the new locus (i.e. the diagonal line, D) in the phase 
diagram, which is somewhat different from the one in the Ramsey model and ours in chapter four. 
Analytically, we derived equation (5.43), which represents the diagonal line as a non-linear 
equation. We also found that the slope of the diagonal line is downward sloping. As a result, we 
confirmed our anticipation that there is a limit or a restriction on how  and ̂  can jump relative 
to each other. 
Finally, we use a numerical simulation under standard and commonly used parameters in the 
literature to simulate the model in three main parts. In the first part, we introduce consumption tax 
to see how the PGSU variables can change, and we also examine what type of steady-state we 
should be in under a given set of parameter values. Our simulation results indicated that the growth 
rate of government spending in the impact period would be temporarily high due to the 
consumption tax. During the transition path,  and hence  would initially drop in the impact 
period because of the sudden rise in government spending. Then, they return to their old steady-
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state because the consumption tax does not have an impact on their steady-state equations. On the 
other hand, ̂  falls initially in the impact period and then tends to its new steady-state, which is 
less than the old one. The reason for not turning back to its old steady-state is due to the fact that 
consumption tax directly affects ̂∗. Regarding what type of steady-state we must be in, we found 
that under some restriction in parameter values,  can be greater than one. We compared  under 
its restrictions with two values of , then we concluded that if  is set to be high                             
(e.g. = 1.01), then the actual steady-state is the exogenous growth steady-state, because       
< . If, on the other hand,  is set to be close to one (e.g. = 0.1), then the actual steady-
state in this case would be the endogenous growth steady-state, because > . Moreover, we 
presented a simple numerical exercise to calculate when the economy could move from a steady-
state to another if we hold  constant and change consumption tax. Based on the parameter values 
chosen in our model, if the authority sets the policy parameter at < 36.4% ( > 36.4%), then 
the economy would have the exogenous (endogenous) growth steady-state. 
In part two, we investigated what happens to the key endogenous level variables if the consumption 
tax is added by simulating these level variables under two different cases. The first case is that 
when  is sufficiently close to one (e.g. = 0.9), while the second case is that when  is 
sufficiently close to zero (e.g. = 0.1). Our simulation results are consistent with our findings in 
all level variables, where the value of  is only crucial in our model to determine the time path of 
the level of consumption. Nevertheless, the value of  did not substantially impact other level 
variables (i.e. the level of government spending, capital stock, and output all increased in both 
cases of , and that increase was due to increased consumption tax). In other words, the value of 
the discount factor played an essential role in determining the time path of the level of 
consumption. 
In the third part of our simulation section, we worked on a numerical exercise to determine the 
amount of different consumption tax that can compensate for any reduction in oil revenues. We 
derived a formula for consumption tax, equation (5.46), that allowed us to calculate the required 
tax rate that compensates for any reduction in oil revenues and keeps, at the same time, the 
government spending unchanged. Then, we provided a table, i.e. Table 12, that displayed how 
different tax rates could compensate for different declining in oil revenues to keep the government 
spending stable and unchanged at 2. In the next chapter, we extend our model further by 




6 Chapter Six: Modelling Saudi Economic Growth with 
Personal Income Tax 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is related to the previous chapters, where we would now have more discussion about 
introducing a new type of taxes in our model. This type of tax is a personal income tax. In 
particular, this chapter aims to find out how a new fiscal policy tool can work and affect the growth 
rate and the key level variables in the Saudi economy. Although Saudi Arabia does not currently 
have this type of tax, there are four motivations to study personal income tax in our economy. (i) 
One of the important primary goals of Saudi's Vision to be achieved in 2030 is to generate revenues 
away from oil through diversifying sources of income, where this type of tax could be one of these 
sources. Thus, personal income tax would be applied in the near future in the Saudi economy since 
the country now seeks to reduce its dependence on oil. (ii) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has mentioned early in their report 'Tax Policy Reforms in the GCC Countries: Now and How?' in 
2015 that there is plenty of scope for Saudi Arabia to implement new taxes. Furthermore, the IMF 
has recently92 urged the GCC, including Saudi Arabia, to diversify their sources of income. The 
IMF has confirmed that additional revenues other than oil may contribute to alleviating future 
financial pressure on the budgets of these countries. For two main reasons, they have indicated 
that the reform of the current tax system as a key tool in fiscal policy is important. The first reason 
is to ensure revenue stability, while the second reason is due to the limited taxes in the state. (iii) 
As per our knowledge, there is no previous research in the literature that examine introducing 
personal income tax and its impact on Saudi economic growth. (iv) The last motivation for 
studying this type of tax is our desire to compare the two fiscal policy tools: consumption and 
personal income taxes, in our model93. The main objective of making this comparison is to find 
out the suitable reform in the fiscal policy for the Saudi economy. Consequently, this chapter will 
be focused on introducing personal income tax as the second source of government revenues along 
with oil revenues. Like previous chapters, we will build a theoretical framework based on the Barro 
(1990) model to examine the agents in the economy, equilibrium, analysis of the steady-state, 
stability, transitional dynamics, and numerical simulation.  
 
92 The IMF published a paper on February 6, 2020, called ‘The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region’. 
 
93 It could be possible to study three sources of government revenues, the consumption and personal income taxes along with oil 
revenues, together; however, that would make our theoretical model more complicated. Thus, we examine them separately and 
then compare between them. 
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6.2 Model Description 
Like chapter five, the economy in this chapter has five sectors: households, firms, oil, government, 
and external sectors. The households sector receives personal income through wages and salaries 
from firms, and purchase goods and services provided by firms. They also pay income tax to the 
government sector. We assume that households cannot access the international market and 
financial sector. The firms' sector hires the factor of production and pays wages and rent. As we 
set it up previously, the oil sector is monopolistic and exogenous. It maximises its profits and then 
passes them on to the government because the government entirely owns it. The government sector 
receives personal income taxes from the households sector and oil profit from the oil sector. Then, 
it exchanges all these revenues to imported goods from the external sector. In other words, the 
government exports all its revenues and imports goods. Thus, the external sector in our model 
deals only with the government sector from abroad. Finally, once the government receive imported 
goods from abroad, it then provides public goods to the firms' sector instead of supplying social 
transfers to households. These public goods enter into the firms' production function as positive 
externalities. The below diagram elaborates the structure of our economy in this chapter. 
 
Diagram 18: The structure of the economy in chapter six  
 
In this chapter, there will be some fundamental differences from previous chapters due to the 
introduction of personal income tax. The differences are in the accounting identity and government 
budget constraint, balance of trade, and the PGSU and level variables. 
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Let us begin with the accounting identity and government budget constraint. Regarding the 
accounting identity, it is indeed like the case of introducing only consumption tax in the fifth 
chapter, where the government converts all its revenues, oil profits plus tax, into imported goods. 
However, the market-clearing condition94 becomes now different and takes the form: 
  
 
where exportsYt tX τ Y   95. 
Rewriting the resource constraint of the economy give us, 
 
 
Similar to chapter five, we assume that the relative price of the imported goods in terms of 
domestic good is exogenous and normalised to one. Thus, the government budget constraint can 
be written as,  
 
Regarding the balance of trade in this chapter, there are two types of exports, oil revenues and 
what the government received through the personal income tax, and one type of import, which is 




For the PGSU variables, the capital PGSU and output PGSU steady-state would be changed when 
introducing personal income tax because it enters into them, unlike the case when we introduce 
only consumption tax. Moreover, the consumption of PGSU steady-state would also be affected 
by this new tax. In this regard, we will study in section 6.5.1 of this chapter how personal income 
tax would impact the PGSU steady-state variables. On the other hand, introducing personal income 
tax would also have an impact on other key level variables in our model. Thus, we will discuss 
that as well in more details in section 6.5.2.  
 
94 Similar to the previous chapter, the notation  does not represent the totality of GDP in our economy. It indeed represents the 
non-oil goods. 
 
95  The different from chapter five is that   in chapter five represents the revenues of consumption tax (i.e. = ). 
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where exports ,  which is identical to the government budget constraint.
                                      Trade Balance = Exports  Imported Goods  =  0 







6.3 Model Setup 
There are three main agents in the economy of this chapter: the government, households, and firms 
sectors. The two other sectors, oil and external sectors, are not considered in this chapter. The 
reason is that the oil sector is exogenous and has been discussed in detail in chapter four. Thus, we 
include the oil revenues as a source of government revenues along with the personal income tax. 
On the other hand, the reason for not studying the external sector here is because what it does is 
like the previous chapters, where it only deals with the government sector, as explained before.  
6.3.1 Government Sector 
The government sector has two sources of government revenues: (i) the profit of the oil sector and 
(ii) personal income tax from the households sector. As before, the government revenues are 
assumed to be spent all on purchasing imported goods from abroad. The public goods (e.g. 
infrastructure, legal framework) will be provided to the firm's sector in order to enhance their 




where  is government spending,  is the oil revenues, and  is a constant personal income tax. 
From equation (6.1), we define the growth rate of government spending as  ≡ /  . 
 
 
where / =  is the growth rate of the oil profits, which we have found it early. 
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6.3.2 Households Sector 
It is similar to the problem of the households defined in the previous chapters, where the utility 
function is CRRA, and only a function of consumption with parameter > 0. Thus, the 
households supply is also inelastic. However, personal income tax is now added and modified the 
consumer's budget constraint. Thus, the consumer's budget constraint at a time (t) is written as: 
 
 
Where , ∈ (0,1) are the discount factor and the constant depreciation rate of capital, 
respectively.  is the gross capital income,  is the labour wage,  is the consumption,  
is the personal income tax, and = − +  is the gross investment. So now, we can 
rewrite the capital accumulation as: 
 
 




The first-order conditions: 
 
Substitution (6.4) into (6.5) gives us the Euler equation: 
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6.3.3 Firms Sector 
The firms' problem is the same as we set it up in previous chapters, where the firms' production 
function is assumed to be a Barro-type (1990) production function. In this type of production 












The firms maximise their profits by taking the rental rate of capital, , and wage per unit of labour, 




In the same way as before, we divide the firms' production function by government spending, , 




Assuming that the aggregate labour is = 1, as Barro (1990), where there is no population 
growth. Then, the firms' production function becomes like the AK model, as Barro (1990) 
demonstrated, but now in PGSU variables, 
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Like previous chapters, we divide the capital accumulation equation and the Euler equation at 
equilibrium by government spending, , to obtain PGSU variables. We start rewriting the capital 
accumulation at equilibrium as, 
 
where = , and   is the growth rate of government spending. 
 
On the other hand, the Euler equation at equilibrium becomes, 
 
where ̂ ≡ /  is the consumption PGSU at time t. 
 




These two equations (6.7) and (6.8) plus transversality condition with  given are the main 
equations that describe the market equilibrium of our economy in terms of PGSU variables with 
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6.4 Analysis of the Steady-State 
In this model, government revenues come from two revenue sources: oil revenues and personal 




A steady-state can be fund analytically using the two fundamental equations in the economy, 
equations (6.7) and (6.8), taking into consideration that at the steady-state = = ∗ and 
̂ = ̂ = ̂∗. Thus, we can write the steady-state of capital PGSU, output PGSU, and 
consumption PGSU equations, respectively, as:  
 
These expressions show the equations for the steady-state values ∗, ∗, and ̂∗.  
Since we have in this current chapter two sources of government revenues, as in chapter five, it 
should be the case that in order to avoid that one of these sources tends to be negligible as a 
proportion, all these sources need to grow at a common rate in the steady-state. Thus, we next try 
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6.4.1 The Possibilities for Steady-State 
Given the government budget constraint, equation (6.1), three logically possible ways could be 
defined to achieve a steady-state value in the growth rate of government spending, i.e. equation 
(6.2). We, therefore, begin to rewrite the equation (6.2) as, 
 
 
With an exception to be mentioned below, equation (6.2)' illustrates that we have to get /  
constant over time, so that  is constant over time. Therefore, we can see that as  → ∞, two 
different ways exist in which we can imagine /  tending to be constant over time: 
(i) The share of output relative to oil revenues tends to zero, as time tends to infinity, such that: 
 
/ 0                  t tY as t  
 
(ii) The share of output relative to oil revenues tends to some finite value and strictly positive 
value, as time tends to infinity, such that: 
 
 
If either (i) or (ii) hold, then the growth rate of government spending tends to the exogenous growth 
rate, as time tends to infinity, such that: 
2                    
tG
g as t  
There are, however, variations between the steady-states indicated by (i) and (ii). The difference 
lies in the following: (i) could occur if    grows asymptotically at any rate higher than , whereas 
in order for (ii) to occur,  needs to grow asymptotically at exactly the rate of .  
Looking at these possibilities, it seems obvious that the economy is unable to move towards a 
steady-state of type (i). The explanation is that this situation means that the economy would not 
benefit from rising oil revenues. 
There is one more possibility for how  could tend to a time-invariant value. We can also rewrite 
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Looking at the expression in equation (6.2)", and then considering a situation where: 
(iii) The share of oil revenues relative to output tends to zero, as time tends to infinity. Moreover, 
the growth rate of output tends to some finite value and strictly positive value, as time tends 




If (iii) holds, then the growth rate of government spending tends to the endogenous growth rate, 
as time tends to infinity, such that: 
 
  
It is also evident that in order to have this situation, (iii), we need that  > , (i.e. output grows 
asymptotically faster than the oil revenues). Next, we investigate two types of steady-states in our 
model. 
6.4.2 Two Types of the Steady-States 
The first type is that the output grows at the same rate as the oil revenues, which means everything 
grows at the rate of oil revenues, that is  (i.e. = ). The second type is that the output grows 
faster than oil revenues, which means that everything in this type grows at the rate of                           
(i.e. = ). Thus, we will find the steady-state equations in both types. 
6.4.2.1 Type One of Steady-State ( = ) 
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As a result, everything in the economy of this type grows at the rate of , which clearly represents           
an exogenous growth rate, and the steady-state equations can be then written as,  
 
The steady-state equations (6.13), (6.14), and (6.15)97 show that if the output grows at the same 
rate of  and the personal income tax is time-invariant, then the steady-state is one where all 
variables grow at the rate of . 
6.4.2.2 Type Two of Steady-State ( = ): 
In this type, we consider the case in which the output grows faster than oil revenues. Thus, the 
growth rate of government spending becomes, 
 
As long as the output grows faster than oil revenues, it is obvious that / → 0 as → 0. The 
reason is that oil revenues turn out to be extremely small compared to output. Then, the 
government spending growth rate would become  = . As a result, everything in the economy 
of this type grows at the rate of  , which represents an endogenous growth rate. The steady-
state equations can be then written as, 
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The steady-state equations (6.16), (6.17), and (6.18)98 confirm that the steady-state in this type is 
the one where all variables grow at the rate of . 
In summary, type one of steady-state (i.e. type (I)) requires that the output grows at the same rate 
as the oil revenues, while in order for type two of steady-state (i.e. type (II)) to occur, the output 
should grow faster than oil revenues. Thus, these two types, (I) and (II), are visible and can also 
be achieved. In the next section, we examine two different special cases of the model to find out 
if one or both is/are possible to occur and what would happen in the economy accordingly. 
6.4.3 Two Special Cases of the Model 
As mentioned previously, our model in this chapter contains two revenue sources. Thus, we study 
in this section two different special cases of the model separately. The first case is when we have 
only one source of government revenues, namely oil revenues. This case represents an exogenous 
growth model, where the growth rate is . On the other hand, the second case is when we have 
personal income tax revenues as the only source of government revenues. The growth rate, in this 
case, is an endogenous growth model, which is . The justification for analysing the two cases 
of growth rate separately is to compare between them, (i.e. if  >   or  < ), since we 
want to see if the case two steady-state can occur in our model. 
More specifically, if we are in a situation in which we can only have > , then the steady-
state would be the one which we have found in chapter four. Thus, this situation represents an 
exogenous growth model. On the other hand, if we can have a situation where < , we would 
expect to see an endogenous growth model in our model. The reason is that /  will tend to zero 
asymptotically, as shown in situation (iii). Thus, we next discuss in more depth the two cases of 
growth. 
6.4.3.1 First Case of Growth Rate (only oil revenues as a source of government revenues): 
The first case is that we only have one type of government revenues, that is, oil revenues. In fact, 
this case was achieved in chapter four, where we found that government spending grows at , i.e. 
it represents an exogenous growth model. Besides, the stability and transitional dynamics, in this 
case, were already analysed previously. Since the steady-state has been addressed in depth prior, 
we are therefore focusing on the second case. 
 
98 Analogously, these three equations are identical to equation (6.10), (6.11), and (6.12) if and only if we have case two, = . 
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6.4.3.2 Second Case of Growth Rate (only personal income tax as a source of government 
revenues): 
The second case is that personal income tax is the only source of government revenue, representing 
an endogenous growth model. This case indeed represents Barro (1990) endogenous growth 
model. In this case, the government budget constraint and the growth rate of government spending 
can be written as, 
 
 
The capital accumulation, in this case, 
 
It is evident that the output PGSU, , depends now on only personal income tax. This switching 
would be helpful to solve this case, as we will see after equation (6.20). 
On the other hand, the Euler equation, 
 
From the definition of output PGSU, we know that: 
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Thus, we can say that the output PGSU, , and capital PGSU, , in this case, are both constant. 
Now we can rewrite the capital accumulation, equation (6.19), and the Euler equation, equation 
(6.20), respectively as, 
 
The Euler equation (6.20)' exhibits that the growth rate of consumption is constant over time 
because it depends on only exogenous parameters. Moreover, since government spending is also 
considered proportional to the capital stock, both inputs in the firms' production would have the 
same growth rate.  
At the steady-state, we have = = ∗, ̂ = ̂ = ̂∗, and = = ∗; therefore, the 
capital accumulation equation (6.19)' and the Euler equation (6.20)' in a steady-state can be written 
respectively as, 
 
By making  sufficiently high and rising , we can get  > 1 under one possible situation. This 
situation is if  ( ) > , which could be obtained when we set > 1. 
As mentioned in chapter five, one difference between income and consumption taxes is regarding 
their rates. Personal income tax must be less than one (i.e. <100%), while consumption tax could 
exceed one (i.e. >100%) on some products. Thus, it can be proved that there is a tax rate that 
maximises the economic growth rate. To see that, we take the derivative of equation (6.22) w.r.t. 
the personal income tax, 
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According to Barro99, the above derivative, equation (6.22)', means that the maximum growth rate 
can be obtained when a tax rate is set to be = (1 − ). Thus, if the tax rate is > (1 − ), 
then economic growth will be negatively affected, and vice versa. The intuition behind the negative 
impact on growth is that there is a crowding-out effect between government spending and private 
investment. With too much taxation, the disincentive of households to invest in the capital will 
slow down the accumulation of capital so that the public good partially offsets the positive impact 
on the production process. As Barro (1990) illustrated, the growth rate of consumption, capital, 
and output all equal the same constant, with all PGSU variables growing at the same rate all the 
time. As a result, there is no transitional dynamics in this type of steady-state, i.e. type (II) steady-
state. So now, we examine, as in the previous chapter, if whether both types of steady-state can 
exist for the same set of parameter values or whether there is just one. 
6.4.4 Existence of Steady-States of Both Types 
We extend our study in this section by examining that if both types of steady-states can exist for 
the same set of parameter values. The first type of steady-state (I) is the exogenous growth steady-
state, while the second type of steady-state (II) is the endogenous growth steady-state. In the 
exogenous growth steady-state, /  tends to a finite, non-zero, value, and the growth rate is . 
In the endogenous growth steady-state, on the contrary, /  tends to infinity, and the growth 
rate is  where >  and  is a function of  amongst other parameters. 
We have found a similar result as in chapter five that there is a contradiction100. This contradiction 
originates from the two conditions, (i) /  cannot be negative and (ii) > . As mentioned 
before, if one of these condition holds, then the other condition cannot hold, and vice versa. 
However, we need these two conditions for each steady-state to exist. In more precisely, the first 
condition, (i), is required for type (I) steady-state to exist, while the second condition, (ii), is 
necessary for type (II) steady-state to occur. Therefore, we can conclude that there can still be two 
steady-states, but the two types of steady-state cannot exist for the same set of parameter values. 
In other words, for a given set of parameter values, the steady-state will be either of exogenous or 
endogenous steady-state. In fact, it depends on the value of . If  is sufficiently high (for a 
given value of ), then the steady-state will be of type (I), i.e. an exogenous growth steady-state. 
If, on the other hand,  is sufficiently low (for a given value of ), then the steady-state will be 
of type (II), i.e. an endogenous growth steady-state. 
 
99 In Barro (1990) paper, 'Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth', the analysis was done in continuous-
time. However, since our models in all chapters are analysed in discrete-time, we show in Appendix C.1 how Barro (1990) arrived 
at the growth rate formula in discrete-time. 
 
100 The contradiction is quite similar to what we have found in chapter five, and the only difference is that we have now output, , 
instead of consumption, . Thus, we do not show here the full proof of that since chapter five has comparable proof.  
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If we apply here the same analysis as in chapter five, i.e. keeping  constant at a certain value 
and changing , we could have a different result because of the different type of taxes. Thus, it is 
possible to have a similar discussion as the previous chapter regarding the shift of steady-state 
type. However, before we study how and when the two types of steady-state can switch, it is worth 
mentioning that we have early found that increasing personal income tax would have a positive 
and negative impact on the growth rate. More precisely, the formula of , equation (6.22), shows 
that increasing  would increase the growth rate. However, at a certain value of , the growth 
rate would decline. Thus, the relationship between the personal income tax and the growth rate 
can take a 'hill shape' 101. 
Returning now back to the two types of steady-state, we consider that  is fixed at a certain value, 
but the personal income tax, , can vary. To see that, suppose at the beginning that there is no 
personal income tax, = 0, then the economy would be a type (I) steady-state, which is . The 
reason is that  is the only steady-state that the economy can stay in. This situation represents 
what we have early found in chapter four when there are no taxes at all, and the only source of 
government revenues is the oil revenues. Now, if the government introduces a low rate of personal 
income tax, e.g. = 5%, as we know, this would increase the growth rate of  , but it would be 
less than . Thus, the economy would grow at the rate of , meaning that it is going to stay at 
type (I) steady-state. Suppose the government increases , but also still at a lower rate, e.g.      
= 10%, then although the growth rate of   would be higher now, and the economy would 
have some changes in its level variables, it would be still at  because the tax rate is low yet and 
then > . However, at a certain value of  , e.g. = 20%,  would become greater than 
, i.e. < . In this case, the economy would now move to type (II) steady-state, which is . 
Increasing  further, e.g. = 30%, would also increase the growth rate, and the economy would 
be in a higher position at the growth rate . However, if the authority decides to raise  
significantly, e.g. = 60%, then  would decline because this tax rate passes its maximum rate, 
but the economy would still settle into type (II) steady-state. When the tax rate increases more,                   
e.g. = 70%, although the policymaker may think this scenario would stimulate the economy, 
 indeed declines more and becomes now less than . In this case, the economy would return to 
type (I) steady-state because the growth rate is now > .  
 
 




Therefore, contrary to the result of chapter five, we now have two critical values for . As 
increasing the tax rate, the first one, ̅ , is when the economy turns from type (I) steady-state to 
type (II) steady-state, i.e. from exogenous growth steady-state to endogenous growth steady-state, 
while the second one, ̅ , is the opposite. The below diagram shows the two critical values when 
the economy switches from one type of steady-state to another one, as well as the maximum tax 
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6.5 Analysis of the Effect of Personal Income Tax on PGSU and Level 
Variables in a Type (I) Steady-State 
The analysis of the personal income tax in type (I) steady-state102 will be discussed in two sections. 
The first section studies the impact on the steady-state PGSU variables, whereas the second section 
is devoted to analysing the impact on the level variables. 
6.5.1 The Impact of the Personal Income Tax on the Steady-State PGSU Variables 
In this section, we want to know how changing personal income tax would affect the type (I) 
steady-state of capital PGSU, output PGSU and consumption PGSU to find out the relationship 
between them in our model. 
6.5.1.1  The Impact of Personal Income Tax on the Steady-State of Capital PGSU 





The sign is negative because of ( − 1). That means increasing personal income tax would decline 
the steady-state of capital PGSU and vice versa. 
6.5.1.2 The Impact of Personal Income Tax on the Steady-State of Output PGSU: 





Like (6.13)', the sign is negative because of ( − 1). That means increasing personal income tax 
would decline the steady-state of output PGSU and vice versa. 
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6.5.1.3  The Impact of Personal Income Tax on the Steady-State of Consumption PGSU: 
We first substitute equation (6.13) into equation (6.15),  
 
and then take the derivative of the steady-state of consumption PGSU, with respect to personal 
income tax, 
 
If we restrict some parameter values under their conditions by assuming that , , = 1 and    
= 0, then the ̂∗/  can be simplified as, 
 
 
The numerator is positive, but the denominator is negative. Thus, ̂∗/ < 0, which means that 
increasing personal income tax would also decline the steady-state of consumption PGSU, and 
vice versa. 
6.5.2 The Impact of the Personal Income Tax on the Level Variables 
This section examines the key level variables in the model as a special case, unlike the variables 
of PGSU. Similar to the previous chapter, a level variable implies a variable that is not a growth 
rate. Thus, we investigate here how the key endogenous level variables, i.e. the level of 
government spending, , consumption, , capital stock, , and output, , would be affected 
when we change the personal income tax, . In more precisely, we seek in this section to study 
how increasing, , would affect the steady-state value relative to oil revenues, , of each level 
variables. This calculation would be helpful since we know that the growth path of   cannot be 
affected by increasing . 
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We have found in the steady-state section that personal income tax, , has a negative impact on 




Therefore, compared to chapter five, we attempt here to calculate how changing personal income 
tax would affect the steady-state value of each level variable relative to oil revenues, . However, 
before we start studying these effects, it is helpful to understand first how ∗ can be affected 
when personal income tax changes. Knowing how  affects ∗ would help solve the level 
variables, as we will see later. To do that, we substitute equation (6.14) into ∗. 
 
Then, we take the derivative of (6.23) w.r.t. , and simplify it to obtain: 
 
The first expression in the numerator, [(( ) / − 1 + )/ (1 − )] , is positive, and the 
denominator is clearly positive too because , ∈ (0,1). However, the crucial part is 
[1 − − ], which can determine the sign of the (6.23)'. More precisely, if  and  are 
sufficiently high, then [1 − − ] will be negative and therefore, the sign of the (6.23)' will be 
negative too. If, on the other hand, both  and α  are sufficiently low (e.g. , < 0.5), the sign 
of the (6.23)' will end up being positive because 1 > + . However, the value of   and  may 
not be all together sufficiently high or low. Thus, we know that the value of  can take any value 
between zero and one mathematically, but its standard and common value in the economic 
literature is 0.33. Thus, if we consider that, then the value of   would be mainly determined the 
sign of (6.23)'. As a result, we can conclude that if the value of  is sufficiently high                        
(i.e. > 0.67), then the sign of (6.23)' will be negative. If  is sufficiently low (i.e. < 0.67), 
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6.5.2.1 Level of Government Spending: 
We begin with the level of government spending because it would help us to determine the other 
level variables. To do so, we divide the government budget constraint, equation (6.1), by  and 
then rearrange it, to have, 
 
Substituting equation (6.14) into (6.24) gives us, 
 
 
Taking the derivative of (6.24)' w.r.t. the personal income tax and simplifying it, we obtain: 
 
The denominator of (6.24)" is clearly positive because of ( − 1)( − 1). However, the 
numerator depends on the rate of personal income tax, . Like the previous section, if   is 
sufficiently low, then ( / )/  will be positive. That meaning that the level of government 
spending relative to  would increase, as shown in the below diagram, ( ) . If, on the other 
hand,  is sufficiently high, then ( / )/  will be negative. This implies that the level of 
government spending relative to  would decrease, as can be seen in the below diagram, ( ) . 
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Diagram 20: The time path of the level of government spending relative to the  
 
The result of the government spending level relative to oil revenues, , could be intuitively 
consistent with the 'Laffer curve' theory. The government revenues in our model are equal to the 
government spending (i.e. as we assumed that the government spends all its revenues; thus, they 
are equal). Although high personal income tax generally implies high revenues that the 
government can receive and use for spending purposes, the activities in the economy (e.g. work 
and investment/savings) would be negatively affected, as illustrated by the 'Laffer curve'. 
Subsequently, if the taxes are very high, government tax revenues would decline due to that effect. 
In contrast, if the taxes are very low, then that would generate additional revenues and would at 
the same time encourage economic activities and eventually would raise tax revenues. The 'Laffer 
curve' is shown in the below diagram103. 
 
Diagram 21: Laffer Curve 
 




6.5.2.2 Level of Consumption: 
The level of consumption can be obtained from the definition of consumption PGSU as, 
 
 
Dividing both sides by , 
 
 
Substituting equation (6.24) into (6.25) gives us, 
 
 
Now, we use the steady-state equations (6.13), (6.14), and (6.15) to have, 
 
We take the derivative of (6.25)' w.r.t.  and simplify it as,  
 
We need now to find out the sign of (6.25)", in order to understand how changing personal income 
tax, , would affect the level of consumption relative to oil revenues, . However, the sign of 
(6.25)  " seems algebraically ambiguous because it depends on several parameters. The source of 
this ambiguity comes basically from the 'Laffer curve' effect, where its impact on the level of 
government spending also causes some impact on other variables. Among these variables is the 
level of consumption. To see that, equation (6.25) contains two components, namely the 
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consumption PGSU, ̂ , and the level of government spending relative to oil revenues, / . For 
̂ , we know from the steady-state equation, equation (6.15)", that it is decreasing with increasing 
personal income tax, . However, the second component, / , increases (decreases) if  is 
sufficiently low (high). Thus, these two components work in the opposite direction if only the  
is sufficiently low, which means that the effect is partially ambiguous. As a result, we resort to a 
numerical solution because of this theoretical ambiguity, which would be an appropriate method 
in this case104. For this reason, we use the standard and commonly used parameters values, as in 
previous chapters, which are the following: = 1, = 0.33, = 0.95, = 0.1, = 1.1, and 
= 2. 
In the below table, we provide a numerical exercise to show how the steady-state variables and the 
level variables respond when the personal income tax changes. Calculating first the steady-state 
variables would help us to determine the numerical values of the level of government spending 
relative to oil revenues, / , and then the level of consumption relative to oil revenues,         
/  105. 
Table 13: The numerical values for the steady-state, / , and  /  variables when changes 
 
 ∗ ̂∗ ∗ ( / ) ∆( / ) ( / ) ∆( / ) 
5% 0.7694 0.7174 0.9171 1.0480 − 0.7518 − 
10% 0.7098 0.6618 0.8930 1.0980 ↑ 0.7266 ↓ 
20% 0.5954 0.5551 0.8427 1.2027 ↑ 0.6676 ↓ 
40% 0.3875 0.3613 0.7314 1.4135 ↑ 0.5107 ↓ 
60% 0.2116 0.1973 0.5990 1.5610 ↑ 0.3080 ↓ 
80% 0.0752 0.0701 0.4257 1.5164 ↓ 0.1063 ↓ 
 
The numerical exercise shows for the particular parameter values, as above, that there is a negative 
relationship between the personal income tax and the level of consumption relative to . Thus, 
the diagram below shows the time path of the level of consumption relative to . 
 
104 The effects on the other variables are sequence partly of the ambiguity in effect on the level of government spending (i.e. 'Laffer 
curve' effect). Thus, when we theoretically studied the level of consumption, capital stock, and output, we found that they are 
ambiguous and complicated to determine how  affects them. The reason is that there are many effects on these level variables. 
Some of these effects are due to changes in the level of government spending, while others are due to some additional effects. Thus, 
we resort to a numerical solution to provide values for all steady-states and level variables when the tax rate changes. 
 








Diagram 22: The time path of the level of consumption to the  
 
The intuition of this result is returned to the fact that personal income tax would decline the 
households' disposable income. That implies that the households would have less possibility to 
spend on additional consumption goods. Thus, the level of consumption is generally decreased. 
6.5.2.3 Level of Capital Stock: 
The level of capital stock can be written as, 
 
Dividing both sides by , 
 
Substituting equation (6.24) into (6.26) gives us, 
 
Similar to the level of consumption, the 'Laffer curve' effect also impacts the level of capital 
relative to oil revenues. This effect can be seen in equation (6.26). Thus, by applying the same 
parameters values, the table below shows how the level of capital changes when personal income 
tax changes. 
Table 14: The numerical values for the /  variable when changes   
 ( / ) ∆( / ) ( / ) ∆( / ) 
5% 1.0480 − 0.8063 − 
10% 1.0980 ↑ 0.7794 ↓ 
20% 1.2027 ↑ 0.7161 ↓ 
40% 1.4135 ↑ 0.5477 ↓ 
60% 1.5610 ↑ 0.3303 ↓ 
80% 1.5164 ↓ 0.1140 ↓ 
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Based on the particular parameter values chosen, the above table shows that increasing personal 
income tax decreases the level of the capital stock relative to . Thus, the diagram below displays 







Diagram 23: The time path of the level of capital stock relative to the  
 
Intuitively, increasing personal income tax in our model has two effects, positive and negative 
impact, on the level of the capital stock relative to oil revenues. The positive effect comes from 
government spending. Specifically, we know that increasing personal income tax increases 
government revenues and then increase government spending. Increasing government spending 
implies that the firms would receive more positive externalities from the government to enhance 
their productivity. On the other hand, the negative effect comes from households. In more 
precisely, increasing personal income tax would decline the households' disposable income. In 
turn, this leads to a decrease in the households' demand from firms and then discourages business 
from hiring and investing more. As a result, the particular parameter values, which we have chosen 
in this numerical exercise, show that the negative effect in our model would dominate the positive 
one because the level of the capital stock is shown to be negatively affected by increasing personal 
income tax. 
6.5.2.4 Level of Output: 
The level of output can be written as, 
 
Dividing both sides by , 
 
 
Substituting equation (6.24) into (6.27) gives us, 
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The level of output is also affected by the effect on government spending, as shown in equation 
(6.27). As before, we use the same parameter values in the table below to understand the 
relationship between the level of output and the personal income tax. 
Table 15: The numerical values for the /  variable when changes 
 
 ( / ) ∆( / ) ( / ) ∆( / ) 
5% 1.0480 − 0.9611 − 
10% 1.0980 ↑ 0.9805 ↑ 
20% 1.2027 ↑ 1.0135 ↑ 
40% 1.4135 ↑ 1.0338 ↑ 
60% 1.5610 ↑ 0.9350 ↓ 
80% 1.5164 ↓ 0.6455 ↓ 
 
The numerical exercise clarifies that the personal income tax changes the level of output. More 
precisely, if  is low (high), then ( / ) increases (decreases). The diagram below shows two 
different time paths of the output relative to . The first time path is ( ) , which is when 
personal income tax is low, while the second time path is ( ) , which is when personal income 







Diagram 24: The time path of the level of output relative to the  
 
The economic interpretation for this result is that low personal income tax would help the output 
to increase, benefiting from an increased flow of government spending. However, high personal 
income tax would discourage savings, investment, and work, and it would also reduce the 
households' disposable income. Moreover, since we have found that the level of consumption and 
capital stock relative to oil revenues would be negatively affected, such negative impacts would 
dominate the output level relative to oil revenues if the tax rate is high.  
The steady-state was addressed in sections (6.4) and (6.5); thus, we next focus on studying the 
dynamics of our model. 
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6.6 Analysis of the Stability of Type (I) Steady-State 
As long as we understand now that there is no transitional dynamics in type (II) steady-state, we 
examine in this section the local stability of type (I) steady-state. Throughout this section, we 
merge the two sources of government revenue, oil revenues and personal income tax revenues. If 
all streams of government revenues are viewed together, the growth rate of government spending 




To study the stability in our model, we need first to apply the linearisation method to evaluate the 
local stability of our system. Thus, we construct the linear approximation to the system around the 
steady-state, where the PGSU variables in the steady-state will stay constant all the time. Starting 





We can see that the right-hand side of this equation is a function of , , ̂ . Thus, we find 
the first-order Taylor approximation of it around the steady-state and evaluate the coefficients in 
the steady-state106, 
 
Then, we consider the Euler equation,  
   
 
 
106 The steady-state of capital accumulation equation and Euler equation can be written respectively as,  
∗ = (1 − ) ∗ + (1 − ) ∗ − ̂∗   and  = (1 − ) ∗ + 1 − .  
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The right-hand side of the Euler equation is also a function of , , ̂ . Therefore, we find 




Υ is negative because of ( − 1). Thus, by substituting the approximation of the capital 
accumulation equation, equation (6.28), into the approximation of the Euler equation, equation 
(6.29), we obtain: 
 
Now the above two equations describe the law of motion in this system and define the dynamics 
in  and ̂ . Thus, by linearising these two equations, as shown in equations (6.28) and (6.29)', 
we understand that there will be two eigenvalues in this system.  
The linearised capital accumulation equation (6.28) and Euler equation (6.29)' can also be now 
expressed in matrix form as: 
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The above coefficient matrix A has a trace, 
 
 




The eigenvalues of the matrix are the solutions to the characteristic equation, 
 
Since we have identified two eigenvalues in this system, we need to examine if there are stable, 
unstable, or one of them is stable, and the other is not. To do that, we go back to the government 
budget constraint equation and the definition of both the capital PGSU and consumption PGSU 





Let us begin with the definition of capital PGSU, .  cannot jump and  cannot also jump 
because both  and  cannot jump107. Thus, we can definitely say that  here is a predetermined 
variable. On the other hand, we see from the definition of consumption PGSU, ̂ , that the 
numerator, , can jump, but the denominator cannot jump. Since one of the components of  ̂  
 
107 Determining whether  can or cannot jump may not be obvious at first sight. Thus, we need to elaborate it more. First of all, 
we know that  depends on  through the production function, i.e. = . Thus, if  cannot jump, then  undoubtedly 
cannot jump too, because  is already a predetermined variable. However,  depends partly on  through the government budget 
constraint, i.e. = + . Therefore, if we substitute  out of the production function, we obtain that                                            
= ( + ) , where  enters on both sides. This equation determines  as an implicit function of  and . As a 
result, since  and  cannot jump, it follows that  cannot jump either. 
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can jump, it must be the case that ̂  itself can jump. Therefore, ̂  here is a non-predetermined 
variable. According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) test, we need, in this case, one stable eigenvalue 
and one unstable eigenvalue for the test to be satisfied.  
Now, we apply the test explained by Rankin (2007) for our characteristic equation to have 0, 1, or 
2 stable eigenvalues. This test will equivalently produce conditions for 0, 1, or 2 of the original 
eigenvalues  to lie inside the unit circle108. Therefore, applying the table provided in chapter four 
and converting the table's coefficients (a,b,c) to our coefficients from our characteristic equation 
gives us the necessary and sufficient condition, 
 
Since Υ < 0, the above ratio shows that the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive 
and greater than the numerator. Now, it is clear that the value of this ratio is negative and between 
zero and one. Therefore, there is one eigenvalue that lies inside the unit circle. As a consequence 
of this, we can conclude that the steady-state ∗, ̂∗  is a saddle-point in this type of steady-state, 
i.e. type (I) steady-state109. 
  
 
108 Chapter four clarified in detail the method explained by Rankin (2007). 
 
109  The detailed procedure for analysing this system, starting from the law of motion equations to the necessary and sufficient 
condition, is available in Appendix C.3. 
        
*
* 2 * 2 * 2 * *
ˆ      
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ    ˆ2 1 1 1   
  
σ
a b c k β
a b c βk g α α k g k βg α βαc k β
  






6.7 The Effect of Personal Income Tax on the Transition Path of Variables in 
the Neighbourhood of a Type (I) Steady-State 
This section analyses the transitional dynamics in type (I) steady-state before and after a permanent 
shock, i.e. a personal income tax. This section aims to examine the short-term and medium-term 
effects, through a phase diagram, when a personal income tax, , is increased. 
6.7.1 The Transitional Dynamics Before the Shock 
The dynamics analysis of the model through a phase diagram requires rewriting the two 
fundamental equations in our economy in terms of , ̂ . In other words, the phase diagram is 
based only on two variables,  and ̂ , where each curve corresponds with one of the two zero 
change cases, i.e. ∆ = − = 0 and ∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0. Thus, we start with the 






We subtract  from both sides of the capital accumulation equation, 
 
Then, we set  ∆ = − = 0, and then simplify it to obtain: 
 
 
Equation (6.30) becomes now, 
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We can also draw ̂  as a function of  (treating  as given), as follows: 
 
 
Diagram 25: Drawing equation ̂  as a function of  
 
The second diagram shows that ̂  as a function of   is a 'hill shaped', where  is the value of  
 which maximises ̂ , such that, 
 
 
For low values of  , ̂ / > 0, while for high values of  , ̂ / < 0. Therefore, equation 
(6.31) gives us a concave function (bell curve), as shown in the above diagram. 
Below the ∆ = 0 curve described by (6.31), the consumption PGSU is 'lower' at any point 
below the curve than it is on the curve, so that  ̂ < (1 − ) + (1 − − )  which, taken 
to the capital accumulation equation, it means: >  and the arrows point to 'right', showing 
the expected direction of capital PGSU in that area. 
Above the ∆ = 0 curve, the consumption PGSU is 'higher' at any point above the curve than 
it is on the curve, so that  ̂ > (1 − ) + (1 − − ) , which implies <  and the 
arrows indicate to 'left'. 
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By subtracting ̂  from both sides, setting ∆ ̂ = ̂ − ̂ = 0, and then simplifying it, we can 
rewrite it as follows: 
 
where  is an implicit function of , ̂  given by: 
 
 
The above two equations can be schematically written as: 
Equation (6.32)  ⇒  ℎ ⏟ , , = 0,    where  = ⏟ , ⏟̂ ,  
 











Now, we can try to find out its slope and how it shifts when  increases. To do that, we totally 
differentiate it w.r.t. , ̂ , , which then gives us: 
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Now, we need to evaluate ℎ ,ℎ ,ℎ , , , and  110. Thus, they can be written as: 
 
The slope of the equation of ∆ ̂ = 0 is, 
 
The sign of the slope of ∆ ̂ = 0 locus is ambiguous due to multiple terms in (6.34), making it 
difficult to determine its sign. However, we know that if the personal income tax sets to be 
zero, = 0, then we would return to the situation in chapter four model, where the slope of the 
stationary locus for ̂  is positive. Nevertheless,  in this chapter is not zero, ≠ 0; therefore, 
we can consider it to be sufficiently close to zero. The reason for this is to be able to draw a phase 
diagram because otherwise, it may be difficult to draw it for very general values of . Thus, we 
draw a phase diagram for a value of  which is close to zero. Consequently, with a positive slope 
of ∆ ̂ = 0, we then understand that the saddle path to the new steady-state would be upward-
sloping, i.e. like the one in chapter four model. 
 
110 The procedures to evaluate ℎ , ℎ , ℎ , , , and   is available in Appendix C.4. 
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6.7.2 The Transitional Dynamics After the Shock 
We study in this section how the shock, a change in personal income tax, would affect the 
transitional dynamics. In other words, how the two curves in the phase diagram, ∆ = 0 and 
∆ ̂ = 0, would move when the personal income tax changes. 
A- The locus ∆ = :  
Equation (6.31) shows that personal income tax affects consumption PGSU. Thus, taking the 




The sign of (6.35) is negative, meaning that holding  constant, rising  must fall ̂ . As a result, 
we can conclude that ∆ = 0  locus would shift the bell curve down when personal income tax 
is increased. 
B- The locus ∆ = : 
The vertical shift of ∆ ̂ = 0, when personal income tax changes, is, 
 
The sign of the vertical shift of ∆ ̂ = 0, equation (6.36), is ambiguous. However, what we need 
to understand instead is how  and ̂  behave as the economy moves along the transition path to 
the new steady-state. For this purpose, we know from section 6.5.1 that the personal income tax 
affects both the capital PGSU and the consumption PGSU negatively, as shown in (6.13)' and 
(6.15)". Thus, higher  means that the new steady-state, (E'), should be below the old steady-
state, (E), in the phase diagram. In other words, both  and ̂  fall in the new steady-state. We 
also know that the saddle path to the new steady-state would be upward-sloping if we consider the 
case where  remains close to zero. However, the fall in the new steady-state does not inform us 
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about the initial jump of the capital PGSU. For this reason, we need to examine two main questions 
regarding the effect on  when the shock occurs, i.e. the tax rate changes. The first question is 
that would  jump on the impact period? The second is that if it can jump, would it jump up or 
down? In fact, answering these questions would help us to understand the transition path of  at 
the moment of the impact period.  
Before trying to answer these two questions, it is worth mentioning that in the analysis of the local 
stability, section 6.6, we showed that  is a predetermined variable while ̂  is a non-
predetermined variable. However, when we now study the transition path for the case of chaining 
,  turns to be a non-predetermined variable, like ̂ . The reason is that if we shock , that 
means  would be shocked (i.e. immediately change  even though  is given) because the 
effect is simultaneous on revenues. More precisely, the sudden change in , when  changes, 
can be seen from the government budget constraint (i.e. = + ). Then, from the definition 
of capital PGSU, ≡ / , we know that  cannot jump, but  can now jump. Therefore, 
since  can now jump, it must be the case that  itself would immediately change as well. As a 
result, changing  implies that , as ̂ , would jump at the moment of impact, where it could not 
jump before the shock. 
As long as  and ̂  are both now non-predetermined variables, we can say that our model in this 
chapter is different from the phase diagram in the Ramsey model (i.e. the one in chapter four). In 
other words, when a permanent shock happens,  and ̂  can both jump, but  cannot jump in 
chapter four. Therefore, the economy in this chapter would not move initially to the point that is 
vertically above or below the old steady-state . Since we understood that  and ̂  can both jump, 
we need next to answer the second question, which is regarding how  would jump on the impact 
period. To do that, let us investigate further the definition of the capital PGSU, which can be 
written as : 
 
 
We can see that there is a direct effect of higher   on   even if   did not change. In addition 
to that, when  is unexpectedly increased,  cannot jump, but  can jump because  enters 
directly in  through the production function. To see how the rise in  makes  jumps, we need 
to use the production function, , which is implicitly determined by: 
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Differentiating the production function w.r.t   would help us to determine the initial jump in . 




To find out now how  would jump, we need to find / , which requires some 
differentiation due to the implicit function of  . Appendix C.5. provides the full steps and 
differentiations to arrive at /  and its sign. Therefore, after simplifying it, we have: 
  
 
The sign of equation (6.37) is negative, which means that  would jump initially down in the 
impact period. In other words, equation (6.37) tells us how much the initial jump in  moves 
down when  increases. The reason behind jumping down is that the sudden rise in government 
spending, caused by receiving additional government revenues, makes  to suddenly drop in the 
impact period111. Thus, we need now to find out whether the initial downwards jump in , is larger 
or smaller than the fall in the steady-state value of . The purpose of this comparison is to 
understand how the economy must jump in the impact period. In other words, the jump locus lies, 
whether to the left or the right, of the new steady-state. To see that, we compare the initial 
downwards jump in , i.e. (6.37), and the fall in the steady-state value of , i.e. (6.13)'.  
For equation (6.13)', it is found in section 6.5.1.1. Thus, we simplify it more to be able to compare 
it with (6.37), as112: 
 
 
111  When  unexpectedly rises, the sudden drop in  and ̂  can be seen obviously from both the definition of the capital PGSU, 
 ≡ / , and the consumption PGSU, ̂ ≡ / . 
 
112  It should be noted that both derivatives of (6.13)' and (6.37) are evaluated in the initial steady-state. 
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The comparison between (6.13)" and (6.37), i.e. ∗/  and / , becomes now obviously 
between (1 − ) and 1/ . Since ∈ (0,1), then we know that 0 < 1 − < 1. On the other 
hand, we also know that 1/ = ( / ) = (1/ ). Thus, we evaluate it in the steady-state 





It seems clear that, depending on parameters, 1/ ∗  could take any values between zero and 
infinity, meaning that 1/ ∗  could be greater than or less than (1 − ). In other words, for the 
condition 1/ ∗ > (1 − ) or 1/ ∗ < (1 − ) to hold, it depends on the parameter 
values chosen. Thus, if 1/ ∗  is greater than (1 − ), it then implies that (6.13)" > (6.37), i.e. 
∗/ > / , and the opposite is true.  
To investigate more the possible values for 1/ ∗ , we need to relate the parameter condition 
in 1/ ∗  to the parameter conditions under which a type (I) steady-state exists. For type (I) 
steady-state to exist, we know that some conditions should be held. For example, if  is 
sufficiently high for a given value of , if  is fixed at a certain value and  is too high, and if 
 is fixed at a certain value and  is too low. Looking at  in equation (6.38), it is obvious that 
the higher in  implies the higher in 1/ ∗ , which would ensure that 1/ ∗ > (1 − ) 
because (1 − ) ∈ (0,1). Now, we can say that if  is high, then 1/ ∗ > (1 − ), i.e. 
(6.13)" > (6.37). In other words, the fall in the steady-state value of  is greater than the initial 
downwards jump in , i.e. ∗/ > / . However, the opposite is also true, meaning if 
 is low, then ∗/ < / . In words, the fall in the steady-state value of  is less than 
the initial downwards jump in . As a result, we can conclude that the two situations,   
1/ ∗ > (1 − ) or 1/ ∗ < (1 − ), are both theoretical possible to occur, depending 
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The below phase diagrams display the steady-state values before and after the shock (i.e. changing 
personal income tax). The black loci show the economy before the shock happens, at point (E), 
while the red loci represent the economy after the shock, at point (E'). After the shock occurs, the    
∆ = 0  locus would shift the bell curve down, whereas the ∆ ̂ = 0 locus would move to up 
(i.e. to the left). The blue dotted line is the saddle path, where the intersection between the initial 
jumps of both  and ̂  at point (A) is the saddle-point stable. The phase diagrams also show blue 
arrows, which indicate the dynamic behaviour of  and ̂ . As long as the personal income tax is 
a permanent shock in our model, then these arrows will start to work immediately, which means 
that the economy will move toward the new steady-state, (E') in both phase diagrams. 
As we found previously, there are two possible situations to construct a phase diagram. Thus, we 
will discuss these two possible situations in two separate phase diagrams. In the first situation, 
where  sets to be high, the jump locus lies to the right of the new steady-state, as shown in 
Diagram 26, where  and ̂  would intersect at a point such A. The intersection point, A, is higher 
than the new steady-state (E'). At this point,  and ̂  would fall gradually over time, which means 
that both the level of capital stock and consumption would grow slower than the level of 
government spending along the transition path. This situation would show that the growth rate is 
temporarily declined. As a result, the transitional dynamics for  and ̂  would initially fall and 
intersect at a point such A. Then, the economy at point A will converge along the saddle path 
toward the new steady-state, as usual, i.e. it converges on ∗ from above. On the other hand, the 
second situation can be occurred if  is low. In this case, the jump locus lies to the left of the new 
steady-state,  and ̂  would intersect at a point such A, as shown in Diagram 27. At this point, 
 and ̂  would rise over time, as the economy converges along the saddle path to the new steady-
state, i.e. it converges on ∗ from below. Contrary to the first situation, this situation would exhibit 










Diagram 26: Phase diagram of the transition dynamic when a personal income tax increases (the first situation) 












6.8 Parameterisation and Solution 
Similar to chapter five, we apply in this section a numerical simulation under standard and 
commonly used parameters in literature113. Dynare software is used to simulate the model in two 
parts. The first part deals with PGSU variables, where we investigate how introducing personal 
income tax, e.g. = 10%114, would affect all PGSU variables, i.e. the steady-state responses and 
the transitional dynamics. This part aims to explore the full range of possible qualitative results in 
our model (e.g. whether ∗ falls by more or less than  when  increases). In the previous section, 
we found theoretically that changing  would help us to determine if  ∗ falls by more or less 
than . However, this result is not clear enough; thus, we would investigate that further 
numerically. Specifically, we would provide two simulations under two different set of parameter 
values to explore how ∗ and  behave in both cases. The second part pursues to numerically 
determine what type of steady-state, an exogenous or an endogenous growth steady-state, that we 
should be in, under a particular set of parameters values. This part also makes some sensitive 
analysis in our simulations regarding the personal income tax thresholds. Finally, it should be 
noted that this section would not discuss the level variables, i.e. , , , and , numerically. The 
reason is that section 6.5.2 has already examined what would happen to the level variables when 
the personal income tax changes by providing some tables to show the numerical values for these 
variables. 
6.8.1 Part One: Introducing a Personal Income Tax (PGSU Variables) 
In this part, we introduce personal income tax in our model to see how the PGSU variables can 
change and calculate the dynamic time paths of PGSU variables. We found theoretically that the 
if  is high (low), then the fall in the steady-state value of  is greater (less) than the initial 
downwards jump in . Thus, we provide two simulations by setting  in the first simulation as 
a high, i.e. = 1.1, while setting  in the second simulation as a low, i.e. = 1.01. The tables 
below summarise the impact of the steady-state values on PGSU variables when a 10% personal 
income tax rate is introduced under two values of . On the other hand, the graphs display the 
dynamic responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy when personal tax is also 




113  The parameter values used here are the same as in the previous chapters, where we set  = 1, = 0.33, = 0.95, = 0.1, 
and = 2. 
  
114  We previously, i.e. in chapter five, introduced a 5% tax rate, but we now introduce a 10% tax rate. The reason is that introducing 
a 5% tax rate in this chapter does not show us clearly the transition paths of all variables. 
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Table 16: The steady-state responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy when the value of   is 1.10: 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Personal Income Tax 0 Personal Income Tax 0.10 
Output PGSU 0.9406 Output PGSU 0.8930 
Capital PGSU 0.8306 Capital PGSU 0.7098 
Consumption PGSU 0.7745 Consumption PGSU 0.6618 
Interest Rate 0.3737 Interest Rate 0.4152 
 
 









Table 17: The steady-state responses of a number of PGSU variables in the economy when the value of   is 1.01: 
 
Old Steady-State Values New Steady-State Values 
Variables Value Variables Value 
Personal Income Tax 0 Personal Income Tax 0.10 
Output PGSU 1.3714 Output PGSU 1.3021 
Capital PGSU 2.6041 Capital PGSU 2.2252 
Consumption PGSU 1.0850 Consumption PGSU 0.9271 
Interest Rate 0.1738 Interest Rate 0.1931 
 
 






When we compare the above tables and graphs with our theoretical conclusion in the steady-state 
and the transitional dynamics sections, we find that they are consistent with each other. However, 
to ensure that the two simulations are valid, we need also to verify that the condition in type (I) 
steady-state is satisfied for both simulations. We understand from analysing the steady-state that 
if the growth rate in type (I) steady-state is greater (less) than the growth rate in type (II) steady-
state, for the same set of parameter values, then the correct steady-state will be type (I) steady-
state, i.e. exogenous growth steady-state (type (II) steady-state, i.e. endogenous growth steady-
state). Thus, using the same set of parameter values with a tax rate at 10%, the corresponding value 
for the growth rate in the endogenous growth steady-state (i.e. ) is less than the growth rate in 
the exogenous growth steady-state (i.e. )115. As a result, we can say that these two simulations 
are under type (I) steady-state. In other words, both simulations confirm that the condition in type 
(I) steady-state is satisfied. 
Returning to our simulations, although we set two different values of , introducing personal 
income tax decreases the steady-state values of all PGSU variables, as shown in Table 16 and 
Table 17. More precisely, a 10% personal income tax rate would reduce, in both cases of , the 
output PGSU by 5.06%, and both the capital PGSU and the consumption PGSU by 14.55%. For 
the transitional dynamics, the dynamic responses shown in the above figures are also consistent 
with our two phases diagrams in section 6.7.2. More precisely, with an additional income source, 
namely personal income tax, the government revenues increase, which in turns is reflecting in the 
increase in government spending. However, when the  is high, i.e. = 1.10, the growth rate 
of government spending declines in the short run and medium run116, and it then returns 
asymptotically to its initial steady-state in the long run. The reason is that  (and hence ) is 
falling over time, which causes a temporary decline in the growth rate. Moreover, a shock on  
makes the consumption PGSU, capital PGSU, and output PGSU all initially jump down at the 
moment of impact period, and then they fall over time. On the contrary, if the  is low, i.e.       
= 1.01, the growth rate of government spending in this case is temporarily boosted because 
 (and hence ) is rising over time. Thus, once the shock happens, the consumption PGSU, 
capital PGSU, and output PGSU all initially jump down at the moment of the impact period, and 
then they rise over time. However, the new steady-state of all PGSU variables would be still less 
than the old steady-state due to the negative impact caused by the tax. 
 
115 We used the formula (6.22) with the same set of parameter values in the two simulations. Then, we found that > . 
 
116 Although introducing personal income tax would intuitively generate extra government revenues and then increases the 
government spending, which would also affect the growth rate positively, the growth rate in this situation would temporarily 
decline. To see that clearly, Appendix C.6 discusses the reason for the temporary decline in the growth rate of government spending 
when  is high. 
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6.8.2 Part Two: What Type of Steady-State We Should Be in (PGSU Variables) 
We understand from our discussion in the existence steady-state section that the two types of 
steady-state, i.e. type (I) steady-state or type (II) steady-state, cannot exist for the same set of 
parameter values. We have also shown that under some restrictions in parameter values,  would 
be greater than one in order to have endogenous growth. These restrictions include that  should 
be sufficiently high, high personal income tax, and > 1. By using these parameter value 
restrictions, as well as other standard parameter values in equation (6.22), we can ensure that  is 
greater than one117. Consequently, under these parameter value restrictions, we can also confirm 
that  could be greater than , i.e. > , because  would increase with rising tax until it 
reaches its maximum value. Thus, we could have endogenous growth steady-state when the tax 
rate increases, but at a certain tax rate,  may turn out below  and then the actual steady-state 
becomes the exogenous growth steady-state.  
To see that, we provide a simple numerical exercise to show when the economy could move from 
a steady-state to another, if we hold  constant and change the personal income tax. In this 
exercise, we attempt to find out the critical values that allow the economy to change its steady-
state position. To find the possible values for  and compare it with , we first assume that  
is fixed at 1.1, and then we increase  using the formula of  in equation (6.22) and applying 
the same set of parameter values as before, except that. The below table displays our calculation 
for  and the potential type of steady-state for each value of . 
Table 18: The calculation for  and the potential type of steady-state for each value of  : 
 
   Steady-State Type 
10% 0.936 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
20% 0.966 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
30% 1.005 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
40% 1.046 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
50% 1.080 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
57.8% 1.100 1.100 =  First Critical Value 
60% 1.104 1.100 <  Endogenous Growth Steady-State 
70% 1.108 1.100 <  Endogenous Growth Steady-State 
75.4% 1.100 1.100 =  Second Critical Value 
80% 1.087 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
90% 1.030 1.100 >  Exogenous Growth Steady-State 
 
 
117  Specifically, using the same set of parameter values as before, setting = 2, and 0.28 < < 0.94 would ensure that > 1. 
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The above exercise shows that there are two critical values for . The first critical value is when 
= 57.8%, while the second critical value is when = 75.4%. That implies that if the 
authority sets the personal income tax at  < 57.8%  or  > 75.4%, the economy would have 
the exogenous growth steady-state because of  > . On the other hand, if the authority sets 
the personal income tax at 57.8% < < 75.4%, then the economy would move from exogenous 
growth steady-state to the endogenous one because of < . Thus, based on the parameter 
values chosen in this exercise, the above table clarifies that it is possible to discover the two critical 
values. However, it should be noted that even though our simple numerical example does not 
reflect exactly the real world because of our simplifying and some parameter restrictions, it is 
helpful to get a better understanding regarding the idea of how to achieve these two critical values 
and how the economy could turn out from one type of steady-state to another one. For this reason, 
we will next investigate more the personal income tax thresholds, like the analysis of chapter five. 
For equation (6.22), it seems not possible to provide an analytical solution for personal income tax 
thresholds. The reason is that it cannot be solved algebraically, since it is a non-linear equation. 
For this reason, we resort to a numerical solution, which would be a suitable method in this 
situation, as shown in the previous chapter. However, it should be noted that the personal income 
tax in our model, contrary to the consumption tax, has two thresholds (i.e., minimum and 
maximum values118) for each set of parameter values. 
Although equation (6.22) cannot be explicitly solved in our model for personal income tax, it is 
clear that the tax thresholds depend on six parameters. These parameters include = , , , , 
, and . Thus, we will next examine these parameters separately to identify the possible values 
of the tax thresholds. 
Similar to our numerical solution presented in chapter five, we use the same range of parameter 
values for  and , as empirical evidence, where ∈ [0.40, 0.69] and ∈ [0.05, 0.15]. Moreover, 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, , is assumed to be at 2, as considered for oil-exporting 
countries by Cherif and Hasanov (2012) and for Saudi Arabia by Pierru and Matar (2014). 
Therefore, to find the tax thresholds, we begin by varying the values of  and keeping the other 




118 The minimum and maximum values are the two critical values discussed in section 6.4.4. 
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Table 19: The personal income tax thresholds response to changes in  
Parameter Income Tax Thresholds 
 min values max values 
0.40 31.30% 84.52% 
0.45 23.37% 83.94% 
0.50 16.25% 83.75% 
0.55 10.37% 83.78% 
0.60 5.92% 83.94% 
0.65 2.89% 84.18% 
As we can see from the above table, a higher  would lower the minimum tax thresholds. However, 
higher  would lower (higher) the maximum tax thresholds for the range ∈ (0.40, 0.50] 
 ∈ [0.55, 065) . 
Now, we change the values of  and hold the other parameter values fixed to see how the tax 
thresholds would respond. 
Table 20: The personal income tax thresholds response to changes in  
Parameter Income Tax Thresholds 
 min values max values 
1.05 5.20% 90.88% 
1.10 10.37% 83.78% 
1.15 17.61% 74.76% 
1.20 29.64% 61.04% 
The above table shows that if  is higher, the minimum tax thresholds become higher too, while 
the maximum tax thresholds become lower. Next, we vary the values of  and hold the other 
parameter values fixed. 
Table 21: The personal income tax thresholds response to changes in  
Parameter Income Tax Thresholds 
 min values max values 
0.05 10.37% 83.78% 
0.08 12.06% 81.60% 
0.12 14.54% 78.49% 
0.15 16.60% 75.97% 
Similar to changing the values of , if the  is higher, the minimum tax thresholds are higher, 
whereas the maximum tax thresholds are lower. Finally, we alter  values and keep the other 
parameter values constant. 
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Table 22: The personal income tax thresholds response to changes in  
Parameter Income Tax Thresholds 
 min values max values 
2 10.37% 83.78% 
2.5 5.96% 89.78% 
3 3.87% 92.87% 
3.5 2.71% 94.69% 
In contrast to changing the values of both  and , higher  implies lower minimum tax 
thresholds and higher maximum tax thresholds. 
6.9  Why Do Taxes Matter in Saudi Arabia? 
The way in which the Saudi economy is characterised by limited taxes was covered in the first and 
second chapters. Thus, the current taxes in Saudi Arabia predominantly comprise the corporate tax 
on only foreign companies and the value-added tax (VAT). Saudi citizens' companies are not 
subject to corporate tax but are subject to Zakat, which is 2.5% on wealth. A 5% VAT rate was 
recently introduced in 2018. Therefore, a typical Saudi citizen is currently covered by the VAT 
and Zakat and no personal income tax. This tax structure is considered one of our main motivations 
to study taxes in the Saudi economy. It gives also rise to three important questions: (i) are taxes 
(direct or indirect), appropriate for the Saudi economy? (ii) what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of the taxes for the Saudi economy? (iii) what type of tax would be more suitable 
for the Saudi economy? Thus, this section is devoted to discussions on these three important 
questions related to the Saudi Arabian tax policy.  
Before answering the first question, it is important to mention that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) indicated in its 2015 report that there is a large space for new taxes in the Saudi economy 
due to the limited taxes directed in the current tax policies (IMF, 2015c). This leads us to the 
discussion on the first question regarding the importance of taxes, whether direct taxes (like 
personal income tax) or indirect taxes (like consumption tax), as additional sources of revenues 
for the Saudi Arabian economy. In fact, there is no doubt that economic diversification through 
diversification of income sources is one of the most critical challenges facing countries that rely 
heavily on oil revenues. According to the IMF report in 2016, the decline in oil prices in 2014 led 
to many oil-exporting countries facing a substantial reduction in government revenues and public 
spending in addition to their international reserves. Thus, low oil revenues negatively affected 
domestic consumption in oil-dependent countries, where a lot of jobs in these countries are directly 
or indirectly related to the productivity of the oil sector. This negative impact is represented in the 
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loss of many job seekers from obtaining a job due to the recession, which means less income and 
therefore less consumption (IMF, 2016a). For this reason, diversifying sources of income and then 
reducing reliance on oil revenues would be an appropriate way to stabilise the economy. As long 
as taxes would generate additional revenues to the government, the Saudi government should be 
aware that diversifying the sources of income by reforming the tax system would minimise its 
significant reliance on oil revenues. 
In Saudi Arabia, all economic activities, i.e. the government, private sector, exports and, imports, 
depend heavily on oil. This means that the Saudi economy is directly influenced by the shocks to 
which the oil markets are usually exposed, hence impacting the economy. Therefore, economic 
diversification would help overcome or even reduce the negative effects of temporary and 
permanent changes in oil markets. One source of income diversification is tax revenues, which 
may stimulate non-oil GDP growth. In fact, these additional revenues may help to separate 
government expenditures from oil revenues, which in turn helps to reduce the exposure of the 
Saudi economy to the oil markets risks, i.e. not transferring oil price fluctuations to the Saudi 
economy. Therefore, using taxes as one of the fiscal policy tools could potentially be suitable and 
valuable for the Saudi economy in diversifying income sources and reducing its dependence on oil 
revenues. Moreover, the importance of reforming the tax system can be seen from the role of fiscal 
policy in the Saudi economy. The fiscal policy in the state and its tools of government spending, 
fees, subsidies, and taxes are much more important than monetary policy in directing and 
managing the economy for several reasons. These reasons were already discussed previously, but 
the most important one is related to the size and role of government spending represented in the 
state budget in influencing the movement of the economy. Before implementing VAT in 2018, the 
fiscal policy was fundamentally limited on government spending, which was significantly 
supported by oil revenues and some other fees, but the tax instrument did not have much 
significance in the Saudi financial policy system. As a result, because of the important role played 
by the government sector in the economy, the tax reform would not only be appropriate for the 
Saudi economy, but it would also be necessary to deal with the fluctuations in oil revenues. 
Answering the first question leads us to discuss the second question on the advantages and 
disadvantages of taxes for the Saudi economy. In general, introducing taxes in countries that 
depend on government spending for boosting their economy (such as Saudi Arabia) are likely to 
have a significant positive impact on the economic growth of those countries. These countries are 
mostly developing or emerging countries, where government spending has a prominent role in 
leading the local economy. However, the situation may differ in developed countries, where the 
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private sector may consider to be one of the most critical drivers of economic growth. Thus, taxes 
in these countries may discourage the private sector and therefore the economic growth. The best 
example is what happened recently (i.e. in 2020) in Saudi Arabia and the UK to change the VAT 
rates. With the COVID-19 pandemic, all the world's economies have undoubtedly been negatively 
affected, which made these countries seek earnestly to offer various incentives to support their 
economy from collapse. For example, Saudi Arabia decided to raise the VAT rate from 5% to 
15%, while the UK reduced the tax rate of VAT from 20% to 5%. Both countries seek to support 
its economy by alleviating the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic through fiscal policy 
tool. However, a simple question, that may arise, is who among them does the right thing to 
stimulate its economy. Although the accurate answer to such a question requires a detailed study, 
they all have their own expectations regarding stimulating their economy. 
According to our model in chapter five, the Saudi economy could benefit from raising taxes. The 
main reason is that with these taxes, government revenues and then government spending would 
increase. This, in turn, would confirm that the government's support for the private sector would 
continue despite the existence of this pandemic. Thus, it can be said that the introduction or 
increase of taxes in an economy such as the Saudi economy could cause potentially stimulation 
for economic growth or even limits the growth shrinking in the worst cases such as this pandemic 
situation or the case of low oil revenues. On the other hand, taxes in countries that depend on the 
private sector to lead the economy, such as the UK, reducing taxes would be appropriate to 
stimulate economic growth. To see that, we understand from the theory that the tax cut would have 
two main effects on the demand and supply sides. For the demand side, the tax cut would help to 
increase spending on consumption and then increase aggregate demand. On the supply side, the 
tax cut would enhance people to work more, which in turn would be reflected in the increase in 
productivity. Therefore, reducing the tax rate in developed countries could boost their private 
sectors and then economic growth. 
From the above example, we understand that the recent high tax rate by decision-makers in Saudi 
Arabia gives evidence that our use of the Barro model (1990) may be suitable for the Saudi 
economy, even if it is simplified. The reason returns to our findings in chapter five, where 
consumption tax would stimulate the economy in the short and long terms. Specifically, if 
consumption tax sets to be low, then it would enhance the economy in the short run. On the other 
hand, if it is high, then economic growth would be boosted. Thus, reforming the tax system may 
be the most appropriate rather than investing in SWFs, as we argued previously, to offset potential 
declines in oil revenues and support economic growth (through government spending). As a result, 
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the consumption tax would be unlikely to increase the hardships on the Saudi economy, given that 
the situation in Saudi Arabia is somewhat different from others. 
Despite taxes, whether personal income or consumption tax, generating additional revenues for 
the state treasury, there are many differences among them, and therefore each of them has 
advantages and disadvantages. One of the main differences between them is the type of money 
imposed on tax. Personal income tax is imposed on earning money, while consumption tax is 
imposed on spending money. Therefore, the consumption tax generally encourages savings and 
reduces consumption, unlike the personal income tax. Thus, tax evasion or fraud may be less than 
the personal income tax. However, consumption tax is considered less fair than the personal 
income tax because it negatively affects poor people, who generally spend a more significant part 
of their income compared to rich people. 
Taxes generally play an essential role in all economies in affecting production, consumption, 
savings, prices, and achieving economic stability. Given the state of the Saudi economy, although 
the Saudi economy may have benefited from taxes, the consumption tax, unlike the personal 
income tax, may have many advantages that make it fit more the Saudi economy for several 
reasons. In terms of production, the presence of revenues other than oil may help the Saudi 
economy improve natural resources use in sustainable ways. In other words, with additional 
income sources such as taxes, excessive dependence on natural resources could be reduced and 
hence achieved the optimal use of these resources, which makes future generations benefit from it 
as well. Even though both taxes, personal income tax or consumption tax, could achieve this goal, 
consumption tax could be less distorted than personal income tax on other economic activities. For 
instance, a consumption tax would not harm foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports. In terms 
of consumption and savings, some oil-rich countries, including Saudi Arabia, are characterised by 
high average income per capita, leading to higher consumption of luxury goods. Therefore, 
consumption tax, more than personal income tax, may help Saudi citizens to spend less money on 
'unnecessary goods' and thus change consumers behaviour or re-evaluate their spending habits. 
The consumption tax also encourages the consumers to save money and reduce financial waste, 
which ends up enhancing the ability of society in the future to invest more and then improve 
income levels and offset the effects of the tax. 
Regarding the general level of prices and economic stability, taxes generally aim to achieve 
economic stability by addressing the state of recession or inflation. For inflation, taxes absorb 
excessive purchasing power by reducing total demand. This can be accomplished by raising 
current taxes or introducing new taxes. In the event of a recession, taxes are generally reduced to 
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raise total demand to increase and create purchasing power. Also, taxes may achieve financial 
sustainability and adopt sound economic policies targeting non-oil GDP growth. Thus, they help 
improve the quality of public services offered to citizens and the private sector through continued 
government spending and addressing the negative effects of low global oil prices. In short, 
consumption taxes would have less distortion and more advantages for the Saudi economy than 
personal income taxes. 
We need now to discuss what type of taxes would be more suitable for the Saudi economy by 
linking that with our findings in chapters five and six. Intuitively, personal income tax would raise 
the growth rate temporarily because it would provide additional revenues to the government sector. 
However, our model showed that the growth rate for certain parameter values would fall119. This 
result could be, in fact, the complete opposite of the intention of the policy. Thus, let us compare 
our main results in chapters five and six. Chapter five concluded that the growth rate would go up 
when we raise the consumption tax. In chapter six, we found that the growth rate would depend 
on the parameter values chosen, but there is a situation in which if we raise the personal income 
tax, the growth rate would temporarily go down. The latter result cannot happen in chapter five; 
thus, it could be a warning to a policymaker that personal income tax could reduce the growth rate. 
As a result, we believe that the consumption tax would be more suited for achieving economic 
stability in Saudi Arabia. 
6.10 Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter is to study the possibility of introducing a new type of tax, namely, 
personal income tax, in the Saudi economy. This chapter is based on a theoretical framework 
similar to previous chapters, where the Barro model (1990) is also extended. The main difference 
from the previous chapter, i.e. chapter five, is that the tax whose effects are studied is now personal 
income tax, rather than consumption tax, alongside the oil revenues. Thus, there are only two 
sources of government revenues to finance government spending. We then investigated these two 
sources separately in two cases. The first case is when oil revenues can only finance government 
spending, and the growth rate of this case is exogenous. This case was already discussed in more 
details in chapter four. The second case is when personal income tax can only feed the government 
revenues and then government spending, where the growth rate of this case is endogenous. The 
growth rate formula, in the latter case, was found in (6.22), which is a similar result as the Barro 
model (1990), but it showed that we could have > 1 if we set > 1. 
 




We then checked if both types of steady-state, the exogenous and the endogenous growth steady-
state, exist for the same set of parameter values. The results showed that there is a contradiction 
between two conditions, which are similar but not identical to chapter five. These two conditions 
are: (i) the ratio /  can not be negative for exogenous growth steady-state to occur, and (ii) we 
need the condition >  for an endogenous growth steady-state to exist. Thus, we concluded 
that both types of steady-state growth rate could not exist for the same set of parameter values . 
From this conclusion, we understood that the steady-state would be either type (I) steady-state, i.e. 
exogenous growth steady-state, or type (II) steady-state, i.e. endogenous growth steady-state. 
Thus, like chapter five, we examined two situations that are changing  and keeping  constant, 
and the opposite. The first results showed that if  is sufficiently high (low) for a given value of 
, then the steady-state will be an exogenous growth steady-state (endogenous growth steady-
state). The second results showed that keeping  fixed at a particular value and varying  would 
have a different result than chapter five. The difference came from using a different type of taxes. 
More precisely, changing personal income tax, unlike consumption tax, would positively and 
negatively impact the growth rate, as shown in equation (6.22). Thus, keeping  constant and 
changing  clarified two positions for the steady-state growth rate. The first position is that when 
 sets to be either sufficiently low or sufficiently high, then the steady-state growth rate is 
exogenous. The second position is that if  sets to be at a certain value, that is neither sufficiently 
low nor sufficiently high, the steady-state growth rate is endogenous. As a result, the main 
conclusion drawn in this chapter is that we have two critical values for personal income tax. The 
first is when the economy moves from type (I) steady-state to type (II) steady-state, i.e. from 
exogenous growth steady-state to endogenous growth steady-state, while the second is the 
opposite. These results indeed illustrated in Diagram 19. 
This chapter also studied how the personal income tax would affect the main level variables, i.e., 
government spending, consumption, capital stock, and output. The findings showed that if personal 
income tax is sufficiently low (high), then the level of government spending would increase 
(decrease). This result is consistent with the 'Laffer curve' theory, where the government revenues 
in our model are assumed to be equal to government spending. However, the effect on government 
spending caused a lot of theoretical ambiguity in the effects on other level variables. For this 
reason, we resorted to a numerical solution, which would be an appropriate method in this case. 
Based on the particular parameter values chosen, the numerical solution results showed a negative 
relationship between the personal income tax and both the level of consumption and capital stock. 
These findings mean that raising the tax rate implies a fall in both the level of consumption and 
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capital stock. Regarding the level of output, the results indicated that if personal income tax is 
sufficiently low (high), then the level of output would increase (decrease). 
In the analysis of local stability of type (I) and type (II) steady-states and the transitional dynamics, 
we understood from type (II) steady-state that there is no transitional dynamics because the growth 
rate of consumption PGSU, capital PGSU, and output PGSU all equal the same rate all the time, 
as illustrated by Barro (1990), unlike type (I) steady-state. Although there is transitional dynamics 
in type (I) steady-state, it is different from chapter five in terms of predetermined and non-
predetermined variables. In chapter five, we confirmed that both  and ̂  are non-predetermined 
variables, while in the current chapter,  is a predetermined variable and ̂  is a non-predetermined 
variable. Thus, we applied the stability properties for this steady-state type, which tells us that one 
stable eigenvalue is required for the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) test to be satisfied. Then, we 
concluded that steady-state of type (I), ∗, ̂∗ , is a saddle-point. 
In the transitional dynamics of this type,  turned to be a non-predetermined variable in the event 
of the shock. The reason behind this switching is that changing personal income tax would change 
the government budget constraint and then alter . Thus, both  and ̂  can now jump at the 
moment of impact. However, in spite of the fact that  is now a non-predetermined variable as 
̂ , they are still different from chapter five. Briefly, the difference between them in the two 
chapters is in  jumping, which is not immediate to observe. The transformation of  in this 
chapter made us see not only a jump in the consumption PGSU but also in the capital PGSU and 
the output PGSU in the impact period. However, when we attempted to study the transitional 
dynamics in a phase diagram, it was worthwhile to explore how  would jump on impact period. 
The reason is that it would help us to understand the transition path of  on impact period. After 
all, we found that  would jump down at the moment of impact, but the jump was found to be 
either right or left of the new steady-state, depending on the parameter values chosen. We then 
showed that both situations are theoretically possible to occur. Specifically, the first situation, 
which happens when  is high, showed that the growth rate is temporarily declined and then 
returned asymptotically to its initial steady-state. The reason behind a temporarily fall in growth 
rate is due to that  is falling over time. The second situation, which happens when  is low, 
displayed that the growth rate is temporarily increased and then went back to its old steady-state. 




We then presented two numerical simulations by using Dynare software. The first simulation 
looked at the transitional dynamics near a type (I) steady-state. The time paths showed that there 
are consistent with our previous analysis in section 6.7.2. More precisely, the implementation of 
personal income tax would provide extra public revenues and thus boost government spending. 
However, depending on the parameter values, the growth rate of government spending would go 
down or up in the short run and medium run and then tends back to its steady-state asymptotically. 
The second simulation also looked at steady-state, but it displayed when the economy could move 
from one type of steady-state to another one when we keep  constant and vary the tax rate. 
According to our parameter values, the simple numerical exercise showed that there are two critical 
values for the tax rate, = 57.8% and = 75.4%, which represent the possibility of a regime 
switch. If the tax rate sets to be < 57.8% or > 75.4%, then the economy would have an 
exogenous growth steady-state. If, on the other hand, tax rate sets to be 57.8% < < 75.4%, 
then the growth steady-state would be endogenous. 
Lastly, we briefly discussed why taxes matter in the Saudi economy. This question includes some 
sub-questions that all together attempt to answer one of the main research questions in this thesis. 
Thus, we compared in this section between consumption tax and personal income tax, and what 
among them would be appropriate for the Saudi economy. We concluded that consumption tax 
seems to be more suitable than the personal income tax for several reasons. The consumption tax 
would be a less distortion tax compared to personal income tax. It would also play a vital role in 
the Saudi economy by influencing production, consumption, savings, prices, and achieving 
economic stability more than personal income tax. Moreover, consumption tax was found in our 
model to simulate the economy in the short-run and the growth rate, unlike the personal income 
tax, which would discourage the growth rate temporarily under certain parameter values. Now, we 





7 Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations, 
Limitations and Future Research 
7.1 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we summarise our contributions, models, and main results. This chapter also 
provides policy recommendations and highlights limitations and future research. Broadly, this 
thesis attempts to fit and describe the Saudi economy with a practical focus on Saudi economic 
growth. The thesis is divided into seven chapters: (i) introduction, (ii) analysis of the Saudi 
economy, (iii) literature review, (iv) modelling Saudi economic growth, (v) modelling Saudi 
economic growth with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposal (introducing consumption 
tax), (vi) modelling Saudi economic growth with personal income tax, and finally (vii) the 
conclusion. The significance of this research is related to the two main challenges facing the Saudi 
macroeconomy, namely, continuing to the significant reliance on oil to finance economic activities 
and the suffering from a lack of taxation to generate revenues away from oil. The primary objective 
of this thesis involves studying how economic growth would be affected if there is a negative 
shock in the oil demand. This thesis also aimed to focus on the fiscal policy reforms to investigate 
the effectiveness of implementing the proposals of the IMF on Saudi economic growth for 
countering oil revenue fluctuations. We sought to examine the possibility of introducing 
consumption tax and personal income tax and discussed the effectiveness of these taxes along with 
oil revenues in economic growth. Besides, this study pursued investigating the appropriate amount 
of consumption tax that could compensate for potential reduction in oil revenues. Finally, it 
discusses the suitability of the consumption tax and personal income tax for the Saudi economy. 
This thesis aims to contribute to four main aspects of the field. The first contribution is to 
extend the Barro (1990) model by adding the monopolistic oil sector. The key feature of our model 
is that the oil sector is treated as an exogenous and monopolistic sector, where the growth is 
basically led by a growing demand for oil. The importance of the oil sector can be seen in its role 
in financing the productive government sector. The reason for modelling the oil sector in this way 
is that the economic growth of resource-rich countries in most research is considered to be affected, 
both positively and negatively, by the oil industries. However, the economic growth literature 
ignored to analyse the market power of oil. In other words, the oil sector is not given enough and 
detailed attention to economic growth literature. Therefore, modelling the oil sector as a 




The second contribution is that our models are different from the original Barro (1990) model 
and Bambi and Venditti's (2018) paper on the government budget constraint. More precisely, the 
government budget constraint in each model in our study has been modified to include oil revenues 
and other taxes, meaning that there are different sources of government revenues. These sources 
are (i) only oil revenues, (ii) oil revenues with consumption tax, and (iii) oil revenues with personal 
income tax. Consequently, the contribution of this study can be summarised by adding the oil, i.e. 
monopolistic sector, revenues with different taxes to finance productive government spending in 
Barro (1990) model. 
The third contribution is regarding the other possible methods or strategies to deal with oil 
fluctuations and its impact on economic growth. A few studies, such as Devarajan et al. (2017), 
Primu (2016), Richmond et al. (2015), and Berg et al. (2013), have explored the best methods and 
strategies to deal with volatility in resource revenues. More precisely, they have focused on 
offsetting volatility and shocks through Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). However, they did not 
consider the fact that tax reform could be one of the fiscal instruments to help oil-rich countries 
maintain stable economic growth in the event of negative shocks in oil demand. We argue that tax 
reform would be a suitable strategy, especially in countries that suffer from a lack of taxes, as in 
the case of Saudi Arabia. The main reason for our argument is that there are many countries, which 
lack natural resources, rely on only taxes as revenues to finance their public spending. 
Consequently, the priority for oil-rich counties is to be able to reform their tax system, even if they 
have abundant resources, to maintain stable economic growth. Therefore, reforming the current 
fiscal policy could be a solution to reduce the negative effects of fluctuations in natural resource 
revenues. It could also be a better strategy than using SWFs, which can be affected by several 
external factors, as mentioned before. These external factors may not be under the control of the 
countries that own them. As a result, our thesis would contribute to investigating the introduction 
of consumption tax and personal income tax in Saudi Arabia. It would also seek to find out the 
amount of consumption tax to compensate for a reduction in the level of government spending 
associated with the decline in oil revenues.  
The fourth contribution is based on the absence of a study that examines taxation, i.e. 
consumption and personal income taxes, and their effects on the economic growth of Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, this study is also different from previous models developed for resource-rich countries 
that have focused on low-income countries. The current model attempts to fit the conditions of 
Saudi Arabia, as the world's second-largest oil economy, which also has much scope to implement 
new taxes, as mentioned by the IMF. 
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This thesis aims to provide a theoretical framework based on Barro's (1990) neoclassical 
growth model to model Saudi economic growth. There are a number of studies, such as Alrasheedy 
and Alrazyeg (2019), Alshammari and Aldkhail (2019), Al-Obaid (2004), and Barri (2001), that 
confirmed the significance of government spending to stimulate economic growth in Saudi Arabia. 
From this point, we believe that the Barro (1990) model is one of the most appropriate models to 
represent countries that depend on government spending to finance economic activities. Thus, the 
seminal contribution of Barro (1990) in economic growth literature can be extended to fit our case 
study. For this reason, we extended his original model by modifying the government budget 
constraints in three models of chapter four, five, and six. Each chapter has a different budget 
constraint, where all sources of revenues in the three main chapters finance productive government 
spending. In all models, the government is assumed to spend all its revenues on purchasing 
imported goods; therefore, the government revenues in all our models are equal to government 
spending. For this reason, government spending is not entered in the resource constraint of the 
economy because the home-goods are assumed to be not used in government spending. In addition, 
for the growth rate purposes, we converted the main level variables to per government spending 
unit (PGSU) variables by dividing them by government spending; thus, we obtained the capital 
PGSU, consumption PGSU, and output PGSU. 
Chapter two presented an overview of the Saudi economy. It also analysed the structure and 
characteristics of the Saudi economy and focused on the role of the oil sector and its relation to 
economic growth. After studying the Saudi economy, we found that it faces two significant 
challenges: its primary dependence on oil revenues and the need to diversify its income sources. 
The main reason is that oil revenues are the primary source of public spending. Therefore, relying 
on oil revenues and then on government spending as a significant driver of economic activity has 
made the Saudi economy insecure and more sensitive to fluctuations in the global oil markets. As 
proposed by the IMF, the reform of the current tax system would provide additional revenues and 
help reduce the continued volatility in oil revenues. On the other hand, chapter three is the literature 
review, where we examine six main themes. They include the economic growth models, the 
structure of the oil market: Saudi's oil sector, economic growth in oil-rich countries, managing oil 
revenue fluctuations in oil-rich countries, taxes and their roles in economic growth, and finally 
fiscal policy and economic growth in Saudi Arabia. The main reason behind searching in different 




Chapter four extended the Barro (1990) model to describe the Saudi economy before 
implementing the proposed fiscal policy by the IMF. We modelled the Saudi economy, where 
government spending is financed by only one government revenue source, namely oil revenues. 
Although we used Barro endogenous growth model and his type of production function, our model 
showed different conclusions from Barro's finding. More precisely, we found that the growth rate 
of government spending is the growth rate of oil profits, . That means everything in the economy 
of this chapter grows at the rate of government spending, which is the exogenous growth rate, 
unlike Barro's conclusion. 
Besides, in this chapter, we studied how a shock, a permanent reduction in the growth rate of 
government spending, would affect the steady-state position. The findings indicated that if the 
growth rate of government spending declines, both capital PGSU and consumption PGSU would 
raise at the steady-state. Moreover, we obtained an interesting result that although the level of 
consumption would grow at a slower rate due to the reduction in the government spending growth 
rate, the consumption PGSU would be higher. Higher consumption PGSU suggests that there 
would be partially offsetting of the effect of the reduction in the government spending growth rate. 
Thus, our model showed that there is some partial offsetting shift in the level of consumption, 
which may not be obvious. Away from the growth rate, the results also displayed that the level of 
government spending would significantly impact other level variables in the economy. More 
precisely, if the level of government spending falls, then the level of output, capital stock, and 
consumption would also fall. The reason is that government spending is the main engine in our 
model, which in fact reflects the situation of the Saudi economy. For this reason, we understood 
that the Barro (1990) model could be an appropriate theoretical model for the Saudi economy. 
Chapter five focuses on fiscal policy reforms and follows the IMF's recommendations by 
introducing a consumption tax, . We extended the model of chapter four and aimed to investigate 
how introducing these taxes affect economic growth and how effective these taxes are in 
maintaining stable economic growth if there is a negative shock to oil demand. The government 
budget constraint in this chapter has two sources of revenues: oil revenues and consumption tax 
revenues. As long as it is unlikely to have a steady-state in which the two sources of revenues grow 
at a different rate, thinking of an equilibrium in which one of these shares tends to zero, and the 
other tends to one could be a valid equilibrium to consider in this chapter. For this reason, we 
studied three possible types of steady-states. We found that two of them involve that the growth 
rate of government spending tends to an exogenous growth rate (type (I) steady-state), while the 




Furthermore, our proof showed an unavoidable contradiction between two conditions related 
to type (I), i.e. the exogenous steady-state, and type (II), i.e. the endogenous steady-state, of the 
growth model. Thus, we concluded that both types of steady-state growth rate could not exist for 
the same set of parameter values. In other words, for one set of parameter values, either the steady-
state will be the exogenous growth steady-state and will not exist any other type, or for a different 
set of parameter values, instead, the only type of steady-state will be the endogenous growth 
steady-state. In this regard, two main results have been found in how and when the economy could 
move from a steady-state to another. The first finding was that if we set consumption tax, , 
constant and change . The results showed that if  is sufficiently high (low) for a given value 
of , then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) growth steady-state. The second 
finding was that if we set   constant and vary . The results indicated that at a certain value of 
, the economy would switch from the exogenous growth steady-state to the endogenous growth 
steady-state. The switch to the endogenous growth steady-state would raise the rate of growth, as 
high taxes would help provide enough government spending to improve the production function 
of the firms. 
To explain the latter result further, as we gradually increase , eventually the economy will 
pass from an exogenous growth steady-state to an endogenous growth steady-state. Thus, there is 
a critical value, which can be interpreted as the critical value of  at which this switch occurs as 
being the 'take-off' point for the economy. In other words, as  is increased, beyond this point, 
the steady-state growth rate of the economy is eventually 'freed' from the growth rate of oil profits; 
whereas, until it is reached, the steady-state growth rate is tied to the growth rate of oil profits. 
Consequently, the result of switching from one type of steady-state to another one is indeed 
unusual in most growth models. 
Continuing in the steady-state analysis, we investigated in this chapter how the key level 
variables respond to a change in consumption tax. Our results showed that if we increase 
consumption tax, then the level of government spending and the capital stock would increase. The 
intuition behind increasing the level of government spending is simply due to the increase in 
government revenues with a consumption tax. While increasing the capital stock level is because 
firms receive positive externalities from the government sector, which would promote their 
production. For the level of consumption, increasing consumption tax would generally cause a 
decrease in consumption level because people would save more when consumption tax is high 
since their purchasing power decreases. However, we found that although consumption tax is 
increased, the level of consumption in our model may increase or decrease, depending on the value 
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of the discount factor. In this regard, we theoretically discovered that if the discount factor is 
sufficiently close to one (close to zero), then increasing consumption tax would increase (decrease) 
the level of consumption. The intuition behind increasing the level of consumption could be due 
to that high consumption tax provides additional revenues to the government, which in turns allows 
the firms to receive more positive externalities from the government. Thus, firms may somehow 
pass some of these positive externalities to the households, e.g. through high wages or high rental 
rate of capital. This would end up being the cause of high consumption. 
Regarding the transitional dynamics, we studied first a pure consumption tax case, i.e. type (II) 
steady-state. In this case, there was only one eigenvalue, which was then found unstable. We also 
concluded that there was no transitional dynamics in this case, which is a similar result as Bambi 
and Venditti (2018). We then studied the effect of consumption tax on the transition path of 
variables in the neighbourhood of type (I) steady-state. Our analysis showed that there is one stable 
eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue. Then, we found that the steady-state is a saddle point if 
 is sufficiently high. In the transitional dynamics, we illustrated that our phase diagram is 
somewhat different from the one in the Ramsey model. The main difference lies in the jump locus. 
More precisely, the economy in the Ramsey model would jump initially on a point that is vertically 
above or below the old steady-state. The reason is that the capital PGSU is a predetermined 
variable, while consumption PGSU is a non-predetermined variable. However, our economy at the 
moment of the shock would jump initially on a new locus. This new locus originated from the 
relationship between capital PGSU and consumption PGSU, which are both non-predetermined 
variables. We then studied this relationship carefully and found that this locus is a diagonal line 
with a downward slope. Our result also showed that the growth rate would unambiguously be 
temporarily increased by the increase in . 
Finally, we provided in this chapter a numerical exercise to find out the amount of different 
consumption tax that can compensate for any reduction in oil revenues. We derived a formula for 
consumption tax, equation (5.46), that allowed us to calculate the required tax rate that 
compensates for any reduction in oil revenues and keep, at the same time, the government spending 
unchanged. The reason behind holding the government spending fixed is to avoid at least having 
low growth, i.e. = = 1. Our simple example of this exercise showed that if the target 
government spending is at 2, which can maintain the economic growth rate unchanged and the oil 
revenues declined by 10%, the required tax rate to compensate for this reduction is 6.21%. As a 
result, based on our derived formula and our exercise, this tax rate can ensure that it compensates 
for not only the 10% reduction in oil revenues but also the government spending, and the economic 
growth rate would remain unchanged. 
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Chapter six is also related to the previous chapters, where it studied another type of tax, 
personal income tax, . This chapter extended the Barro (1990) model by allowing for two 
sources of government revenues to finance productive government spending. These two sources 
are oil revenues and personal income tax revenues. Although Saudi Arabia does not have a 
personal income tax currently, four motivations encouraged us to study this type of tax in this 
research. The first is that the country seeks to generate revenues away from oil through diversifying 
sources of income. The second is based on the IMF recommendation, which hinted several times 
that Saudi Arabia has plenty of space to implement new taxes. The third is because no prior study 
has been conducted exploring the implementation and effect of personal income tax on the Saudi 
economy. The final motivation is to check on the IMF recommendations of introducing new taxes 
by investigating which among consumption tax or personal income tax would be more suited for 
the Saudi economy. 
As long as we have two sources of government revenues, our analysis found a similar result to 
the previous chapter, where the two sources cannot grow at a different rate. Thus, studying these 
two sources separately showed that we could have an exogenous or endogenous growth model. 
Moreover, the results showed that both types of steady-state, i.e. the exogenous and endogenous 
growth steady-state, cannot exist for the same set of parameter values. The reason is that there is 
a contradiction between two conditions for each type of growth models. For this reason, we 
realised that our model would present two types of steady-state, as in chapter five. Type (I) steady-
state is the exogenous growth steady-state, where the growth rate of government spending is equal 
to the oil profits growth rate, = . Correspondingly, type (II) steady-state is the endogenous 
growth steady-state, where the growth rate of government spending is equal to the growth rate of 
output, = . Thus, to examine under which conditions our economy would be in, we 
investigated two situations. The first situation was to change  and fix , whereas the second 
situation was the opposite. The result of changing  and fixed  showed that if  is sufficiently 
high (low) for a given value of , then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) growth 
steady-state. The result of the second situation, i.e. keeping  constant and varying , displayed 
two different positions for the steady-state growth rate. Specifically, if  is either (neither) 
sufficiently low or (nor) sufficiently high, then the steady-state will be an exogenous (endogenous) 
growth steady-state. These two positions give us a clear picture of having two critical values for 
 in our model. As increasing , the first critical value is when the economy moves from 
exogenous growth steady-state to endogenous growth steady-state, while the second critical value 
is the opposite. The diagram in section 6.4.4 illustrated how and when the economy could move 
from one type of steady-state to another when personal income tax changes. 
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Like previous chapters, we also studied in this chapter the impact of personal income tax on 
all level variables, i.e. the level of government spending, consumption, capital stock, and output. 
We found that if personal income tax is sufficiently low (high), then the level of government 
spending would increase (decrease) in response to an increase in the tax rate. This result was 
similar to the 'Laffer curve' result, but it caused a lot of theoretical ambiguity on the other level 
variables. Thus, to overcome this ambiguity, we used a numerical solution as a suitable method in 
this case. The results then showed that rising personal income tax would decline both the level of 
consumption and capital stock. However, the level of output would change depending on the tax 
rate, i.e. if the tax rate is sufficiently low (high), then the output level would increase (decrease). 
Regarding the analysis of local stability, we found in type (II) steady-state a similar result as 
Barro (1990), where there is no transitional dynamics. The reason is due to the fact that the growth 
rate of all PGSU variables are equal to the same rate all the time. However, our analysis of the 
stability properties in type (I) steady-state showed that there is one stable eigenvalue for the 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) test to be satisfied. We then found that the steady-state of this type is 
a saddle point. Even though there was transitional dynamics in type (I) steady-state, studying the 
transition paths of the economy revealed that there is a switch in the capital PGSU variable. More 
precisely, the consumption PGSU was a non-predetermined variable, while the capital PGSU was 
a predetermined variable before the shock occurred, i.e. when we studied the local stability of this 
type of steady-state. However, the capital PGSU, at the moment of the shock, turned to be a non-
predetermined variable, as the consumption PGSU. The switching of the capital PGSU was due to 
the fact of changing the tax rate, which also caused government spending to change. Thus, this 
transformation allowed all PGSU variables to jump initially at the moment of the impact period. 
Although, in the beginning, we could not draw a phase diagram for very general values of , we 
attempted to draw it for a value of  that is close to zero. This indeed helped us to understand 
better how the two stationary loci for capital PGSU and consumption PGSU would take place 
before and after the shock. Also, it told us that the saddle path toward the new steady-state would 
be upward-sloping, if  is close to zero.  
Moreover, we found that  would jump down at the moment of impact, but the jump locus 
was found to be depending on the parameter values chosen. Thus, we showed two situations that 
are theoretically possible to happen. In the first situation, we set  to be high, while  to be low 
in the second situation. The result of the first situation indicated that the growth rate is temporarily 
declined and then returned asymptotically to its initial steady-state. The reason behind a 
temporarily fall in growth rate is due to that  and (hence ) is falling over time. The result of 
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the second situation displayed that the growth rate is temporarily increased and then went back to 
its old steady-state. The reason is that  and (hence ) is raising over time. 
We subsequently provided two numerical simulations by using Dynare software. The two 
numerical simulations studied how changing the personal income tax would affect the transitional 
dynamics and steady-states. We found an interesting feature of this chapter regarding the impact 
of rising the personal income tax on the growth rate. As we know, raising the tax rate would 
intuitively generate additional government revenues, but we found that, depending on parameter 
values chosen, a rise in the tax rate could cause a temporary lower growth rate. The reason behind 
this decline is that the capital PGSU is falling over time. In fact, this result is the opposite of the 
fifth chapter result, i.e. in the case of consumption tax, where an increase in consumption tax would 
lead to a temporary increase in the growth rate.  
Finally, this chapter also discussed what among consumption tax and personal income tax 
would be suitable for the Saudi economy. It then concluded that consumption tax could be more 
effective, less distortion, and growth stimulator, compared to personal income tax, for the Saudi 
economy. This conclusion was based on some of the positive effects of the consumption tax on 
production, consumption, and economic stability, which seem to dominate the effect of personal 
income tax. 
7.2 Policy Recommendations 
Although this thesis is based on a simplified theoretical approach, we still believe that it would 
provide a great deal of visualisation and expectations of economic growth paths to policymakers. 
It may also potentially help in providing some necessary and appropriate information about the 
fiscal policy reforms and the role of different taxes in the Saudi economy. The study results showed 
that any effect of oil revenues would affect the economy in the long term. In other words, if the 
primary determinant of economic growth in the country is the government spending, which is 
supported by solely oil revenues, it undoubtedly would create many economic problems due to the 
instability of oil revenues. With continued oil revenue fluctuations, the government has to search 
and move quickly towards diversifying the sources of economic income, which the IMF has 
recommended. Thus, there is an urgent need to increase non-oil revenues because the level of 
spending will continue to be associated with fluctuations in oil revenues, which will inevitably 
affect economic growth. Diversifying sources of economic income, such as reforming the current 
tax system, may help to alleviate these fluctuations. In other words, additional revenues may be 
used to offset a likely continuous decline in oil revenues and reduce excessive dependence on oil 
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revenues to finance other economic activities. As a result, tax revenues may move the oil revenues 
from a primary to a secondary source in the economy, which would relieve the volatility of the 
economy. 
Even though taxes would create additional revenues to the government sector and would at the 
same time cause some economic distortions, consumption tax, as found in our model, would be 
the best choice since it would have a positive impact on economic growth. As shown in chapter 
five, if we only consider consumption tax as a revenue source, it would enhance economic growth. 
However, if consumption tax and oil revenues are together considered, economic growth will be 
determined based on the consumption tax rate. Specifically, as our result showed, low (high) 
consumption tax implies that the economic growth would be exogenous (endogenous), where the 
endogenous growth steady-state is higher than the exogenous one. Thus, as a policy 
recommendation, a lower consumption tax may not be sufficient to boost the growth rate. 
However, a high tax rate would significantly change and push the economy to be determined by 
the endogenous growth steady-state, which ensures a higher growth rate, according to our model. 
Regarding personal income tax, although it would also provide extra revenues to the state's 
budget, it is still a distortion tax in some other economic activities. The economic impact of 
introducing personal income tax may have a different effect than consumption taxes. Our model 
showed that if personal income tax and oil revenues are the only sources of government revenues, 
then personal income tax would stimulate economic growth in quite limited cases. More precisely, 
if the tax rate is set to be between a certain range, i.e. neither sufficiently low nor sufficiently high, 
the economic growth would be endogenous. If otherwise, i.e. the tax rate sets to be sufficiently 
low or sufficiently high, then the economic growth would be in this case exogenous. In contrasts 
to consumption tax, based on particular parameter values chosen, a rise in the personal income tax 
could result in a temporary lower growth rate due to the decline in the capital PGSU over time. 
Therefore, the personal income tax may be undesirable compared to consumption tax because the 
latter could be sufficient to address the negative side of oil dependence and avoid the negative 
effects of the personal income tax. However, suppose that the application of personal income tax 
becomes necessary to finance government spending. In that case, it should be applied with caution 
because their rate, based on our model, may switch the rate of economic growth from one position 
to another. Also, it would cause a temporary reduction in the growth rate under certain parameter 
values. As a result, our findings in chapters five and six confirm that consumption tax would be a 
good choice for the Saudi economy, compared to personal income tax. 
261 
 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
We have learned from this thesis to build a base of knowledge of the fiscal policy reforms of 
the Saudi economy by extending an existing theoretical work. As per our knowledge, this kind of 
analysis is being done for the first time in Saudi Arabia. However, the models in this thesis have 
been greatly simplified and have governed some limitations. The theoretical framework used in 
this study is assumed to reflect the Saudi economy; thus, our results in this thesis are considered 
to be limited. However, it can be generalised to only limited countries. For instance, the 
characteristics and the structure of the economics of some GCC countries are like the Saudi 
economy120. Consequently, our study and our results can be generalised and applied to these 
countries. 
Even though the theoretical approach used in this thesis aimed to provide a theoretical 
knowledge base on economic growth in Saudi Arabia, the lack of available data regarding taxes 
limits the scope of our analysis. Thus, there are two priority research agendas for the future. The 
first is to use an empirical approach to attempt to provide evidence to justify our results in this 
thesis and provide broad 'stylised facts' about our findings. Developing an empirical model to 
verify our model and predictions of our theoretical results would be our priority to convert these 
predictions to precise numerical outcomes. The second research agenda is to work on our main 
research results in chapter five and six regarding the possibility of switching regimes as we change 
the policy parameters. They are important results; thus, we intend to develop and confirm them 
further as a research agenda for the future. The reason for examining these results is that they are 
unusual in most growth models; thus, we believe that it is worth exploring them more. 
If we were able to redesign our models in this thesis, we would make a number of 
modifications. Most importantly, we would extend the model in each chapter by allowing for each 
sector to be more realistic. Starting with the oil sector, it was assumed in our model to be derived 
by the global GDP growth. Although this is the most influential factor based on historical oil 
statistics, some other factors may affect oil demand as well.  A number of examples of factors 
affecting oil demand were mentioned in the fourth chapter. Thus, considering and modelling some 
of these factors would add many features to a model in economic growth literature, especially for 
modelling the economic growth of oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia. For the government sector, 
we make it simple by avoiding lending and borrowing, transfer to households, and other revenues. 
Therefore, allowing to access the international financial market and adding households' transfer 
 
120 Some GCC countries, such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, are rich in natural resources. They rely heavily on 
natural resources to finance their expenditures and have also limited tax regimes. 
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and other non-oil revenues could make the model closer to reality. Regarding the household's 
sector, we assumed that the labour supply is inelastic, and that consumption tax would stimulate 
the economy. Although assuming elastic labour supply would be affected by reducing the real 
value of net earnings, we believe that the result would not be much affected. The reason is that the 
government used these tax revenues in our models to enhance the firms' production, which in turn 
would somehow reflect in the household sector. 
As far as taxes are concerned, we studied consumption and personal income taxes separately 
along with oil revenues in the Barro (1990) model in order to compare the effectiveness of different 
fiscal policy instruments in the Saudi economy. However, the possibility of combining all three 
sources to finance productive government spending requires further investigation. With rapid 
transformations and the orientation of many reforms in the Saudi economy, we believe that 
personal income tax may be one of the potential options for the decision-maker in the future. Thus, 
it would be interesting for future work to explore and study all these sources together as sources 
of government revenues. Finally, although these points could make our theoretical models more 







A. Appendix to Chapter 4 
A.1 The Key Equations in Ramsey Model and Our Model 
The below table illustrates the fundamental equations in the two models. In the Ramsey model, we 
show how decreasing technological progress would affect the whole economy and compare it with 
our model when the growth rate of oil profit declines. The key equations in both models are 
summarised as: 
 
The discrete-time Ramsey model with 
decreasing technological progress 
Our model with decreasing the growth 
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A.2 The Saddle Path and Its Slope in Our Model 
The linearised capital accumulation equation (4.25) and Euler equation (4.26) can be now 




where the 2x2 matrix of coefficients, = , has a characteristic equation,  
 
 
where the trace is = + , and the determinant is = ( − ), with 
eigenvalues,  
 
For the dynamics of the solution, we apply the spectral decomposition of A to express the matrix 
of the eigenvectors and its inverse, 
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Now, we need to find the parameter values of (II). The eigenvector corresponding to λ  eigenvalue 









Since λ  is an eigenvalue of the characteristic equation, equations (A) and (B) would be the same. 
Thus, by normalising = 1, we obtain the eigenvector,  
 
 
Similarly, by normalising = 1, the eigenvector associated with the λ  eigenvalue would be, 
 
 
For the parameters , ,  and , we know that they are the inverse of  matrix. 
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Then, the inverse of  matrix is, 
 











Since we have two eigenvalues in this system, we assume that λ  is an unstable eigenvalue, while 
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PGSU equation, − ∗ . Since  also relies on the value of the structural parameters, the same 
condition must hold for the consumption PGSU equation, ( ̂ − ̂∗). 
 
 
Therefore, for the stability requirement, the initial consumption, ̂ , should be chosen by, 
 
 
This equation, (IV), is the equation for the saddle path, which combines the initial value of  with 
the initial value of ̂ . The slope of the saddle path equation is (λ − )/ , which determines 
the cross of the original value of  either below, above, or exactly at the original value of ̂ .  
Again if  λ  is an unstable eigenvalue, then the dynamics of the system is specified by, 
 
Dividing (VI) by (V), we get the consumption PGSU equation ( ̂ − ̂∗),  
 
 
Moreover, it can be seen that conditions (V) and (VI) will hold at the time (t=0) by plugging the 
initial consumption PGSU, (IV), into (V) and (VI). As a result, the dynamics of the system can be 
written as, 
 
As a result, these two linear approximations, (VIII) and (IX), show that both capital PGSU and 
consumption PGSU converge to their steady-state levels from their initial values. 
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B. Appendix to Chapter 5 
B.1 The Growth Rate of Government Spending When We Combine the Two 
Sources of Government Revenues, Oil and Consumption Tax Revenues 
 
The government budget constraint is, 
 
The growth rate of government spending is, 
 
which can be writing as121, 
  
 











121  Equation (C) can be also written as =  ( / )( / ) . However, if we follow the same steps as above, we arrive at a 
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B.2 Existence of Steady-States of Both Types 
We have considered the steady-states equilibria of two types, that are: 
(I) When /  tends to a finite, non-zero value (i.e. that means both revenues are non-zero), and 
the growth rate is  (calling this type an exogenous growth steady-state). 
 
(II) When /   tends to infinity (i.e. this occurs when  is very large relative to oil revenues), 
and the growth rate is   where  >   and   is a function of   amongst other 
parameters (calling this type an endogenous growth steady-state). 
Although these steady-states equilibria are of different types, they both have the feature that PGSU 
variables (i.e. , ̂ , ) are constant over-time. That means all variables in both types grow at the 
same rate of government spending, but the way of growth is different. For this reason, let us now 
distinguish between the two systems: 
- System (I) is the difference equation when / > 0122  (and hence ̂ < 1/  123) 
Here, we want the ratio of /  to remain strictly positive because, in the 'pure consumption tax 
case', this ratio goes to zero. Moreover, we understand from the formula                                         
(1 − ̂ )/ (1 − ̂ ) that ̂  should be strictly less than 1/ . It could be however that 
̂ > 1/ , but this would imply that (1 − ̂ )/ (1 − ̂ ) is a negative value which 
becomes meaningless. Therefore, we cannot possibly have ̂ > 1/  because of the negative 







122  We have shown ( / ) in the first type steady-state equilibrium (i.e. type I), where the ratio ( / ) is the same thing but in 
terms of a different variable. To see that clearly, the level of government spending relative to oil revenues in our model can be 
written as, / = 1/(1 − ), i.e. / = 1 − , while the level of consumption relative to oil revenues can be written as, 
/ = /(1 − ). We also know the definition of consumption PGSU is = / . Thus, by using all these facts together, 
we obtained that / = ( / )/( / ). 
 
123  This ensures ( / ) > 0  since / = 1 −  . 
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- System (II) is the difference equation when / = 0  (and hence ̂ = 1/ , = ,∀ ) 
Here, the ratio of  /  becomes zero because in the 'pure consumption tax case',  becomes 
very large and then ̂ = 1/  unchanged over-time. The two main equations that describe this 




These two systems are similar but not formally identical. The reason is that if we set  
̂ = ̂ = 1/  in the system (I), it does not resolve itself into the system (II) in a simple way. 
The ratio (1 − ̂ )/(1 − ̂ ) is  0/0  in this case, and so undefined. Instead, we can take the 
limit of (1 − ̂ )/(1 − ̂ ) as ̂ , ̂ → 1/ . In certain circumstances, one can find this 
limit using L'Hôpital's rule, but it is unclear how to apply it here. Hence, we will continue to treat 
these two systems as similar but not identical for the time being. 
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The differences between the two systems at the steady-state are the following: In the first system, 
̂∗ is not exogenously imposed to equal 1/ , whereas  is exogenously imposed to equal . In 
the second system, ̂∗ is exogenously imposed to equal 1/ , while   is not exogenously imposed 
to equal . In other words, which variables are treated as exogenous and endogenous has been 
switched around. In more precisely, ∗ and ̂∗ are endogenous variables in the first system, while 
∗ and  become endogenous variables in the second system. So now, from the two steady-state 





In system (III), we neither set ̂∗ = 1/  nor = , and this pair of equation holds in both 
systems (I) and (II). However, it is, by itself, not sufficient to determine the steady-state 
equilibrium values of variables because we have three endogenous variables (namely: ∗, ̂∗, ), 
but only in two equations. Then, the system (III) is not a complete description. Therefore, to 
complete the system, one needs either to add the assumption that =  (which converts it into 
the system (I)), or to add the assumption that ̂∗ = 1/  (which converts it into the system (II)). 
In other words, depending on the two additional assumptions which we add, we either go from the 
system (III) to the system (I) or from the system (III) to the system (II). However, system (III) can 
be applied for both types. 
System (III) is nevertheless helpful because it enables us to see what system (I) and system (II) 





This yields an implicit relationship between ∗and ̂∗. Moreover, this relationship holds in both 
system (I) and system (II). We can try to use it to understand better the relationship between type 
(I) steady-state and type (II) steady-state. In particular, we want to know whether, for a given set 
of exogenous parameter values, both types of steady-state can exist in the model, or whether only 
one type of steady-state will exist for a particular set of parameter values.  
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Diagram 28: Drawing equation ̂  as a function of  
 
From Diagram 28, we can see that the relationship between ̂∗ and  ∗ is increasing and concave, 
which passes through the original case. It is indeed common for both steady-states. Thus, whether 







Diagram 29: The location of type (II) steady-state 
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Type (II) steady-state can be easily located on Diagram 29. To locate the type (I) steady-state on 








So, by knowing  , we can identify that ∗ is associated with the type (I) steady-state. This shows 
that the higher in , the lower in ∗ (since < 1). Given , this, therefore, locates a point on 
the curve which corresponds to a type (I) steady-state. 
Now, we try to know whether the type (I) steady-state lies to the left or the right of the type (II) 
steady-state. Since we must have ̂∗ < 1/  (this is necessary to be consistent with / > 0), it 
then follows that type (I) steady-state must be to the left (below) the type (II) steady-state, as shown 
in Diagram 30 below: 
 
Diagram 30: The location of both type (I) and (II) steady-states 
 
In the diagram, we cannot have ̂∗ > 1/  , so we cannot have the type (I) steady-state, which is 
the right (above) the type (II) steady-state because it will violate its condition, as shown in system 
(I). However, if the type (I) steady-state exists for the same set of parameter values, it will be the 
left of type (II) steady-state because that implies ̂∗ < 1/ . Thus, if it is possible to have two 
types of steady-states for the same set of parameter values, they must be ordered this way around 
as in Diagram 30, where they could not be the other way around. Therefore, for the type (I) steady-
state to lie to the left of the type (II) steady-state,  is indeed what determines this position. 
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Meaning that higher  is more to the left will be the position of this steady-state, and higher  is 
more down. In brief, for both types of steady-states to be that way around, as shown in Diagram 
30, certain conditions will need to hold about , , and other parameters.  
It is now clear that for the type (I) steady-state to lie to the left of the type (II) steady-state,  must 
be 'sufficiently high' and  must be 'sufficiently low'. On the other hand, if the opposite is true, 
when  is 'sufficiently low' and  is 'sufficiently high', then they will be the other way around, 
where the type (I) steady-state lies to the right of the type (II) steady-state, as shown in Diagram 
31 125 below. 
 
Diagram 31: The reverse location of both type (I) and (II) steady-states 
 
However, we now have a contradiction because there is another condition linked to these underline 
parameter values, and that is for type (II) steady-state to exist, we need > . This condition is 
violated if this is a way around, as shown in Diagram 31126. 
We have just found that, for a type (I) steady-state to exist for the same set of parameter values as 
a type (II) steady-state, we need  to be 'sufficiently high' and  to be 'sufficiently low'. However, 
we also know from our previous discussion that a type (II) steady-state to exist, we need > . 
This latter condition ensures that oil revenues, , grows slower than consumption, , and 
government spending, , so that / → 0 as → ∞, i.e. oil revenues become insignificant. This 
means we need  to be 'sufficiently low' not 'sufficiently high'. In fact, the condition  >  is 
the exact opposite of the requirement that the type (I) steady-state should lie to the left of the type 
 
125 Although the situation shown in the Diagram 31 is not possible to happen in this case because it is violated the condition of 
/  being negative, we just draw this diagram to show the opposite situation of type (I) and type (II) steady-state. 
 
  
126 The two conditions are: /  cannot be negative and > . These two conditions completely conflict with each other, where 
if one holds, then the other cannot hold and vice versa. 
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(II) steady-state on the diagram. To see this, note that in a type (II) steady-state, the growth rate, 
, is decreasing in ∗ (see equations of system (III)) and hence high  requires that ∗ to be 
lower. 
In conclusion, since we have seen that there is an unavoidable contradiction between the two 
conditions for both type (I) and type (II) steady-states to exist for the same set of parameter values, 
we conclude that type (I) and type (II) steady-states cannot exist for the same set of parameter 
values. The corollary is that for a given set of parameter values, the steady-state will be either of 
type (I) or type (II), i.e. there will be a single type of steady-state. In more precise detail, 
- If   is sufficiently high (for a given value of ), then the steady-state will be of type (I), i.e. 
an exogenous growth steady-state. 
- If   is sufficiently low (for a given value of ), then the steady-state will be of type (II), i.e. 
an endogenous growth steady-state. 
The critical value of , for these purposes, is whatever the endogenous growth rate associated 
with a particular value of , in the pure consumption tax version of the model. (In general, a 
simple algebraic expression for this critical value of  cannot be written down: it whatever makes 




B.3 Possible Parameter Values 
Looking at equation (5.32), we can see that ∗depends on a set of parameters. Thus, we try in this 
section to show what happens not just as  changes but also as other parameters change by using 
numerical exercise. To do that, we vary each parameter separately and keep the others constant. 
From the previous calculation, we found that if  1 > ≥ 0.67, then that insures ∗ > 1. Thus, we 
consider now two values of  (i.e. the large value, = 0.99, and the small value, = 0.67). We 
do that because we want to understand what happens as all parameters change if we set  with 
these ranges of values. 
We start finding the possible values of  and keep other parameter values constant by setting  
= 0.99 and = 0.67, in order to guarantee that ∗ > 1. Then, we use the possible values of 
, which we got, to determine the possible values of , when also = 0.99 and = 0.67. After 
that, we employ both values of  and  to find the possible values of  for the same set of  
values. We then carry on using the same method to determine the possible values of all other 
parameters. 
B.3.1 Possible values of : 
 
 




To ensure that ∗ > 1, then  should be 0.55 < ≤ 1. 
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To ensure that ∗ > 1, then  should be < 0.005. 
B.3.3 Possible values of : 
 
 




To ensure that ∗ > 1, then  should be ≥ 0.5. 
B.3.4 Possible values of  : 
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B.3.5 Possible values of : 
 
 
To ensure that ∗ > 1, then  should be 0.9 < ≤ 1.015. 
 
 
To ensure that ∗ > 1, then  should be ≤ 1. 
The table below summarises the possible values of , , , , and  parameters in ∗ which ensure 
∗ > 1. 
 
Table 23: The possible values of all parameters in ∗ which insure ∗ > 1 
 
Parameters  Possible Range of Values    = .     = .  
 1 ≤ < 1.25 0.55 < ≤ 1 
 < 0.015 < 0.005 
 ≥ 0.5 ≥ 0.5 
 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 
 0.90 < ≤ 1.015 ≤ 1 
 
Although we have shown all parameters in ∗ which insure ∗ > 1, it would also be possible to 
have ∗ < 1 if the values of the above parameters are different from the mentioned ranges. 
Therefore, both scenarios are possible to happen, depending on the parameters' values. To see now 
whether ∗ > 1 or ∗ < 1 is more likely, we compare between the two possible scenarios. Let us 
just look at the possible values when  is large, = 0.99. According to our calculations, it seems 
that ∗ < 1 would be more likely to occur for some reasons. The first reason is that  needs to 
be ∈ [1, 1.25) to guarantee that ∗ > 1. However, if ≥ 1.25 that means ∗ < 1. Thus, the 
possible range of  values to ensure ∗ < 1 is greater than the ones that satisfy ∗ > 1. The 
second reason is that ∗ > 1 requires the  to be close to zero, but for ∗ < 1 to occur, it should 
be > 0.015. Again, it is clear that the possible range of  values to ensure ∗ < 1 is greater than 
the ones that satisfy ∗ > 1. Another reason is that the range value for  to guarantee ∗ > 1 
should be 0.90 < ≤ 1.015, which implies very limited range values compared to ∗ < 1. As a 
result, ∗ < 1 seems likely to occur because it allows for the most parameters values taking a 
broad range of values more than ∗ > 1. 
  
  0.99  ,   0.009  ,   1.24  ,   0.5  ,   1  ,  GIf A then       
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B.4 The Proof of Equation (5.33) Is Unstable 
The single first-order different equation in the case of pure consumption tax is,  
 
From equation (5.33), we can see that although we cannot write  as an explicit function of , 
we can simplify the equation somewhat if we assume = 1. In that case, we can rewrite it as: 
 
 
To make the consideration of stability even more accessible, let us assume for the moment that 
= 1, then 
 
 
In fact, we can replace  by , using the production function, thus 
 
 
Given that 0 < < 1, so that (1/ ) > 1. It is now clear that this first-order, linear, difference 






Diagram 32: Drawing the equation  
 
The 'phase line' has a slope greater than one and a negative intercept. As a result, we can conclude 
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We know that  is negative because of ( − 1), but it is still unclear if its value is greater or less 
than one. Knowing that would help us to determine the necessary and sufficient condition for 
stability in our model. 
In the above  ratio, the numerator contains ∗ , and as ∗ → 0, then ∗ → ∞. Also, we 




which can also be written as, 
 
 




Assuming now that = 1 and ≥ 1, and using the fact explained in the system (I) in Appendix 
B.2 that ̂ < 1, we can ensure that the numerator is negative and less than one, while the 
denominator is positive and either greater than (or equal to) one. As a result, we can conclude that 
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B.6 The Comparison Between (5.19)’ and (5.43)’ 
The purpose of this algebraic calculation is to compare between (5.19)' and the differentiation of 
(5.43) w.r.t. consumption tax in order to see which is larger. This would help us determine whether 
the (D) locus in the phase diagram shifts downwards by more or less than the steady-state shifts.  
Rewriting (5.19)' and (5.43)', 
 
From (5.19)', we know that  ∗ = ∗ + (1 − − ) ∗  and  ̂∗ = ∗/(1 + ) . Then,      
∗ = (1 + ) ̂∗. Thus, (5.19)’ can be now written as: 
 
On the other hand, using the government budget constraint, = + , the definition of 
capital PGSU, ≡ / , and consumption PGSU, ̂ ≡ / , allow us to rewrite equation 
(5.43)' as: 
 
Now, we can compare between (5.19)" and (5.43)", where increasing  seems to have more 
impact on (5.43)'' compared to (5.19)''. Therefore, the (D) locus should shifts downwards by more 
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C. Appendix to Chapter 6 
C.1 Barro Endogenous Growth Model in Discrete-Time 
In Barro (1990) paper, 'Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth', he 
developed the variation of the Ramsey model by introducing productive government spending in 
an endogenous growth model. In his model (discrete-time version), where the PGSU variables are 
absent, and the utility function is given by ( ) =  , the government uses the tax revenue to 
finance its spending; thus, the government budget constraint is 
 
 
The government provides public goods to the firms to enhance their production function, 
 
The firms' rental rate of capital is, 
 
By substituting the later rental rate of capital, i.e. (C), into the government budget constraint, i.e. 
(A), and solving for , we get: 
 
Then, substituting back the last expression for  , i.e. (D), into the rental rate of capital, i.e. (C), 
we obtain: 
 
Finally, the growth rate formula in the Barro (1990) model in discrete-time is, 
 
 
which is slightly different from ours in , as shown in equation (6.22). The tax rate that maximises 
the economic growth rate, 
 
( )  also varies somewhat from ours shown in (6.22)' because of the use of different utility 
function, i.e. above is used log utility function, while we use in our model a CRRA utility function 
with > 0. 
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C.2 A Simple Numerical Exercise to Show How the Personal Income Tax 
Affects the Level of Government Spending Relative to Oil Revenues, 
'Laffer Curve' 
According to the formula in (6.24)', we can show a similar result to the 'Laffer curve'. We use the 
same set of parameters values as before. Then, we start setting the personal income tax rate at 0% 
and then increases it by 5% to find out how the level of government spending relative to oil 
revenues responds on impact. 
 
Figure 43: How the personal income tax affects the level of government spending relative to  
 
As discussed in section 6.5.2.1, when personal income tax is low, the level of government spending 
relative to oil revenues increases, and vice versa. According to our model and parameters values 
used, our simple numerical exercise shows in the above figure that the maximum value of personal 
income tax is = 67%. That means that if  < 67%  ( > 67%), then the level of government 




















C.3 The Detailed Procedure for Analysing the Stability of Type (I) Steady-
State 




Differentiation of the capital accumulation equation w.r.t. , , and ̂ , and evaluate them in 
the steady-state and then simplify them give us the first-order Taylor approximation of the capital 
accumulation equation around the steady-state, 
 
On the other hand, the Euler equation can be written as, 
 
 
Similarly, differentiation the Euler equation w.r.t. , , and ̂ , and evaluate them in the steady-
state and then simplify them give us the first-order Taylor approximation of the Euler equation 
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By substituting the approximation of the capital accumulation equation, equation (6.28), into the 
approximation of the Euler equation, equation (6.29), we obtain: 
 
The linearised capital accumulation equation (6.28) and Euler equation (6.29)' can also be now 
expressed in matrix form as: 
 
 
The determinant (Det) and the trace (Tr) of matrix A are the following: 
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The eigenvalues of the matrix are the solutions to the characteristic equation, 
 
The necessary and sufficient condition for this system is: 
 
Since Υ < 0, then the numerator is negative and less than the positive denominator. 
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C.4 Evaluating of , , , , , and   
Starting with the capital accumulation equation, , which is implicitly determined by, 
 
 
we totally differentiate it: 
 
 
We know that = ⏟ , ⏟̂ , . Thus, we evaluate , ,  in the steady-state 127: 
 
 
127 At the steady-state, we know that  = = ∗,   ∗ = (1 − ) + (1 − ) ∗ − ̂∗   and  
= (1 − ) + 1 − . 
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On the other hand, we totally differentiate equation (6.32) to find ℎ , ℎ , ℎ . Then, we evaluate 
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C.5 How  Would Jump on Impact Period? 
 
The definition of the capital PGSU can be written as, 
 
 
where  is implicitly determined by: 
 
From (B), we apply the implicit differentiation method to get / : 
 
 
To determine the sign of / , we first multiply the numerator and denominator of equation 
(C) by ( + ) : 
 
 
Then, when substituting out ( + )   as  / ( + ) by using (B) and simplifying 
it, we obtain, 
 
 
By using the product rule, we obtain: 
 
 
Now, we use the expression of  in equation (A) to get its derivative w.r.t.  (i.e. / ). 
However, we should note that   also depends on  as shown in the implicit function. Thus, when 
we take the derivative of the expression of  , we need to take the derivative of the product (  ). 
Then,  




   
1




αY Y α Y
t t t
α AK YdY C




ˆ                                                     ( )t tt Y
t t t
K Kk A






                                 ( )

   
Y Y
t Y Yt t
t tY Y Y Y
C
d τ Y dY dYdτ Y τ Y τ D
dτ dτ dτ dτ
   










t t t tt
αY α Y Y
t t t
α AK Y π τ YdY
dτ α AK τ π τ Y










By using the government budget constraint, = + , the definition of capital PGSU,     
= , the production function,  = , and the fact that  = 1 − = 1 − ,  
we can rewrite (E) after simplifying it as: 
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C.6 Why the Growth Rate of Government Spending Drops on Impact in the 
Case of Rising the Personal Income Tax 
This section discusses the reason behind the low growth rate at the moment of impact period of 
rising personal income tax. When we set  to be high (e.g. = 1.1), the initial downwards jump 
in  falls by less than the steady-state value on the impact period. Thus, to see the impact on the 




which has two correct formulas that can describe it on the transition path to a type (I) steady-state. 
However, the growth rate at the moment of the shock is not correctly represented by these 
formulas. To see that, let us begin with the formula (A). 
Formula (A) came from the government budget constraint, = + , and we know that  
grows at the constant rate, , which is here = 1.1. Now, suppose that the impact period in 
which the tax rate increased is t=2. Then, 
 
 
This is true because, by assumption, there is no tax in period one, t=1. Therefore, by this reasoning, 
the growth rate of government spending in the impact period should be greater than  (i.e. not 
less than ). However, it should be emphasised that formula (A) does not tell us anything about 
the time path because it is only about the impact period. As a result, the growth rate of government 
spending should increase in the impact period. 
On the other hand, formula (B) is consistent with our simulation, shown in Figure 41. In fact, the 
consistency could not be obvious until we look at the transition path for . In the simulation,  
(and hence ) is falling over time. This implies that > , and then: 
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Thus, formula (B) tells us that the growth rate of government spending should decrease in the 





Diagram 33: The time path of the growth rate of government spending, using formula (B) 
 
Now, we are facing a mystery regarding the effect on the growth rate of government spending at 
the moment of the impact period. Thus, we need to understand carefully the above two formulas, 
(A) and (B), in the impact period. 
It should be noted that the definition of  , given in formula (B)’, is forward-looking. It means 
that  measures the growth rate of government spending between period (t) and period (t+1), i.e. 
not between period (t-1) and period (t). Therefore, the first instance of  to deviate from , 
given that the tax rate increases in t=2, is not , but . The reason can be seen in formula (A)’, 
i.e. ≡ / = [( + )/ ] > . As a result, the graph of the time path for government 










However, it was difficult to make Dynare correctly produce the growth rate of government 
spending in the impact period, like Diagram 34, because it showed that there is a missing data 
point in our simulation. The reason for the missing data point is due to that we used formula (B), 
which could not show the start of the time path because it assumes perfect foresight. Thus, there 
is in the impact period a one-period departure from perfect foresight, which could be recognised 
as the missing data point. To solve this issue, we calculated the growth rate of government 
spending in the impact period by using formula (A), and then used the value obtained, with the 
remaining values for the growth rate generated by Dynare128, to plot the below graph for the growth 




























AD Aggregate Demand 
ARDL Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
B-K Blanchard and Kahn 
BOT Balance of Trade 
BP The British Petroleum Company 
BPD Barrels Per Day 
BPY Barrels Per Year  
CA Current Account 
CEMAC The Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CRRA Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
CRS Constant Returns to Scale 
DE Direct Effect 
Det The determinant of a Matrix 
DRS Decreasing Returns to Scale 
DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GAZT The General Authority of Zakat & Tax  
GCC The Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
IE Indirect Effect 
IES Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 
IMF The International Monetary Fund 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IRS Increasing Returns to Scale 
LHS Left-Hand Side 
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Mbbl One Thousand Barrels 
MC Marginal Cost 
MMbbl One Million Barrels 
MR Marginal Revenue 
NFA Net Foreign Assets 
NIE Net Indirect Effect 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
OPEC The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PGSU Per Government Spending Unit 
PIF The Public Investment Fund 
R&D Research and Development  
RHS Right-Hand Side 
ROW Rest of the World  
SAMA The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
SWF Sovereign Wealth Fund 
TC Total Cost 
TFP Total Factor Productivity  
TR Total Revenue 
Tr Trace of a Matrix  
VAR Vector Auto Regression 
VAT Value-Added Tax 
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